银行关联对民营企业融资约束的影响分析
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摘要
国有企业改革以来,民营经济在国民经济中所占比重逐渐增大,但民营企业可获得的信贷资源却十分有限。不仅小微企业,大中型民营企业也不同程度地反映出对外部资金的旺盛需求、对银行贷款的依赖和实际融资中的困难。这种困境很大程度上是由中国的金融体制安排造成的,中国的金融体制以银行间接融资为主,资本市场等直接融资渠道发展缓慢,更为关键的是,政府对信贷资源有很强的控制力。
从工业化进程的角度看,上述制度安排有其合理性和必要性,对金融资源的控制使这些国家在工业化的道路上,得以快速追赶并实现超越。当然,这种金融安排的弊端就是银行偏好国有企业,对民营企业存在信贷歧视,抑制了对民营企业的信贷供给。虽然2006年之后以四大国有银行为代表的国有企业改革取得阶段性成功,国内银行的市场化程度得到了提升,但仍未完全摆脱地方政府的干预、央行信贷额度的控制,银行的信贷决策过程中仍存在着较多的非市场化因素。
可见,现行金融体制下,民营企业易受银行的信贷歧视,较难从正规的融资渠道获得足够的信贷支持,且融资成本较高,常常受到融资约束的困扰。在此背景下,本文将探寻其他替代机制,能够缓解民营企业因所有权性质差异而受到的信贷歧视,探究规模以上民营企业与银行建立的银行关联,是否可以帮助民营企业从正规的融资渠道中获得稳定足够的信贷支持,从而缓解外部融资约束,为民营企业进一步的做大做强奠定基础。
文章首先利用全国工商联对规模以上民营企业的调查统计数据,从收入、资产规模、利润和员工人数四个维度对上市民营企业、上市中小板民营企业与规模以上民营企业做了对比,发现三者间具有较高的相似性。以上市民营企业为例,采用国内研究者较少使用的自然实验法,以2008年出台的《关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定》作为外生冲击,对比研究了国有上市公司和民营上市公司在《新规》出台前后的现金分红差异,通过对比验证了规模以上民营企业的融资约束。
然后重点研究了银行人事关联对民营企业融资约束的影响。从社会资本和信息两个角度展开分析。一方面非正式制度的出现可以在一定程度上弥补正式制度的空隙和不足,帮助减少信贷市场上的信息不对称程度,减轻市场摩擦。另一方面,中国的传统文化使得人们在从日常生活到企业经营等各种活动中非常重视人际关系的建立和运用,人情、面子和关系成为了人们获取稀缺资源的一种重要资本。采用对中小板民营上市公司招股说明书中手工搜集的数据,就银行人事关联对民营企业融资约束的影响作用进行了经验研究。结果发现,银行人事关联可以显著缓解民营企业受到的融资约束,政治关联也具有类似的效果,两种关联方式具有替代效果。有银行人事关联的民营企业,在整体负债和银行短期借款方面,均显著高于无银行人事关联的民营企业。而在银行长期借款上则没有表现出显著的差异。在融资成本方面,并未发现银行人事关联对融资成本有降低作用。
与银行人事关联这种非正式制度相比,银行股权关联则完全是一种市场化关联行为,随着国内银行不断改革,内部治理和外部法律法规体系不断完善,正式制度将不断发挥更多的作用,企业与银行间的交易行为将主要以市场为基础。因此,文章接着对银行股权关联做了探讨,现阶段我国只允许企业参股银行,所以重点分析和评价了企业参股银行这种关联方式对民营企业融资约束的影响。
本文先构建了一个理论框架,讨论了企业参股银行对企业融资成本和要素投入偏好的影响。结果发现,企业持有银行的股份,无论是否能够影响银行的信贷决策,对企业资金需求的影响结果都相同,这类企业对从银行借入的资本价格敏感度降低。在任意的资本和劳动力价格组合下,持有银行股权的企业会更多的使用资本进行生产,偏好资本密集型的生产方式。然后以上市民营企业为例,就银行股权关联对民营企业融资约束的影响作了经验检验。结果证实了民营企业持有银行股份对企业融资约束的缓解作用。参股银行后,民营企业在整体负债水平、银行借款方面都有显著增加,企业的银行借款期限结构显著缩短,同时财务风险也有所增加,但并不显著。此外,由于国内银行业属垄断行业,存在着较丰厚的垄断利润,多元化经营、分享银行业垄断利润也是现阶段民营企业参股银行的考虑之一。
虽然目前国内商业银行法禁止银行持有非金融企业股权,文章还是从理论上探讨了银行持有企业股权这种银行股权关联形式。结果发现,银行持股企业以直接和间接两条渠道帮助民营企业获得贷款。直接影响是持股增强了企业的资本实力,增加了企业的可抵押资产,与增加银行监督资本投入的效果相同。同时,企业项目成功后银行获得的收入增加,弥补了监督所付出的成本,改善了银行的激励机制。间接影响是银行持股降低了与民营企业的信息不对称程度,节省了银行监督成本的投入,间接增加了民营企业获得信贷的可能性。
Since the reform of state-owned enterprises, the proportion of private economy is gradually increasing in the national economy. But credit resources obtained by the private enterprise are quite limited. Small micro enterprise not only, but also to a varying extent in large and medium-sized private enterprises reflect the external capital demand, dependence on bank loans and the actual difficulties in financing. This dilemma is largely caused by China's financial system arrangement, China's financial system is given priority to with bank indirect financing, and slow development of capital market and direct financing channels, and crucially, the government have strong control on credit resources.
From the perspective of industrialization, the institutional arrangement has its rationality and necessity. On the way of industrialization, the control of financial resources makes these countries to quickly catch up and achieve beyond. Of course, the disadvantages of the financial arrangements are bank preference of state-owned enterprises, credit discrimination on private businesses, and inhibition of the supply of credit to the private enterprise. Although represented by four large state-owned Banks reform of state-owned enterprises achieved partial success after2006, the domestic bank has improved marketing degree. But it is still not completely get rid of the intervention of local governments and the central bank lines of credit control, there are still many non-market factors in the decision-making process of bank credit.
Under the current financial system, private enterprises are vulnerable to bank credit discrimination, and it is more difficult for them to get enough credit support from formal financing. In addition to this, financing costs of private enterprises are much higher, and they are often plagued by financing constraints. In this background, this article will explore other alternative mechanism to ease the credit discrimination caused by the nature of the ownership differences of private enterprises, and explore whether the bank connection can help private enterprises to get enough credit support from the formal channels, and to ease external financing constraint, strengthen for the private enterprise capital foundation.
We use the national federation of industry and commerce survey statistical data of private enterprises. From four dimensions of income, size, profit and number of employees, we compare the listed private enterprises, listed small and medium-sized private enterprises and the private enterprises above designated size. With the listed private enterprises as an example, we use natural experiment that few researchers use in this field in China, with the new law regulations as an exogenous shock, comparative cash dividends differences before and after the new regulation between state-owned listed companies and private listed companies. We verify the financial constraints of private enterprises above designated size.
Then we study the influence of bank interpersonal connection on private enterprises financing constraints from two perspectives of social capital and information. On the one hand, the emergence of informal system can make up for the gap and the insufficiency of formal system, and help reduce the degree of information asymmetry in credit market and relieve market friction. On the other hand, China's traditional culture makes people attaches great importance to interpersonal relationships from daily life to all sorts of activities such as enterprise management, establishment and use of human feelings, face and relationship become an important capital in access to scarce resources. Using the data of small and medium-sized board listed private companies from their IPO prospectus; we do empirical research on the impact of bank interpersonal connection on private enterprises financing constraint. We find that bank interpersonal connection can significantly ease the private enterprise financing constraints, and political connection is the same. The Two types of connection have substitution effect. Liabilities and short-term bank borrowing of private enterprises with bank interpersonal connection are significantly higher than those without bank interpersonal connection. But there are no significant differences between the two types of private enterprises about long-term bank borrowing. In terms of financing costs, we do not find bank interpersonal connection could lower funding costs.
Compared with bank interpersonal connection, bank equity connection is a kind of market behavior. As domestic bank reform continuously, internal governance and external legal system perfecting, the formal system will continue to work, and the trading behavior between banks and enterprises will be mainly based on the market. So we go on to discuss bank equity connection. Only company taking a stake in the bank is allowed at present stage in our country, so we analyze the impact of bank equity connection on private enterprises financing constraint.
We construct a theoretical framework, and discuss the impact of taking equity stakes in banks on the inputs of preferences and financing costs of enterprises. We find that whether the bank's credit decision-making is affected, the impact on the enterprise money demand is the same, and the capital price sensitivity is lower. Under any combination of the capital and the labor. Enterprises with bank equity connection will use more capital for the production, and preference capital intensive production mode. With the listed private enterprises as an example, we test the impact of bank equity connection on private enterprises financing constraint. We find that liabilities and bank borrowing of private enterprises with bank equity connection are significantly higher than those without bank equity connection, and the maturity structure of bank loan is markedly shortened, and financial risks are also increased, but not dramatically. In addition to that, due to domestic banking monopoly industries, there is a lucrative monopoly profits, so sharing the banking monopoly profits is one of the reason why private enterprises chose to hold bank equities at present stage.
Although domestic commercial banking laws ban banks to hold non-financial enterprises' equity, we still discuss this form of connection. We find that there are two channels for private enterprises with bank holding to get loans, one is direct channel, and the other is indirect channel. The former enhances the enterprise's capital strength and increases the mortgage assets; it is the same to increase supervision capital. Meanwhile, after the success of the enterprise project, the bank income is increased, and the cost of supervision is made up, so the incentive mechanism of the bank is improved. The latter reduces the degree of information asymmetry, saves the cost of bank supervision activity, indirectly increased the potential for private enterprises to obtain credit.
从工业化进程的角度看,上述制度安排有其合理性和必要性,对金融资源的控制使这些国家在工业化的道路上,得以快速追赶并实现超越。当然,这种金融安排的弊端就是银行偏好国有企业,对民营企业存在信贷歧视,抑制了对民营企业的信贷供给。虽然2006年之后以四大国有银行为代表的国有企业改革取得阶段性成功,国内银行的市场化程度得到了提升,但仍未完全摆脱地方政府的干预、央行信贷额度的控制,银行的信贷决策过程中仍存在着较多的非市场化因素。
可见,现行金融体制下,民营企业易受银行的信贷歧视,较难从正规的融资渠道获得足够的信贷支持,且融资成本较高,常常受到融资约束的困扰。在此背景下,本文将探寻其他替代机制,能够缓解民营企业因所有权性质差异而受到的信贷歧视,探究规模以上民营企业与银行建立的银行关联,是否可以帮助民营企业从正规的融资渠道中获得稳定足够的信贷支持,从而缓解外部融资约束,为民营企业进一步的做大做强奠定基础。
文章首先利用全国工商联对规模以上民营企业的调查统计数据,从收入、资产规模、利润和员工人数四个维度对上市民营企业、上市中小板民营企业与规模以上民营企业做了对比,发现三者间具有较高的相似性。以上市民营企业为例,采用国内研究者较少使用的自然实验法,以2008年出台的《关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定》作为外生冲击,对比研究了国有上市公司和民营上市公司在《新规》出台前后的现金分红差异,通过对比验证了规模以上民营企业的融资约束。
然后重点研究了银行人事关联对民营企业融资约束的影响。从社会资本和信息两个角度展开分析。一方面非正式制度的出现可以在一定程度上弥补正式制度的空隙和不足,帮助减少信贷市场上的信息不对称程度,减轻市场摩擦。另一方面,中国的传统文化使得人们在从日常生活到企业经营等各种活动中非常重视人际关系的建立和运用,人情、面子和关系成为了人们获取稀缺资源的一种重要资本。采用对中小板民营上市公司招股说明书中手工搜集的数据,就银行人事关联对民营企业融资约束的影响作用进行了经验研究。结果发现,银行人事关联可以显著缓解民营企业受到的融资约束,政治关联也具有类似的效果,两种关联方式具有替代效果。有银行人事关联的民营企业,在整体负债和银行短期借款方面,均显著高于无银行人事关联的民营企业。而在银行长期借款上则没有表现出显著的差异。在融资成本方面,并未发现银行人事关联对融资成本有降低作用。
与银行人事关联这种非正式制度相比,银行股权关联则完全是一种市场化关联行为,随着国内银行不断改革,内部治理和外部法律法规体系不断完善,正式制度将不断发挥更多的作用,企业与银行间的交易行为将主要以市场为基础。因此,文章接着对银行股权关联做了探讨,现阶段我国只允许企业参股银行,所以重点分析和评价了企业参股银行这种关联方式对民营企业融资约束的影响。
本文先构建了一个理论框架,讨论了企业参股银行对企业融资成本和要素投入偏好的影响。结果发现,企业持有银行的股份,无论是否能够影响银行的信贷决策,对企业资金需求的影响结果都相同,这类企业对从银行借入的资本价格敏感度降低。在任意的资本和劳动力价格组合下,持有银行股权的企业会更多的使用资本进行生产,偏好资本密集型的生产方式。然后以上市民营企业为例,就银行股权关联对民营企业融资约束的影响作了经验检验。结果证实了民营企业持有银行股份对企业融资约束的缓解作用。参股银行后,民营企业在整体负债水平、银行借款方面都有显著增加,企业的银行借款期限结构显著缩短,同时财务风险也有所增加,但并不显著。此外,由于国内银行业属垄断行业,存在着较丰厚的垄断利润,多元化经营、分享银行业垄断利润也是现阶段民营企业参股银行的考虑之一。
虽然目前国内商业银行法禁止银行持有非金融企业股权,文章还是从理论上探讨了银行持有企业股权这种银行股权关联形式。结果发现,银行持股企业以直接和间接两条渠道帮助民营企业获得贷款。直接影响是持股增强了企业的资本实力,增加了企业的可抵押资产,与增加银行监督资本投入的效果相同。同时,企业项目成功后银行获得的收入增加,弥补了监督所付出的成本,改善了银行的激励机制。间接影响是银行持股降低了与民营企业的信息不对称程度,节省了银行监督成本的投入,间接增加了民营企业获得信贷的可能性。
Since the reform of state-owned enterprises, the proportion of private economy is gradually increasing in the national economy. But credit resources obtained by the private enterprise are quite limited. Small micro enterprise not only, but also to a varying extent in large and medium-sized private enterprises reflect the external capital demand, dependence on bank loans and the actual difficulties in financing. This dilemma is largely caused by China's financial system arrangement, China's financial system is given priority to with bank indirect financing, and slow development of capital market and direct financing channels, and crucially, the government have strong control on credit resources.
From the perspective of industrialization, the institutional arrangement has its rationality and necessity. On the way of industrialization, the control of financial resources makes these countries to quickly catch up and achieve beyond. Of course, the disadvantages of the financial arrangements are bank preference of state-owned enterprises, credit discrimination on private businesses, and inhibition of the supply of credit to the private enterprise. Although represented by four large state-owned Banks reform of state-owned enterprises achieved partial success after2006, the domestic bank has improved marketing degree. But it is still not completely get rid of the intervention of local governments and the central bank lines of credit control, there are still many non-market factors in the decision-making process of bank credit.
Under the current financial system, private enterprises are vulnerable to bank credit discrimination, and it is more difficult for them to get enough credit support from formal financing. In addition to this, financing costs of private enterprises are much higher, and they are often plagued by financing constraints. In this background, this article will explore other alternative mechanism to ease the credit discrimination caused by the nature of the ownership differences of private enterprises, and explore whether the bank connection can help private enterprises to get enough credit support from the formal channels, and to ease external financing constraint, strengthen for the private enterprise capital foundation.
We use the national federation of industry and commerce survey statistical data of private enterprises. From four dimensions of income, size, profit and number of employees, we compare the listed private enterprises, listed small and medium-sized private enterprises and the private enterprises above designated size. With the listed private enterprises as an example, we use natural experiment that few researchers use in this field in China, with the new law regulations as an exogenous shock, comparative cash dividends differences before and after the new regulation between state-owned listed companies and private listed companies. We verify the financial constraints of private enterprises above designated size.
Then we study the influence of bank interpersonal connection on private enterprises financing constraints from two perspectives of social capital and information. On the one hand, the emergence of informal system can make up for the gap and the insufficiency of formal system, and help reduce the degree of information asymmetry in credit market and relieve market friction. On the other hand, China's traditional culture makes people attaches great importance to interpersonal relationships from daily life to all sorts of activities such as enterprise management, establishment and use of human feelings, face and relationship become an important capital in access to scarce resources. Using the data of small and medium-sized board listed private companies from their IPO prospectus; we do empirical research on the impact of bank interpersonal connection on private enterprises financing constraint. We find that bank interpersonal connection can significantly ease the private enterprise financing constraints, and political connection is the same. The Two types of connection have substitution effect. Liabilities and short-term bank borrowing of private enterprises with bank interpersonal connection are significantly higher than those without bank interpersonal connection. But there are no significant differences between the two types of private enterprises about long-term bank borrowing. In terms of financing costs, we do not find bank interpersonal connection could lower funding costs.
Compared with bank interpersonal connection, bank equity connection is a kind of market behavior. As domestic bank reform continuously, internal governance and external legal system perfecting, the formal system will continue to work, and the trading behavior between banks and enterprises will be mainly based on the market. So we go on to discuss bank equity connection. Only company taking a stake in the bank is allowed at present stage in our country, so we analyze the impact of bank equity connection on private enterprises financing constraint.
We construct a theoretical framework, and discuss the impact of taking equity stakes in banks on the inputs of preferences and financing costs of enterprises. We find that whether the bank's credit decision-making is affected, the impact on the enterprise money demand is the same, and the capital price sensitivity is lower. Under any combination of the capital and the labor. Enterprises with bank equity connection will use more capital for the production, and preference capital intensive production mode. With the listed private enterprises as an example, we test the impact of bank equity connection on private enterprises financing constraint. We find that liabilities and bank borrowing of private enterprises with bank equity connection are significantly higher than those without bank equity connection, and the maturity structure of bank loan is markedly shortened, and financial risks are also increased, but not dramatically. In addition to that, due to domestic banking monopoly industries, there is a lucrative monopoly profits, so sharing the banking monopoly profits is one of the reason why private enterprises chose to hold bank equities at present stage.
Although domestic commercial banking laws ban banks to hold non-financial enterprises' equity, we still discuss this form of connection. We find that there are two channels for private enterprises with bank holding to get loans, one is direct channel, and the other is indirect channel. The former enhances the enterprise's capital strength and increases the mortgage assets; it is the same to increase supervision capital. Meanwhile, after the success of the enterprise project, the bank income is increased, and the cost of supervision is made up, so the incentive mechanism of the bank is improved. The latter reduces the degree of information asymmetry, saves the cost of bank supervision activity, indirectly increased the potential for private enterprises to obtain credit.
引文
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