上市公司高管股权激励利益效应研究
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摘要
高管股权激励的根本目的是提升公司业绩,但也会引起相关各方的利益效应。虽然从其基本理论看,股权激励是以股东长期价值最大化为目标,以股东与经营者的利益结合为手段,根本目的在于解决因投资者与经营者的分离所形成的委托代理问题。一般而言,股权激励能激发高管的主观能动性,从而带来更好的公司业绩。但是,由于信息不对称、高管的道德风险等问题的存在,它不仅会导致委托人与代理人的利益冲突问题,也会牵扯到相关各方的利益变化。同时,高管权力加剧了道德风险的发生概率,从而制约着股权激励的效果及利益效应的方式。因此,分析股权激励的效应不应忽视高管权力的约束。本文所指的高管权力,意指从最大化自身利益目标出发,高管按自我意愿行事、压制不同意见的能力,主要体现为剩余控制权的扩张。在计量方法上,以高管是否持股、高管连续任职、兼任两职和股权集中度、是否专家(硕士研究生以上学历或高级职称)五个维度度量高管权力,然后用主成份分析法合成高管权力综合指数。全文从以下几个角度讨论了高管权力扰动下的高管股权激励所带来的利益效应问题：
(1)为了深入探讨股权激励的利益效应问题,本文以2006年到2009年推出高管股权激励计划的中国上市公司为样本,从高管权力、内部条件及外部环境三个方面对公司股权激励的动因进行了研究。在控制公司规模、资金流动性、股权结构、财务杠杆、公司风险等因素的情况下,公司高管权力越大,公司推出高管股权激励计划的可能性就越大,而公司的成长性、会计信息的噪声干扰对此股权激励计划推出的可能性之间并没有显著性的关联。
(2)通过对公告高管股权激励的公司及其配对样本的业绩表现分析,本文发现高管股权激励的公司无论公告前后其业绩均显著高于配对组,表现出盈利能力的惯性；进一步的回归分析的结果发现,高管股权激励计划对于提高公司业绩具有明显的作用,同时与公司的资产规模、劳动力报酬的支付等关系密切,并与上期的盈利状况高度相关；在考虑权力累积量和高管股权激励强度的情况下,高管权力对于公司业绩的表现具有显著的负作用,而在不考虑高管股权激励的强度的情况下,高管权力对公司业绩的影响呈负方向,但并不显著。
(3)本文分析了股权激励计划最终对次生激励的影响,发现实施股权激励的公司次生激励(业绩薪酬敏感度)无论在实施前或是在实施后均明显高于非股权激励公司,而且在股权激励计划公告前一年或当年达到顶点,然后迅速下降靠近全部上市公司的平均水平；通过SEM模型分析,股权激励计划一般能促进公司业绩的增长,而公司业绩的增长则往往伴随对职工薪酬激励的抑制；次生激励对公司业绩的反作用在国有控股企业较显著,在非国有控股企业则不显著；在国有控股公司,高管权力对股权激励下的次生激励没有显著性影响,在非国有控股公司则具有显著性影响。同时,高管权力对股权激励下的次生激励影响,在不同的阶段、不同控股者的影响下,也会出现不同程度的经济后果。
(4)以事件研究方法分析股权激励公告与资本市场的效应关系,发现资本市场对高管股权激励初次公告只有很微弱的负反应,在统计上并不显著。但把窗口期往前追溯两周后,则发现在在公告前两周左右资本市场有显著的异常收益,表明资本市场上可能已经提前得到了泄漏的公司“内部信息”,而这种信息泄漏,也导致了投资行为的改变。公告之后的两周,既没有显著的异常收益,也没有显著的负反应,说明资本市场已经归于平静,“内部消息”带来的振荡已经消退。另外,本文还发现与国外的高管股权激励计划相比,我国上市公司的高管股权激励计划成熟期较短、行权条件较宽松及业绩指标单一的特点。
(5)本文在控制产权比率、公司市值、留存收益、销售增长率、现金净流量、大股东持股比例以及净资产收益率的基础上,检验了股权激励、高管权力及其共振效应对股利支付的可能性影响,发现股权激励、高管权力及其交互关系均对支付股利的可能性有正的显著性影响；高管权力与股利支付率呈二次抛物线(上凸)相关(在1%的水平上具有显著性),股权激励及其与高管权力的交互作用则对股利支付率并没有显著性作用,支持备择假设。同时,股权激励对象包含董事长及董事会成员会显著地降低股利支付可能性及股利支付率
Executive stock option (ESO) is not only the issues of compensation and incentive, but also can cause a series of interest linkage. According to its basic theories, stock option incentive focuses on the maximization of long-term value of shareholders and aims at to solve the principal-agent problem brought by the separation between investors and operators with the means of their interest's combination. Generally, ESO can stimulate the subjective initiative and then better the company performance. However, for information asymmetry and moral hazard problem, it may lead to the problem of interest conflict between principal and agent, and cause interests linkage among other relevant parties. Meanwhile, executive power exacerbates the probability of moral hazard, which restricts the effect and interest linkage way of stock option incentive. In my dissertation, executive power means executive's ability by which executive can act according to self-willing and suppress different views to maximize their own interests, and mainly embody as the expansion of residual control rights. So, it is necessary that we should not ignore the constraint of executive power when we analyze the incentive effect of executive stock option. To measure an executive's power, we use five dimensions that include whether the executive hold shares and continuously is appointed, duality, equity concentration, and whether the executive is an expert (means the executive has got a master degree or above, or high academic title), and then synthesize the composite index of executive power with principal component factor analysis. On the basis of above analysis, we explore the benefits linkage brought by the incentive of ESO with the disturbance of executive power.
In order to discuss the interest linkage of ESO incentive, we explore the driver of ESO plan from executive power, internal conditions and external environment three aspects. Controlling some related factors such as corporate size, liquidity, equity structure, financial leverage, company risk, etc., we find that the greater the executive power of a corporate, the more the possibility that the company would introduce the incentive plan of ESO, and the growth opportunity and the interference of accounting noise insignificantly impact on the possibility of the incentive plan of ESO to be launched.
By means of the analysis about the overall performance of companies that have announced the incentive plan of ESO, we find the performance of the group of company with ESO plan is significantly higher than matched group either before or after, and the profitability of company with ESO planes inertial. With linear regression analysis, we find that ESO plan positively affect the corporate performance significantly, and size, employee compensation and prior period performance also closely related with current performance. When we consider the accumulated power and the intensity of ESO, executive power negatively impact on the current achievement of company significantly. Whereas, when we don't consider the intensity of ESO, executive power insignificantly affects the corporate performance, even though the direction of influence as before.
Analyzing the ultimate effect of secondary incentive that the ESO incentive plan produced, we find out that the secondary incentive (sensitivity of performance to salary) in the corporate with ESO incentive plan is significantly higher than comparison group either before or after, and it reaches a climax before years ago or in the same year, then descend and rapidly close to the average level of the whole listed companies. With structural equation model (SEM), we test the relationship among ESO plan, corporate performance and the secondary incentive, and find that ESO plan promotes the growth of the company performance which restrains the share of employee compensation in creative values. The counteraction of secondary incentive on performance is significant in the group of state-owned holding companies, but in the group of non-state-owned corporations is not. Meanwhile, executive power effect secondary incentive significantly in the group of non-state-owned corporations, but not in the group of state-owned holding companies. Simultaneously, the influence of executive power on secondary incentive is different in diverse stages and controlling shareholders.
We research the correlation between the first announcement of ESO incentive and the effect of capital market with the method of event study, and only find it is very weak negative and statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, if the window periods go back about two weeks, we can become conscious of that there is a significant abnormal return in capital market before the two weeks or so prior to the announcement, which shows that capital market may have got the being leaked internal information in advance which indirectly led to the change of investment behavior. However, there is neither any significant abnormal return nor any significant negative reaction in two weeks later of the public statements, which indicates that capital market has resented calming after the announcement and the oscillation brought by the internal information was fading. In addition, we also find that, compared with foreign ESO plans, our shave following characteristics, such as, the inspired period are shorter, exercise price are lower, vesting conditions are relatively looser, and performance indicators are less.
We also investigate whether dividend payout is affected by the ESO plan, executive power and their resonance effect. The empirical analysis result indicates that, even after controlling for equity ratio, company value, sales growth, net cash flow, shareholding ratio of major shareholders and return on equity, the possibility of dividend payments is significantly affected by ESO plan and executive power, as well as their resonance effect. Another, the relationship between executive power and dividend payout ratio is convex quadratic parabolic, which is significant at1%level. But both ESO plan and resonance effect insignificantly affects the rate of dividend payout. Meanwhile, the ESO plan whose incentive objects include chairman and members of board would significantly reduce the possibility of dividend payments and dividend payout ratio.
(1)为了深入探讨股权激励的利益效应问题,本文以2006年到2009年推出高管股权激励计划的中国上市公司为样本,从高管权力、内部条件及外部环境三个方面对公司股权激励的动因进行了研究。在控制公司规模、资金流动性、股权结构、财务杠杆、公司风险等因素的情况下,公司高管权力越大,公司推出高管股权激励计划的可能性就越大,而公司的成长性、会计信息的噪声干扰对此股权激励计划推出的可能性之间并没有显著性的关联。
(2)通过对公告高管股权激励的公司及其配对样本的业绩表现分析,本文发现高管股权激励的公司无论公告前后其业绩均显著高于配对组,表现出盈利能力的惯性；进一步的回归分析的结果发现,高管股权激励计划对于提高公司业绩具有明显的作用,同时与公司的资产规模、劳动力报酬的支付等关系密切,并与上期的盈利状况高度相关；在考虑权力累积量和高管股权激励强度的情况下,高管权力对于公司业绩的表现具有显著的负作用,而在不考虑高管股权激励的强度的情况下,高管权力对公司业绩的影响呈负方向,但并不显著。
(3)本文分析了股权激励计划最终对次生激励的影响,发现实施股权激励的公司次生激励(业绩薪酬敏感度)无论在实施前或是在实施后均明显高于非股权激励公司,而且在股权激励计划公告前一年或当年达到顶点,然后迅速下降靠近全部上市公司的平均水平；通过SEM模型分析,股权激励计划一般能促进公司业绩的增长,而公司业绩的增长则往往伴随对职工薪酬激励的抑制；次生激励对公司业绩的反作用在国有控股企业较显著,在非国有控股企业则不显著；在国有控股公司,高管权力对股权激励下的次生激励没有显著性影响,在非国有控股公司则具有显著性影响。同时,高管权力对股权激励下的次生激励影响,在不同的阶段、不同控股者的影响下,也会出现不同程度的经济后果。
(4)以事件研究方法分析股权激励公告与资本市场的效应关系,发现资本市场对高管股权激励初次公告只有很微弱的负反应,在统计上并不显著。但把窗口期往前追溯两周后,则发现在在公告前两周左右资本市场有显著的异常收益,表明资本市场上可能已经提前得到了泄漏的公司“内部信息”,而这种信息泄漏,也导致了投资行为的改变。公告之后的两周,既没有显著的异常收益,也没有显著的负反应,说明资本市场已经归于平静,“内部消息”带来的振荡已经消退。另外,本文还发现与国外的高管股权激励计划相比,我国上市公司的高管股权激励计划成熟期较短、行权条件较宽松及业绩指标单一的特点。
(5)本文在控制产权比率、公司市值、留存收益、销售增长率、现金净流量、大股东持股比例以及净资产收益率的基础上,检验了股权激励、高管权力及其共振效应对股利支付的可能性影响,发现股权激励、高管权力及其交互关系均对支付股利的可能性有正的显著性影响；高管权力与股利支付率呈二次抛物线(上凸)相关(在1%的水平上具有显著性),股权激励及其与高管权力的交互作用则对股利支付率并没有显著性作用,支持备择假设。同时,股权激励对象包含董事长及董事会成员会显著地降低股利支付可能性及股利支付率
Executive stock option (ESO) is not only the issues of compensation and incentive, but also can cause a series of interest linkage. According to its basic theories, stock option incentive focuses on the maximization of long-term value of shareholders and aims at to solve the principal-agent problem brought by the separation between investors and operators with the means of their interest's combination. Generally, ESO can stimulate the subjective initiative and then better the company performance. However, for information asymmetry and moral hazard problem, it may lead to the problem of interest conflict between principal and agent, and cause interests linkage among other relevant parties. Meanwhile, executive power exacerbates the probability of moral hazard, which restricts the effect and interest linkage way of stock option incentive. In my dissertation, executive power means executive's ability by which executive can act according to self-willing and suppress different views to maximize their own interests, and mainly embody as the expansion of residual control rights. So, it is necessary that we should not ignore the constraint of executive power when we analyze the incentive effect of executive stock option. To measure an executive's power, we use five dimensions that include whether the executive hold shares and continuously is appointed, duality, equity concentration, and whether the executive is an expert (means the executive has got a master degree or above, or high academic title), and then synthesize the composite index of executive power with principal component factor analysis. On the basis of above analysis, we explore the benefits linkage brought by the incentive of ESO with the disturbance of executive power.
In order to discuss the interest linkage of ESO incentive, we explore the driver of ESO plan from executive power, internal conditions and external environment three aspects. Controlling some related factors such as corporate size, liquidity, equity structure, financial leverage, company risk, etc., we find that the greater the executive power of a corporate, the more the possibility that the company would introduce the incentive plan of ESO, and the growth opportunity and the interference of accounting noise insignificantly impact on the possibility of the incentive plan of ESO to be launched.
By means of the analysis about the overall performance of companies that have announced the incentive plan of ESO, we find the performance of the group of company with ESO plan is significantly higher than matched group either before or after, and the profitability of company with ESO planes inertial. With linear regression analysis, we find that ESO plan positively affect the corporate performance significantly, and size, employee compensation and prior period performance also closely related with current performance. When we consider the accumulated power and the intensity of ESO, executive power negatively impact on the current achievement of company significantly. Whereas, when we don't consider the intensity of ESO, executive power insignificantly affects the corporate performance, even though the direction of influence as before.
Analyzing the ultimate effect of secondary incentive that the ESO incentive plan produced, we find out that the secondary incentive (sensitivity of performance to salary) in the corporate with ESO incentive plan is significantly higher than comparison group either before or after, and it reaches a climax before years ago or in the same year, then descend and rapidly close to the average level of the whole listed companies. With structural equation model (SEM), we test the relationship among ESO plan, corporate performance and the secondary incentive, and find that ESO plan promotes the growth of the company performance which restrains the share of employee compensation in creative values. The counteraction of secondary incentive on performance is significant in the group of state-owned holding companies, but in the group of non-state-owned corporations is not. Meanwhile, executive power effect secondary incentive significantly in the group of non-state-owned corporations, but not in the group of state-owned holding companies. Simultaneously, the influence of executive power on secondary incentive is different in diverse stages and controlling shareholders.
We research the correlation between the first announcement of ESO incentive and the effect of capital market with the method of event study, and only find it is very weak negative and statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, if the window periods go back about two weeks, we can become conscious of that there is a significant abnormal return in capital market before the two weeks or so prior to the announcement, which shows that capital market may have got the being leaked internal information in advance which indirectly led to the change of investment behavior. However, there is neither any significant abnormal return nor any significant negative reaction in two weeks later of the public statements, which indicates that capital market has resented calming after the announcement and the oscillation brought by the internal information was fading. In addition, we also find that, compared with foreign ESO plans, our shave following characteristics, such as, the inspired period are shorter, exercise price are lower, vesting conditions are relatively looser, and performance indicators are less.
We also investigate whether dividend payout is affected by the ESO plan, executive power and their resonance effect. The empirical analysis result indicates that, even after controlling for equity ratio, company value, sales growth, net cash flow, shareholding ratio of major shareholders and return on equity, the possibility of dividend payments is significantly affected by ESO plan and executive power, as well as their resonance effect. Another, the relationship between executive power and dividend payout ratio is convex quadratic parabolic, which is significant at1%level. But both ESO plan and resonance effect insignificantly affects the rate of dividend payout. Meanwhile, the ESO plan whose incentive objects include chairman and members of board would significantly reduce the possibility of dividend payments and dividend payout ratio.
引文
9 胡潇滢.格力董事长成A股薪酬之王.证券日报,2009年3月18日.
10 陈蓉.格力电器自行造富,股权激励未经珠海国资委审批.证券日报,2009年3月24日.
12 郑鸣,徐璐.中国上市公司期权激励的影响因素分析.软科学,2010,24(10)：87-92.
13 2012年暑假在清华大学的博士生论坛上,与同行讨论过是否可称为“派生激励”的问题。笔者认为,派生激励意味着高管受到激励后定会激励下属及员工。而事实上,有不少高管在接受股东们的激励后,采取的是通过加强“管理”的方式——直接或间接“节约人工成本”的做法提高公司业绩,并不一定对从总体上对员工采用薪酬激励措施。而次生则是在原生的基础上间接的、强度不定、很可能会发生而并非必然发生。故本文选用“次生激励”之名。
14 引自Frank H. Easterbrook, "Managers' Discretion and Investors' Walfare:Theories and Evidence", Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 9(1098):750。
19 参见吴明隆《结构方程模型——AMOS的操作与应用》第52页。
20 考虑到时间长度,2011年及以后实施的股权激励公司未作图。
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10 陈蓉.格力电器自行造富,股权激励未经珠海国资委审批.证券日报,2009年3月24日.
12 郑鸣,徐璐.中国上市公司期权激励的影响因素分析.软科学,2010,24(10)：87-92.
13 2012年暑假在清华大学的博士生论坛上,与同行讨论过是否可称为“派生激励”的问题。笔者认为,派生激励意味着高管受到激励后定会激励下属及员工。而事实上,有不少高管在接受股东们的激励后,采取的是通过加强“管理”的方式——直接或间接“节约人工成本”的做法提高公司业绩,并不一定对从总体上对员工采用薪酬激励措施。而次生则是在原生的基础上间接的、强度不定、很可能会发生而并非必然发生。故本文选用“次生激励”之名。
14 引自Frank H. Easterbrook, "Managers' Discretion and Investors' Walfare:Theories and Evidence", Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 9(1098):750。
19 参见吴明隆《结构方程模型——AMOS的操作与应用》第52页。
20 考虑到时间长度,2011年及以后实施的股权激励公司未作图。
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