转型期土地违法行为—演变特征、诱发机理与化解机制研究
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摘要
土地违法行为是我国社会转型期失范现象之一。近十年(2001-2010)来,随着国民经济的快速发展和我国城市化建设步伐不断加快,对土地的需求量也随之不断增加。而土地作为一种稀缺并且供给有限的生产资料,面对日渐增长的需求,供需矛盾逐渐严峻。在经济利益和各级政府盲目追求GDP的驱动下,土地不规范利用甚至违法违规行为层出不穷。土地违法案件之多、涉及耕地面积之大引起国家的极大重视。鉴于此,本文以转型期土地违法行为为研究对象,抓住演变特征、诱发机理与化解机制三个重点,试图找到解决我国转型期土地违法问题的路径。
本文运用定性分析和定量分析相结合的方法,构建土地违法行为诱发机理的理论分析框架,拟定一个包括体制因素、经济因素、社会因素和法律因素为一体的土地违法行为诱发因子体系,并运用相关社会经济统计数据进行实证检验,在此基础上,提出较为全面的化解转型期土地违法行为的对策和建议。主要研究内容和结论如下：
基于土地利用行为特征,借鉴犯罪学研究范式以及默顿社会失范理论,本文构建了我国转型期土地违法行为(也可称为“土地利用行为失范”)解析模式。其基本的理论内涵是：我国转型期土地违法行为,重要原因是我国转型期内社会结构组成(价值观、社会规范)无法有效缓解的矛盾及这种矛盾在社会个体生活中的投射。此解析方法更侧重于探索土地违法案件产生的社会结构性原因,集中解析在社会转型期由社会结构层面调整而引起的土地违法行为的价值及规范两个关键性的因素(宏观视角),以及两个关键因素在个体社会活动层面的投射。这种投射作用是决定个体行为失范的重要因素(微观视角)。(1)从宏观角度,核心变量包括：因变量(土地违法案件)；中间变量(矛盾、化解)；自变量(道德观念、社会结构、法规内容)。本命题从宏观视角描述为：在社会转型期,土地违法行为主要由于价值观念的改变、社会分层结构的失衡与断裂而产生的社会紧张。而且缺乏有效的法律法规化解社会紧张。详细地说,经济发展快速出现的复杂利益相关社会阶层、劳动者的地位与劳动报酬的相悖、基尼系数的不断拉大,这些原因促进了对社会不满情绪的传播蔓延。而我国正处于社会转型期,相关土地法律制度还存在不健全、不完善的地方。缺乏规范完善的土地制度保障,就无法保证土地利用过程中利益分化的有序与公正,进而放纵土地管理阶层腐败,社会紧张迟迟得不到化解,量变的堆积产生质变,社会紧张最终以土地违法的形式释放。(2)从微观上,核心变量包括：因变量(已知的违法案件)：中间变量(社会矛盾产生与化解)；自变量(个人目标、社会现实、实现方法、违法成本)。因变量土地违法行为,是指社会个体由于社会其他影响或行为投射而产生的共生性与共时性违法行为。中间变量矛盾的产生是由于社会关系结构的不平衡发展而堆积于社会个体的能量,通过自变量的个体目标与社会现实体现。其中的目标,是行为个体对社会生产生活资料的追求,通过个体目标期望值体现;其中的现实,是行为个体对所追求生产生活资料的实际占有控制情况,通过现实满意度体现。中间变量矛盾化解是社会堆积矛盾的合法性化解,通过自变量合法方发展使得人们的价值观扭曲,过度追求物质利益观念而忽略社会主义价值观、过度追求个人利益而忽略公共利益或者集体利益、社会传统道德观念的丢失与变化冲突,以及社会中合法与违法成本表述。人们通过社会法律制度所规定允许的渠道或方法获得土地资源是自变量合法方法,由合法方法难易度表述；而个体通过非法方式获得生活资料的付出则是自变量违法成本,通过社会认知、刑法认知、司法效能评价表述。
目前,我国正处于工业化城镇化快速发展期和经济社会转型期,这个时期各种社会形势急剧变化,人地矛盾突出,土地资源越来越无法满足工业化城镇化以及经济发展的需求,加之人们正确的价值观念尚未形成,追求经济利益的主导价值思潮仍然普遍为人们所接收。因此,为了暂时的眼前利益,一些企业甚至是地方政府不顾法律约束,违法占用土地,形成了大量的违法用地。从国外经济发达国家的发展历程来看,在他们工业化城镇化的过程中,土地违法数量也呈增长趋势,随着经济发展水平的逐步提高以及法制的逐步完善,土地违法数量呈下降趋势,并最终维持在较低的水平。因此,我们国家目前的土地违法行为的高发态势是与特定经济社会发展时期相适应的,是与我们国家的社会转型期相适应的。
为此,应该从“倡导土地伦理观,树立正确的土地利用价值观”、“完善相关法律制度及体制机制,规范土地利用行为”两个方面构建起化解转型期土地违法行为的机制。具体而言：首先,树立生态、道德的土地利用意识和构建道德的人地关系；其次,通过土地法律制度完善、土地执法管理体制改革和土地执法工作机制创新三个方面完善土地法律制度。
在此基础上,论文以G省为例,通过驱动因素的选择、驱动模型的构建、数据搜集、计量估计等步骤,从定量的角度,筛选出了土地违法行为的驱动因素,计量估计结果显示：(1)土地违法行为与价值观指数呈负相关关系,且通过10%的显著性检验,这说明价值观越是明晰、积极向上,人们有可能采取土地违法行为的概率越小,即正确的价值观对抑制土地违法行为具有积极的作用。这也从相反的侧面验证了,在社会转型期,人们价值观越来越物质化,迷乱彷徨,土地违法行为相应增加。土地违法行为与规范(制度)指数呈负相关关系,且通过10%的显著性检验,这说明,土地法律责任越完备,威慑力度越大,人们则不敢也无法采取土地违法行为,即完备的土地法律责任有助于抑制土地违法行为。这也告诉我们,在社会转型期,面对日益复杂多变的社会环境,我们要适时调整、修改、完善相关法律制度,从而形成对土地违法行为的持续的高压态势。(2)“文化程度、单位负责人、土地法律责任的威慑力度、对物质生活的评价、土地违法对事业的作用”这五个变量通过显著性检验,即这五个变量对土地违法行为的影响较为显著,而且在这五个显著变量中,“土地法律责任的威慑力度”与土地违法行为呈负相关关系,即法律对土地违法的惩处力度越大,人们通过违法的成本—收益比较分析后,觉得“违法是一件不合算的事情”,也就不会采取土地违法行为。
Violation of land law is one of the anomie phenomenon during Chinese transitional period. With the rapid development of economy and urbanization construction nearly a decade to2001-2010, the demand of land is increasing. Land is the limited production resources while in the face of growing demand, so the contradiction between supply and demand is gradually serious. In the economic interests and government entities at all levels around the blind pursuit of GDP, driven by unregulated land use and even violation behavior emerge in endlessly. It is the land illegal cases and abusing arable land that cause the country's great attention. In view of this, this paper researches on the land illegal behavior in transitional period, it seizes the evolution characteristics, inducing mechanism and resolving mechanism, and it tries to find the measures to solve the problem of our country land illegal during the transitional period.
This paper uses the method of combining the qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis to build theoretical framework for the mechanism of induced land illegal behaviors, to formulate a system of land illegal behaviors induced factors including system factors, economic factors, social factors and legal factors as a whole, then using the related social economic statistical data for empirical testing. On the basis of these researches, it puts forword comprehensive dissolve of countermeasure and the suggestion for illegal land behaviors during transitional period. The main research contents and conclusions are as follows:
Based on land use behavior characteristics, using criminology research paradigm and merton social anomie theory, this paper constructs the analytical model of land illegal in Chinese transitional period(also known as the "land use behavior anomie"). Its theoretical connotation:land illegal in Chinese transitional time mainly due to the rapid social transition period social structure (value, specification), unable to ease the contradiction and its projection in individual life. This pattern tends to explore the land illegal social structural causes, and analyzes the value and specification of land illegal behaviors caused by social structural adjustment in transitional period(macro view), and the two key factors in individual social activity level projection. This projection is an important factor to determine individual behavior anomie (micro perspective).(1)At the macro perspective, the core of this thesis variables include:the dependent variable land illegal behavior; Intermediate variable tension, dissolution;Independent variable values, social class, legal norms. This thesis from the macroscopic perspective described as:land illegal behavior mainly due to changes in values, social stratification structure imbalance and fracture, resulting in social tensions in the period of social transition. It is lack of effective laws and regulations to resolve social tensions. The rapid development of economy makes people's values distorted, excessive pursuit of material interest and ignoring the socialist values, excessive pursuit of personal interests and ignoring the public interests and collective interests, traditional moral concept conflict between loss and change. As well as some factors promote the spread of discontent such as the complicated interests of the class structure, deviating from the professional status and social reward, the widening gap between rich and poor and the gini coefficient. And our country is in the period of social transition, the relevant land legal system is not perfect. Lack of the good system of land security can not ensure the land use in the process of interest differentiation in order and justice, which lead in corruption and indulgence of land management, social tensions slow to resolve, so social tensions in the form of illegal land eventually released.(2)The core of the micro level, this thesis variables include:intermediate variable tension, dissoluton; independent variable target, reality, legal method, the illegal cost. Dependent variable land illegal act refers to the individual symbiotic and synchronic illegal behaviors are formed by social factors and general projection. Intermediate variable strain accumulation is due to the imbalance of social stratification structure in the individual energy, through the independent variable of the target and reality. Independent variable target, it is the individual pursuit of social production and living materials, through the target reflected expectations; The independent variable reality is individual to pursue the actual situation of the social production and living materials possess, through the real satisfaction. Dissolution of intermediate variable is the legitimacy of social tension, through the independent legal method and the cost of illegal. Independent legal method is that people obtain land resource method within social legal; and individual life information has been obtained through illegal ways is the independent variable illegal cost, through the social cognition, the cognition of criminal law, the judicial efficiency evaluation.
At present, our country is in rapid development of the industrialization and urbanization and the social transition, various social situation changed dramatically in this period. In which the prominent contradiction between human and land, land resource is increasingly unable to meet the needs of industrialization urbanization and economic development, and the correct concept of value has not been formed, pursuit of economic interests of the dominant value trend is still generally received by people. Therefore, in order to obtain the immediate interests, some companies even regardless of the law, local government illegal occupation of land, which cause a large number of illegal use of land. From the point of the development of foreign economic developed countries, in the course of their industrialization urbanization, the land illegal number also on the rise. With the gradual improvement of the level of economic development and legal system gradually perfect, the land illegal number is on the decline, and ultimately to lower levels. Therefore, our country high incidence trend of current land illegal behavior is adapted to specific economic and social development period, that is suit to the social transition of our country.
Therefore, we should be from two aspects to build up the dissolve transition of illegal land mechanism, such as"advocate the land ethics, set up the correct valuesof land use","perfect relevant legal system and the system mechanism, the standard of land use behavior". Specifically:first of all, seting up the ecological and moral consciousness of land use and building the moral man land relationship; secondly, we can improve the system of land law from three aspects:the land law system perfect, the reform of management system and innovation of land law enforcement mechanism.
On this basis, the paper takes G province for example, it selects the land illegal driving factors from the perspective of quantitative through the choice of driving factors, driver model building, data collection, and estimate measurement steps. Measurement estimation results show that:(1) Land illegal behaviors and values index showed a negative correlation relationship, and through the test of significance of10%, which showed that the values of the more clear, positive and uplifting. Then people could take the smaller the probability of illegal land, namely the right values to curb illegal land has a positive role. This also from the opposite side verified, in the period of social transition, people more and more materialistic values, land illegal behavior is increasing. Land illegal behavior and specification (system) index showed a negative correlation, And through the test of significance of10%, this shows that land legal responsibility, the more complete, deterrence, the more people who are also unable to take the land illegal behavior, namely complete land legal responsibility helps to curb illegal behavior. It also tells us that in the period of social transition, in the face of increasingly complex and changeable social environment, we need to adjust, modify and perfect relevant legal system, thus forming the land illegal behavior of continuous high pressure situation.(2)"Cultural degree, unit leaders, land the deterrent strength of legal responsibility, and evaluation of material life, the land illegal to cause the role" the five variables by significance test, which means that the five variables have significant influence on land illegal behavior; and in the five significant variables,"land law responsibility deterrent force" are negatively related with illegal land. Namely the severe penalties for illegal land, the people through the illegal cost-benefit comparison analysis, realize that "illegal is something not worth", also they will not take the land illegal behavior.
本文运用定性分析和定量分析相结合的方法,构建土地违法行为诱发机理的理论分析框架,拟定一个包括体制因素、经济因素、社会因素和法律因素为一体的土地违法行为诱发因子体系,并运用相关社会经济统计数据进行实证检验,在此基础上,提出较为全面的化解转型期土地违法行为的对策和建议。主要研究内容和结论如下：
基于土地利用行为特征,借鉴犯罪学研究范式以及默顿社会失范理论,本文构建了我国转型期土地违法行为(也可称为“土地利用行为失范”)解析模式。其基本的理论内涵是：我国转型期土地违法行为,重要原因是我国转型期内社会结构组成(价值观、社会规范)无法有效缓解的矛盾及这种矛盾在社会个体生活中的投射。此解析方法更侧重于探索土地违法案件产生的社会结构性原因,集中解析在社会转型期由社会结构层面调整而引起的土地违法行为的价值及规范两个关键性的因素(宏观视角),以及两个关键因素在个体社会活动层面的投射。这种投射作用是决定个体行为失范的重要因素(微观视角)。(1)从宏观角度,核心变量包括：因变量(土地违法案件)；中间变量(矛盾、化解)；自变量(道德观念、社会结构、法规内容)。本命题从宏观视角描述为：在社会转型期,土地违法行为主要由于价值观念的改变、社会分层结构的失衡与断裂而产生的社会紧张。而且缺乏有效的法律法规化解社会紧张。详细地说,经济发展快速出现的复杂利益相关社会阶层、劳动者的地位与劳动报酬的相悖、基尼系数的不断拉大,这些原因促进了对社会不满情绪的传播蔓延。而我国正处于社会转型期,相关土地法律制度还存在不健全、不完善的地方。缺乏规范完善的土地制度保障,就无法保证土地利用过程中利益分化的有序与公正,进而放纵土地管理阶层腐败,社会紧张迟迟得不到化解,量变的堆积产生质变,社会紧张最终以土地违法的形式释放。(2)从微观上,核心变量包括：因变量(已知的违法案件)：中间变量(社会矛盾产生与化解)；自变量(个人目标、社会现实、实现方法、违法成本)。因变量土地违法行为,是指社会个体由于社会其他影响或行为投射而产生的共生性与共时性违法行为。中间变量矛盾的产生是由于社会关系结构的不平衡发展而堆积于社会个体的能量,通过自变量的个体目标与社会现实体现。其中的目标,是行为个体对社会生产生活资料的追求,通过个体目标期望值体现;其中的现实,是行为个体对所追求生产生活资料的实际占有控制情况,通过现实满意度体现。中间变量矛盾化解是社会堆积矛盾的合法性化解,通过自变量合法方发展使得人们的价值观扭曲,过度追求物质利益观念而忽略社会主义价值观、过度追求个人利益而忽略公共利益或者集体利益、社会传统道德观念的丢失与变化冲突,以及社会中合法与违法成本表述。人们通过社会法律制度所规定允许的渠道或方法获得土地资源是自变量合法方法,由合法方法难易度表述；而个体通过非法方式获得生活资料的付出则是自变量违法成本,通过社会认知、刑法认知、司法效能评价表述。
目前,我国正处于工业化城镇化快速发展期和经济社会转型期,这个时期各种社会形势急剧变化,人地矛盾突出,土地资源越来越无法满足工业化城镇化以及经济发展的需求,加之人们正确的价值观念尚未形成,追求经济利益的主导价值思潮仍然普遍为人们所接收。因此,为了暂时的眼前利益,一些企业甚至是地方政府不顾法律约束,违法占用土地,形成了大量的违法用地。从国外经济发达国家的发展历程来看,在他们工业化城镇化的过程中,土地违法数量也呈增长趋势,随着经济发展水平的逐步提高以及法制的逐步完善,土地违法数量呈下降趋势,并最终维持在较低的水平。因此,我们国家目前的土地违法行为的高发态势是与特定经济社会发展时期相适应的,是与我们国家的社会转型期相适应的。
为此,应该从“倡导土地伦理观,树立正确的土地利用价值观”、“完善相关法律制度及体制机制,规范土地利用行为”两个方面构建起化解转型期土地违法行为的机制。具体而言：首先,树立生态、道德的土地利用意识和构建道德的人地关系；其次,通过土地法律制度完善、土地执法管理体制改革和土地执法工作机制创新三个方面完善土地法律制度。
在此基础上,论文以G省为例,通过驱动因素的选择、驱动模型的构建、数据搜集、计量估计等步骤,从定量的角度,筛选出了土地违法行为的驱动因素,计量估计结果显示：(1)土地违法行为与价值观指数呈负相关关系,且通过10%的显著性检验,这说明价值观越是明晰、积极向上,人们有可能采取土地违法行为的概率越小,即正确的价值观对抑制土地违法行为具有积极的作用。这也从相反的侧面验证了,在社会转型期,人们价值观越来越物质化,迷乱彷徨,土地违法行为相应增加。土地违法行为与规范(制度)指数呈负相关关系,且通过10%的显著性检验,这说明,土地法律责任越完备,威慑力度越大,人们则不敢也无法采取土地违法行为,即完备的土地法律责任有助于抑制土地违法行为。这也告诉我们,在社会转型期,面对日益复杂多变的社会环境,我们要适时调整、修改、完善相关法律制度,从而形成对土地违法行为的持续的高压态势。(2)“文化程度、单位负责人、土地法律责任的威慑力度、对物质生活的评价、土地违法对事业的作用”这五个变量通过显著性检验,即这五个变量对土地违法行为的影响较为显著,而且在这五个显著变量中,“土地法律责任的威慑力度”与土地违法行为呈负相关关系,即法律对土地违法的惩处力度越大,人们通过违法的成本—收益比较分析后,觉得“违法是一件不合算的事情”,也就不会采取土地违法行为。
Violation of land law is one of the anomie phenomenon during Chinese transitional period. With the rapid development of economy and urbanization construction nearly a decade to2001-2010, the demand of land is increasing. Land is the limited production resources while in the face of growing demand, so the contradiction between supply and demand is gradually serious. In the economic interests and government entities at all levels around the blind pursuit of GDP, driven by unregulated land use and even violation behavior emerge in endlessly. It is the land illegal cases and abusing arable land that cause the country's great attention. In view of this, this paper researches on the land illegal behavior in transitional period, it seizes the evolution characteristics, inducing mechanism and resolving mechanism, and it tries to find the measures to solve the problem of our country land illegal during the transitional period.
This paper uses the method of combining the qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis to build theoretical framework for the mechanism of induced land illegal behaviors, to formulate a system of land illegal behaviors induced factors including system factors, economic factors, social factors and legal factors as a whole, then using the related social economic statistical data for empirical testing. On the basis of these researches, it puts forword comprehensive dissolve of countermeasure and the suggestion for illegal land behaviors during transitional period. The main research contents and conclusions are as follows:
Based on land use behavior characteristics, using criminology research paradigm and merton social anomie theory, this paper constructs the analytical model of land illegal in Chinese transitional period(also known as the "land use behavior anomie"). Its theoretical connotation:land illegal in Chinese transitional time mainly due to the rapid social transition period social structure (value, specification), unable to ease the contradiction and its projection in individual life. This pattern tends to explore the land illegal social structural causes, and analyzes the value and specification of land illegal behaviors caused by social structural adjustment in transitional period(macro view), and the two key factors in individual social activity level projection. This projection is an important factor to determine individual behavior anomie (micro perspective).(1)At the macro perspective, the core of this thesis variables include:the dependent variable land illegal behavior; Intermediate variable tension, dissolution;Independent variable values, social class, legal norms. This thesis from the macroscopic perspective described as:land illegal behavior mainly due to changes in values, social stratification structure imbalance and fracture, resulting in social tensions in the period of social transition. It is lack of effective laws and regulations to resolve social tensions. The rapid development of economy makes people's values distorted, excessive pursuit of material interest and ignoring the socialist values, excessive pursuit of personal interests and ignoring the public interests and collective interests, traditional moral concept conflict between loss and change. As well as some factors promote the spread of discontent such as the complicated interests of the class structure, deviating from the professional status and social reward, the widening gap between rich and poor and the gini coefficient. And our country is in the period of social transition, the relevant land legal system is not perfect. Lack of the good system of land security can not ensure the land use in the process of interest differentiation in order and justice, which lead in corruption and indulgence of land management, social tensions slow to resolve, so social tensions in the form of illegal land eventually released.(2)The core of the micro level, this thesis variables include:intermediate variable tension, dissoluton; independent variable target, reality, legal method, the illegal cost. Dependent variable land illegal act refers to the individual symbiotic and synchronic illegal behaviors are formed by social factors and general projection. Intermediate variable strain accumulation is due to the imbalance of social stratification structure in the individual energy, through the independent variable of the target and reality. Independent variable target, it is the individual pursuit of social production and living materials, through the target reflected expectations; The independent variable reality is individual to pursue the actual situation of the social production and living materials possess, through the real satisfaction. Dissolution of intermediate variable is the legitimacy of social tension, through the independent legal method and the cost of illegal. Independent legal method is that people obtain land resource method within social legal; and individual life information has been obtained through illegal ways is the independent variable illegal cost, through the social cognition, the cognition of criminal law, the judicial efficiency evaluation.
At present, our country is in rapid development of the industrialization and urbanization and the social transition, various social situation changed dramatically in this period. In which the prominent contradiction between human and land, land resource is increasingly unable to meet the needs of industrialization urbanization and economic development, and the correct concept of value has not been formed, pursuit of economic interests of the dominant value trend is still generally received by people. Therefore, in order to obtain the immediate interests, some companies even regardless of the law, local government illegal occupation of land, which cause a large number of illegal use of land. From the point of the development of foreign economic developed countries, in the course of their industrialization urbanization, the land illegal number also on the rise. With the gradual improvement of the level of economic development and legal system gradually perfect, the land illegal number is on the decline, and ultimately to lower levels. Therefore, our country high incidence trend of current land illegal behavior is adapted to specific economic and social development period, that is suit to the social transition of our country.
Therefore, we should be from two aspects to build up the dissolve transition of illegal land mechanism, such as"advocate the land ethics, set up the correct valuesof land use","perfect relevant legal system and the system mechanism, the standard of land use behavior". Specifically:first of all, seting up the ecological and moral consciousness of land use and building the moral man land relationship; secondly, we can improve the system of land law from three aspects:the land law system perfect, the reform of management system and innovation of land law enforcement mechanism.
On this basis, the paper takes G province for example, it selects the land illegal driving factors from the perspective of quantitative through the choice of driving factors, driver model building, data collection, and estimate measurement steps. Measurement estimation results show that:(1) Land illegal behaviors and values index showed a negative correlation relationship, and through the test of significance of10%, which showed that the values of the more clear, positive and uplifting. Then people could take the smaller the probability of illegal land, namely the right values to curb illegal land has a positive role. This also from the opposite side verified, in the period of social transition, people more and more materialistic values, land illegal behavior is increasing. Land illegal behavior and specification (system) index showed a negative correlation, And through the test of significance of10%, this shows that land legal responsibility, the more complete, deterrence, the more people who are also unable to take the land illegal behavior, namely complete land legal responsibility helps to curb illegal behavior. It also tells us that in the period of social transition, in the face of increasingly complex and changeable social environment, we need to adjust, modify and perfect relevant legal system, thus forming the land illegal behavior of continuous high pressure situation.(2)"Cultural degree, unit leaders, land the deterrent strength of legal responsibility, and evaluation of material life, the land illegal to cause the role" the five variables by significance test, which means that the five variables have significant influence on land illegal behavior; and in the five significant variables,"land law responsibility deterrent force" are negatively related with illegal land. Namely the severe penalties for illegal land, the people through the illegal cost-benefit comparison analysis, realize that "illegal is something not worth", also they will not take the land illegal behavior.
引文
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