政策性农业保险各主体利益协同研究
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摘要
全球生态环境的恶化导致自然灾害发生的频率和强度加剧,农业生产风险增大并且集中化,灾害事故的破坏力和经济损失越来越大。从2004年到2013年(除2011年外),9个中央“一号文件”都提出了要大力发展政策性农业保险。然而,农业保险的特殊性(农业风险的弱可保性、农业保险标的的脆弱性、农业保险产品的准公共物品性等)和各主体参与保险的目的不同等因素造成了农业保险三大主体潜在利益的冲突,而有效的利益协同机制的缺失导致主体间的潜在冲突现实化。政策性农业保险各主体共同形成一个开放的协同系统,单个主体为其子系统,在自组织过程中,通过子系统之间的协同,能够逐渐从无序演进到有序、从低级有序演进到高级有序,形成政策性农业保险健康、可持续发展的局面。政策性农业保险各主体利益协同是农业保险可持续发展的关键,是促进政策性农业保险的“内生式”发展道路,协同的根本联结点是利益。
本研究首次将协同学理论和保险学理论相结合,通过定性描述和定量分析,对我国政策性农业保险各主体利益协同进行了研究。本研究分为三大部分：
第一部分即第一章和第二章,主要阐述研究的目的与意义、国内外研究动态、研究的思路与方法、主要内容与研究创新和研究的理论基础。
第二部分由第三章到第五章组成。这一部分分别从协同度的评价和协同效应的分析两方面对政策性农业保险各主体利益协同进行了现实评价。首先,通过构建SAR模型评价政策性农业保险各主体利益协同度。经过测算,我国政策性农业保险系统历年的协同度都比较低。这揭示了我国政策性农业保险系统各子系统在特定时间段内的关联并不强,表明在该时间段内我国政策性农业保险系统在宏观上仍处于低有序的发展状态中。其次,基于农业保险各主体利益协同演化的历程和实例对政策性农业保险各主体利益协同效应进行分析。本研究认为,农业保险系统的演进同样是周期性成长、螺旋式上升,与协同效应的演化规律相符合,在大的演化规律中包含了小的演化规律。并以农业大省湖南省为例,对样本采用描述方法和构建Logistic模型来分析政策性农业保险系统各主体利益的协同效应。同时,探析了政策性农业保险各主体利益协同动力,揭示了驱动政策性农业保险各主体利益协同演进的各种力量。
第三部分由第六章到第七章组成。这一部分主要从三个方面对政策性农业保险各主体利益协同机制的完善提出建议：一是激励机制的完善,即各主体在追求自身利益的同时也能达到政策性农业保险系统稳健发展目标,这主要通过政策性农业保险合同的合理设计来实现；二是保障机制的完善,即如何保持各主体的目标行为与整个系统的发展方向相符,这主要通过政策性农业保险产品的创新来实现;三是效率机制的完善,即如何提高各主体的行动效率,这主要通过双到户模式的采用与智能系统的引入来实现。政策性农业保险各主体利益协同机制的完善,有助于政策性农业保险的长期稳定健康发展。
The deterioration of the global ecological environment has caused the increase of the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. With agricultural production risk rising and centralization, the destructive force of disasters' accidents and economic loss are more and more. From2004to2013(except2011),9central "file No. one" have been put forward to develop the policy-oriented agricultural insurance. However, particularity of agricultural insurance (the risk of agriculture weak insurability, the vulnerability of agricultural insurance products, the quasi-public goods of agricultural insurance, etc.) and the different purposes of participating insurance have caused a potential conflict of interests of three participators of agricultural insurance, and then lack of effective interest synergy mechanism led to the reality of the potential conflict among three participators. Three participators of policy-oriented agricultural insurance together form an open synergic system. Each single participator is its subsystem. In the course of self-organization, the evolution can be gradually from disorderly to orderly and from lower order to higher through the coordination among three subsystems so that a healthy, sustainable development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance has formed. The interest synergy of the participators of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is the key to sustainable development of agricultural insurance, and is the road to promote the "endogenous" development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. The fundamental point of connection is interest synergy.
The first part is the first chapter and the second chapter, mainly elaborated the research goal and the significance, domestic and international research, research ideas and methods, main contents, the innovation and research theory foundation.
Second part is from the third chapter to the fifth chapter. At this part, the realistic evaluation about interest synergy mechanism of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China has analyzed separately from evaluation of the synergy degree and the synergistic effect of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance. First, the interest synergy degree of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China has evaluated by constructing a SAR model. Through calculation, the interest synergy degrees of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance system are relatively low over the years in China. This reveals the association of China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance system within a certain period of time is not strong, and shows that during this period China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance system in the macro is still in the development state of low order. Second, the synergistic effect of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance has been analyzed through the evolution history of each participator'interests of agricultural insurance and examples. The study thinks that evolution of agricultural insurance system is also periodic growth, spiral, and evolution and the synergistic effect is consistent in the evolution with the small evolution. Taking Hunan Province as an example, the synergistic effect of each participator interests of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance has been analyzed by synergistic effect description method and the construction of Logistic model. At the same time, synergy power of each participator interests of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance has been analyzed. It has revealed the forces driving the interest synergy evolution about each participator of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
Third part is from the sixth chapter to the seventh chapter. At this part, some suggestions have put forward from three aspects to perfect interests synergy mechanism of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. First, the incentive mechanism has been improved, that is, the policy-oriented agricultural insurance system can achieve steady development goals in the pursuit of their own interests. It has mainly achieved through the rational design of policy agricultural insurance contract. Second, the guarantee mechanism has been perfected, that is, how to keep the development direction of the entire system and the target of the participators' action accordant. It has mainly achieved through the innovation of policy agricultural insurance products. Third, the efficiency mechanism has been improved, that is, how to improve the efficiency of participators'action. It has mainly achieved through the double to the farmer mode and the introduction of intelligent system. Perfecting the interest synergy mechanism of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is conducive to the Long-term stable and healthy development of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
本研究首次将协同学理论和保险学理论相结合,通过定性描述和定量分析,对我国政策性农业保险各主体利益协同进行了研究。本研究分为三大部分：
第一部分即第一章和第二章,主要阐述研究的目的与意义、国内外研究动态、研究的思路与方法、主要内容与研究创新和研究的理论基础。
第二部分由第三章到第五章组成。这一部分分别从协同度的评价和协同效应的分析两方面对政策性农业保险各主体利益协同进行了现实评价。首先,通过构建SAR模型评价政策性农业保险各主体利益协同度。经过测算,我国政策性农业保险系统历年的协同度都比较低。这揭示了我国政策性农业保险系统各子系统在特定时间段内的关联并不强,表明在该时间段内我国政策性农业保险系统在宏观上仍处于低有序的发展状态中。其次,基于农业保险各主体利益协同演化的历程和实例对政策性农业保险各主体利益协同效应进行分析。本研究认为,农业保险系统的演进同样是周期性成长、螺旋式上升,与协同效应的演化规律相符合,在大的演化规律中包含了小的演化规律。并以农业大省湖南省为例,对样本采用描述方法和构建Logistic模型来分析政策性农业保险系统各主体利益的协同效应。同时,探析了政策性农业保险各主体利益协同动力,揭示了驱动政策性农业保险各主体利益协同演进的各种力量。
第三部分由第六章到第七章组成。这一部分主要从三个方面对政策性农业保险各主体利益协同机制的完善提出建议：一是激励机制的完善,即各主体在追求自身利益的同时也能达到政策性农业保险系统稳健发展目标,这主要通过政策性农业保险合同的合理设计来实现；二是保障机制的完善,即如何保持各主体的目标行为与整个系统的发展方向相符,这主要通过政策性农业保险产品的创新来实现;三是效率机制的完善,即如何提高各主体的行动效率,这主要通过双到户模式的采用与智能系统的引入来实现。政策性农业保险各主体利益协同机制的完善,有助于政策性农业保险的长期稳定健康发展。
The deterioration of the global ecological environment has caused the increase of the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. With agricultural production risk rising and centralization, the destructive force of disasters' accidents and economic loss are more and more. From2004to2013(except2011),9central "file No. one" have been put forward to develop the policy-oriented agricultural insurance. However, particularity of agricultural insurance (the risk of agriculture weak insurability, the vulnerability of agricultural insurance products, the quasi-public goods of agricultural insurance, etc.) and the different purposes of participating insurance have caused a potential conflict of interests of three participators of agricultural insurance, and then lack of effective interest synergy mechanism led to the reality of the potential conflict among three participators. Three participators of policy-oriented agricultural insurance together form an open synergic system. Each single participator is its subsystem. In the course of self-organization, the evolution can be gradually from disorderly to orderly and from lower order to higher through the coordination among three subsystems so that a healthy, sustainable development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance has formed. The interest synergy of the participators of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is the key to sustainable development of agricultural insurance, and is the road to promote the "endogenous" development of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. The fundamental point of connection is interest synergy.
The first part is the first chapter and the second chapter, mainly elaborated the research goal and the significance, domestic and international research, research ideas and methods, main contents, the innovation and research theory foundation.
Second part is from the third chapter to the fifth chapter. At this part, the realistic evaluation about interest synergy mechanism of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China has analyzed separately from evaluation of the synergy degree and the synergistic effect of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance. First, the interest synergy degree of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance in China has evaluated by constructing a SAR model. Through calculation, the interest synergy degrees of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance system are relatively low over the years in China. This reveals the association of China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance system within a certain period of time is not strong, and shows that during this period China's policy-oriented agricultural insurance system in the macro is still in the development state of low order. Second, the synergistic effect of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance has been analyzed through the evolution history of each participator'interests of agricultural insurance and examples. The study thinks that evolution of agricultural insurance system is also periodic growth, spiral, and evolution and the synergistic effect is consistent in the evolution with the small evolution. Taking Hunan Province as an example, the synergistic effect of each participator interests of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance has been analyzed by synergistic effect description method and the construction of Logistic model. At the same time, synergy power of each participator interests of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance has been analyzed. It has revealed the forces driving the interest synergy evolution about each participator of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
Third part is from the sixth chapter to the seventh chapter. At this part, some suggestions have put forward from three aspects to perfect interests synergy mechanism of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. First, the incentive mechanism has been improved, that is, the policy-oriented agricultural insurance system can achieve steady development goals in the pursuit of their own interests. It has mainly achieved through the rational design of policy agricultural insurance contract. Second, the guarantee mechanism has been perfected, that is, how to keep the development direction of the entire system and the target of the participators' action accordant. It has mainly achieved through the innovation of policy agricultural insurance products. Third, the efficiency mechanism has been improved, that is, how to improve the efficiency of participators'action. It has mainly achieved through the double to the farmer mode and the introduction of intelligent system. Perfecting the interest synergy mechanism of each participator of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is conducive to the Long-term stable and healthy development of the policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
引文
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