政治关联、高管变更与资本结构优化调整
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摘要
资本结构管理控制学派突出管理者在公司资本结构决策中的重要作用，而在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下，希望自利的管理者选择一个限制自身经营的资本结构是有困难的，管理防御理论认为在公司内外部激励与约束机制下，管理者会通过调整资本结构决策以固守职位并最大化自身效用。对于管理者而言，被解雇将会使其失去在位时所拥有的一切福利待遇，对其职业生涯造成不利影响，并承担新工作的搜寻成本，这将会把管理防御效应表现到极致。论文在我国上市公司资本结构优化调整速度较慢的现实背景下，提出从管理防御视角考察高管政治关联、高管变更与资本结构优化调整三者之间的关系。
论文在回顾了政治关联问题、高管变更问题与资本结构优化调整问题相关文献的基础上，根据政府“扶持之手”与“掠夺之手”假说、资本结构管理控制理论、控制权理论、高阶管理理论、行为一致性假说与管理防御理论，结合我国转轨经济制度背景，提出政治关联、高管变更与资本结构优化调整的理论分析框架。之后，论文从规范和实证两个角度，利用面板Logistic回归、动态面板数据的GMM估计、调节变量分析、中介效应检验等方法探讨政治关联对高管变更与高管变更业绩敏感性的影响规律、高管变更对资本结构优化调整速度的影响规律、政治关联对资本结构优化调整速度的影响规律和政治关联通过高管变更影响资本结构优化调整速度的传导规律。研究发现高管政治关联程度越高，高管变更可能性越低，高管变更业绩敏感性越弱，高管职位越稳固；高管变更作为一种公司治理机制，能够有效降低管理防御程度，提高资本结构优化调整速度；高管政府官员类政治关联程度越高，其防御程度越强，资本结构优化调整速度越慢，而高管代表委员类政治关联程度越高，其资源效应越强，资本结构优化调整速度越快。在总体样本和国有样本中发现政府官员类政治关联通过高管变更影响资本结构优化调整速度的传导关系成立。最后根据研究结论，论文提出取消国有企业高管行政任命体制、选择恰当的政治关联策略、完善公司接管与破产机制、进一步厘清政府与市场边界等建议。
论文立足我国转轨经济的制度背景，从管理防御视角，探讨高管政治关联特征与高管变更对资本结构优化调整的影响规律，补充了高阶管理理论与行为一致性假说的相关文献，一定程度上丰富了管理防御理论和资本结构管理控制理论，并为上市公司选拔高管、完善公司治理机制和优化资本结构决策提供依据。
The managerial models of capital structure highlight the roles of managers incapital structure decisions. It is difficult to make managers to choose the capitalstrucuture to restrict themselves in the environment of asymmetry information andincomplete contract. Managerial entrenchment theory considers that managers willadjust capital structure to strengthen their position and concentrate on perusing theirown utility while confronting with the incentive and constraint governance mechanisms.If managers are fired, it will make them to lose all the benefits of position, bear thesearch costs of new work, which eventally damages their professional career. It willexhibit the managerial entrenchment perfectly. Based on the background that the capitalstructure adjustment speed is slow in China’s listed companies, this thesis explores therelationship of political connection, CEO turnover and capital structure optimizingadjustment from the aspect of managerial entrenchment.
The thesis firstly reviews the related literature of political connection, CEOturnover and capital structure optimizing adjustment. Based on the hypotheses ofgovernmental helping hand and grabbing hand, control right theory, managerial modelsof capital structure, upper echelon theory, behavioral consistency hypothesis andmanagerial entrenchment theory, combining with the transitional economy backgroundof China, we refine the theoretical framework of political connection, CEO turnover,and capital structure optimizing adjustment. Then taking advantage of the technique ofpanel logistic regression, GMM of dynamic panel data, moderator effect analysis andmediator effect analysis, we explore the impact of political connection on CEO turnoverand CEO turnover performance sensitivity, the impact of CEO turnover on the capitalstructure adjustment speed, the impact of political connection on the capital structureadjustment speed and the conduction of political connection on capital structureadjustment speed through CEO turnover.
Empirical results show as follows. Managerial political connection reduces thepossibility of CEO turnover and weakens the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm’sperformance, which indicates that political connection strengthen the stabilization oftheir positon. CEO turnover increases the adjustment speed of capital structure, whichsuggests that CEO turnover can reduce the extent of managerial entrenchment of thesuccessors and drive the successors to optimize the firm’s capital structure. Whileweakening the governance function, managerial official political connection go against adjusting the capital structure. At the same time, the resources effect is dominant forthe delegate political connection, so it will benefit the capital structure optimizingadjustment. In the end, based on the above findings, we propose the policies ofcanceling the administrative appointment of executives of state-owned firms, selectingthe appropriate political connection policies, perfecting the mechanisms of takeover andbankruptcy and clarifying the boundary between government and market.
This thesis explores the influence of mangerial political connection and CEOturnover on capital structure optimizing adjustment based on the transitional economyfrom the aspect of managerial entrenchment, which supplements the literature of upperechelon theory and hypothesis of behavior consistency. It also enriches the theory ofmanagerial entrenchment and the managerial models of capital structure. The resultsalso provide evidences for selecting appropriate managers, perfecting the corporategovernance mechanisms and optimizing the decisions of capital strucuture.
论文在回顾了政治关联问题、高管变更问题与资本结构优化调整问题相关文献的基础上，根据政府“扶持之手”与“掠夺之手”假说、资本结构管理控制理论、控制权理论、高阶管理理论、行为一致性假说与管理防御理论，结合我国转轨经济制度背景，提出政治关联、高管变更与资本结构优化调整的理论分析框架。之后，论文从规范和实证两个角度，利用面板Logistic回归、动态面板数据的GMM估计、调节变量分析、中介效应检验等方法探讨政治关联对高管变更与高管变更业绩敏感性的影响规律、高管变更对资本结构优化调整速度的影响规律、政治关联对资本结构优化调整速度的影响规律和政治关联通过高管变更影响资本结构优化调整速度的传导规律。研究发现高管政治关联程度越高，高管变更可能性越低，高管变更业绩敏感性越弱，高管职位越稳固；高管变更作为一种公司治理机制，能够有效降低管理防御程度，提高资本结构优化调整速度；高管政府官员类政治关联程度越高，其防御程度越强，资本结构优化调整速度越慢，而高管代表委员类政治关联程度越高，其资源效应越强，资本结构优化调整速度越快。在总体样本和国有样本中发现政府官员类政治关联通过高管变更影响资本结构优化调整速度的传导关系成立。最后根据研究结论，论文提出取消国有企业高管行政任命体制、选择恰当的政治关联策略、完善公司接管与破产机制、进一步厘清政府与市场边界等建议。
论文立足我国转轨经济的制度背景，从管理防御视角，探讨高管政治关联特征与高管变更对资本结构优化调整的影响规律，补充了高阶管理理论与行为一致性假说的相关文献，一定程度上丰富了管理防御理论和资本结构管理控制理论，并为上市公司选拔高管、完善公司治理机制和优化资本结构决策提供依据。
The managerial models of capital structure highlight the roles of managers incapital structure decisions. It is difficult to make managers to choose the capitalstrucuture to restrict themselves in the environment of asymmetry information andincomplete contract. Managerial entrenchment theory considers that managers willadjust capital structure to strengthen their position and concentrate on perusing theirown utility while confronting with the incentive and constraint governance mechanisms.If managers are fired, it will make them to lose all the benefits of position, bear thesearch costs of new work, which eventally damages their professional career. It willexhibit the managerial entrenchment perfectly. Based on the background that the capitalstructure adjustment speed is slow in China’s listed companies, this thesis explores therelationship of political connection, CEO turnover and capital structure optimizingadjustment from the aspect of managerial entrenchment.
The thesis firstly reviews the related literature of political connection, CEOturnover and capital structure optimizing adjustment. Based on the hypotheses ofgovernmental helping hand and grabbing hand, control right theory, managerial modelsof capital structure, upper echelon theory, behavioral consistency hypothesis andmanagerial entrenchment theory, combining with the transitional economy backgroundof China, we refine the theoretical framework of political connection, CEO turnover,and capital structure optimizing adjustment. Then taking advantage of the technique ofpanel logistic regression, GMM of dynamic panel data, moderator effect analysis andmediator effect analysis, we explore the impact of political connection on CEO turnoverand CEO turnover performance sensitivity, the impact of CEO turnover on the capitalstructure adjustment speed, the impact of political connection on the capital structureadjustment speed and the conduction of political connection on capital structureadjustment speed through CEO turnover.
Empirical results show as follows. Managerial political connection reduces thepossibility of CEO turnover and weakens the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm’sperformance, which indicates that political connection strengthen the stabilization oftheir positon. CEO turnover increases the adjustment speed of capital structure, whichsuggests that CEO turnover can reduce the extent of managerial entrenchment of thesuccessors and drive the successors to optimize the firm’s capital structure. Whileweakening the governance function, managerial official political connection go against adjusting the capital structure. At the same time, the resources effect is dominant forthe delegate political connection, so it will benefit the capital structure optimizingadjustment. In the end, based on the above findings, we propose the policies ofcanceling the administrative appointment of executives of state-owned firms, selectingthe appropriate political connection policies, perfecting the mechanisms of takeover andbankruptcy and clarifying the boundary between government and market.
This thesis explores the influence of mangerial political connection and CEOturnover on capital structure optimizing adjustment based on the transitional economyfrom the aspect of managerial entrenchment, which supplements the literature of upperechelon theory and hypothesis of behavior consistency. It also enriches the theory ofmanagerial entrenchment and the managerial models of capital structure. The resultsalso provide evidences for selecting appropriate managers, perfecting the corporategovernance mechanisms and optimizing the decisions of capital strucuture.
引文
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