中国上市公司过度投资行为研究
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摘要
近年来,中国经济保持快速增长,投资对经济增长发挥了主要的拉动作用。但由于受资源和消费需求等的限制,伴随着过快的投资增长,不少行业和地区不同程度地出现了“投资过热”现象,从而引发一系列问题,如能源和原材料的紧缺、产能过剩、经济结构扭曲、重复建设等。由于过度地投资,大量的资本沉淀在生产能力过剩从而盈利能力恶化的领域,同时也减弱了经济增长吸纳劳动力的能力,制约着经济、环境与社会的协调发展。
企业是经济运行的主体,宏观层面的“投资过热”与微观层面的企业“过度投资”是密不可分的。所谓“过度投资”,是指企业的投资超出或偏离了自身的能力和成长机会,投资于净现值为负的非盈利项目,从而损害企业的价值。由于中国市场经济尚处于不成熟阶段,加之股权结构不合理,上市公司“过度投资”行为更为明显和严重,“过度投资”已成为制约中国上市公司质量提升和长期持续发展的主要因素。更值得注意的是,我国相当一部分企业的投资靠银行信贷支持,而投资效率过低意味着信贷回收的前景堪忧以及金融系统风险的积累。
现代企业中所有权与控制权的分离、信息不对称以及监控成本的存在,使自由现金流处于经理人控制之下,经理人具有将资源投入到非盈利项目的能力;同时,经理人的报酬(包括显性报酬和隐性报酬)通常与企业规模正相关;这样,经理人既有能力也有动机将本应发放给股东的红利投入到能够给自己带来私人收益的非盈利项目,从而导致企业过度投资。另一方面,大股东控制了公司的经营决策权,为其掠夺中小股东财富提供了可能。实践中,大股东掠夺小股东获取控制权收益的一个主要方式就是投资资金的滥用以及不正当关联交易。在现代公司运作过程中,股东-经理人冲突引发的代理型治理问题、大股东-中小股东冲突引发的剥夺型治理问题以及股东-债权人冲突引发的债务型治理问题都直接影响着企业的投资决策,其中最主要的体现就是过度投资。
中国的国有企业,由于所有者“虚位”,代理问题和利益冲突更加严重,当企业产生充足的现金流时,国有企业的经营者往往选择通过加大固定资产投资、发展多元化产业或兼并收购等来扩大企业规模。企业通过留存利润增加投资,不用像从金融部门获得融资那样受到严格的审核监督,而且经营者可以控制更多的资源和权力,如果投资顺利、企业规模壮大,还可以获得政府的奖励和更高的薪酬;即使投资项目失败,由于国有企业所有者“虚位”、公司治理机制虚化,也不用承担损失;而分红意味着经营者可控资源的减少和转移,所以往往出现产生高额利润的垄断企业宁愿发展根本不具竞争优势的副业、甚至投资净现值为负的非盈利项目(过度投资),也不向国家或投资者分红的现象。这也是目前出现部门利益凌驾于国家利益、投资效率较低、宏观调控效率不高的根源之一。由于中国上市公司大多由原国有企业改制而成,投资行为并没有摆脱利用财政和银行资金的“投资饥渴症”的影响,在部分投资资金来源于资本市场后,依然沿袭原国有企业的投资行为模式,在过度留存利润和公司治理机制不完善的情况下,普遍存在过度投资行为,导致企业资金配置效率低下和宏观层面的投资过热。
公司治理与企业投资行为存在着不可分割的联系。有效的公司治理能通过一系列制度安排实现股东、债权人和经理人等之间的相互制衡,防范和化解股东-债权人、股东-经理人、大股东-中小股东之间的利益冲突,防范投资风险,保证企业投资决策的科学化和有效运行。正是在这个意义上,Milgorm and Roberts指出,当企业被看作是一组不完备契约时,企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权间的有效结合是提高企业投资效率和经营效率的关键。而公司治理的本质就是关于企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权分配的制度性安排。因此,公司治理在企业投资决策过程中发挥重要作用,公司治理水平直接关系到企业的投资效率。
作为未来现金流量增长的基础和企业成长的主要动因,企业投资行为本应受到学术界的重视,但是由于企业投资行为本身的复杂性,其研究长期处于零散、停滞状态。可喜的是,最近20年来,企业投资—现金流分析范式日趋完善,企业投资不再是“黑箱”,为人们逐步认识和分析企业投资行为提供了理论支持。而目前关于中国企业投资行为的研究还处于起步阶段,与企业的实际投资行为脱钩,还没有对现实条件下中国企业的非效率投资行为作出令人满意的解释。
本文在系统借鉴和吸收西方最新企业投资行为研究成果基础上,综合运用管理学、金融学、信息经济学、计量经济学和公司治理理论,采用文献研究、理论论证、比较分析、统计数据分析、制度分析等研究方法,结合中国资本市场的实际情况,对信息不对称条件下的企业投资行为进行了深入的分析,通过实证研究检验了上市公司过度投资与自由现金流的敏感性,揭示了股权结构、公司治理、负债融资及股利政策等对中国上市公司过度投资的真实影响,阐释了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质,对如何有效控制企业“过度投资”及完善上市公司治理进行了有益的理论分析,提出了有针对性的政策建议。
论文主要围绕以下问题展开:
(1)上市公司存在“过度投资”的理论分析、实证证据及其形成机理。以企业投资理论为基础,结合中国国情,系统分析了上市公司“过度投资”的可能性。借鉴国内外企业投资行为研究的最新成果,建立计量模型,对中国上市公司的过度投资程度进行了衡量,论文通过实证研究证明,相当一部分中国上市公司存在比较严重的过度投资行为,而且近年来有不断加剧的倾向。
(2)自由现金流对上市公司过度投资的“催化”作用及敏感性分析。自由现金流一方面可以提高企业内部融资能力,缓解企业面临的外部融资压力,降低企业因融资约束而发生投资不足的可能性:另一方面,充足的现金流增加了企业经理人的机会主义倾向,如果没有良好的内部治理机制和科学的投资决策机制为保障,自由现金流会给企业带来很严重的代理成本,将企业经营者的过度投资动机“催化”为实际行动。论文通过实证研究发现中国上市公司过度投资与自由现金流之间存在很高的敏感性,证实了“自由现金流”假说。
(3)股权结构、公司治理机制对上市公司过度投资的真实影响。股权结构确立了股东的构成,决定了公司决策机构、执行机构和监督机构的结构以及这些机构与经理人的关系,对公司治理和企业投资决策产生深刻的影响。股权结构对公司价值的影响,是通过影响公司的治理成本、治理效率和企业行为来实现的。适当的股权安排和融资结构选择可促进公司治理、提高治理效率,而好的治理结构又能确保公司经理层得到正好为其投资所需(但又不是更多)的资金来完成净现值为正的项目,协调各利益相关者之间的冲突,实现决策科学化和企业价值最大化。论文通过实证研究分析了股权结构、公司治理机制对上市公司过度投资的真实影响,检验了具体哪些公司治理机制对过度投资起到了有效的抑制作用,哪些公司治理机制尚未真正发挥作用。
(4)负债融资及股利政策对上市公司过度投资约束功效的实证检验。负债对企业投资决策的影响具有两面性:一方面负债带来的股东-债权人冲突催生了股东的资产替代和投资不足行为;另一方面,负债本息的固定支付有利于减少企业的闲置资金,对企业滥用自由现金流的过度投资行为起到抑制作用。利润分配也会影响企业内部资金情况,支付现金股利减少了自由现金流,从而减少了企业从事净现值为负的项目的机会,因此股利发放也可以在一定程度上减轻过度投资问题。论文通过实证研究检验了在预算软约束情况下负债融资及现金股利对上市公司过度投资的约束功能及效果。
(5)上市公司非效率投资尤其是“过度投资”行为的预防和治理。在实证研究的基础上,论文从宏观层面的金融与投资体制改革、微观层面的企业内部控制及公司治理机制完善等角度,有针对性地提出了中国上市公司非效率投资尤其是“过度投资”行为治理的对策和建议。
论文的创新点主要体现在:
第一,结合中国的现实情况,构建了一个中国上市公司“过度投资”行为分析框架,在上市公司过度投资程度计量模型的基础上,通过实证研究揭示了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质。以上市公司非效率投资现象为出发点,在科学衡量企业过度投资程度的基础上,从理论分析、实证研究等方面系统论证了中国上市公司确实存在“过度投资”行为,考察了自由现金流与上市公司过度投资程度的关联性,揭示了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质,以利于发现中国上市公司投资效率低下的真实原因。
第二,从权利主体的制衡上升到科学决策高度探讨公司治理问题,并以公司治理视角对企业过度投资行为进行了系统研究,深化和拓展了公司治理问题的研究领域和理论体系。论文在传统的企业投资-现金流分析范式基础上引入公司治理因素,对公司治理、自由现金流和企业投资行为三者间的关联性进行全面系统分析,在借鉴和吸收最新企业投资行为研究成果基础上,建立了一个由信息不对称和代理问题驱动的企业过度投资行为理论模型,并利用中国上市公司的财务数据进行了实证检验,为企业有效降低自由现金流代理成本提供了思路和依据。
第三,通过实证研究,分析和检验了股权结构、各种公司治理机制、负债融资及股利政策等对中国上市公司过度投资程度的真实影响,对上市公司过度投资行为的治理和防范提供了有针对性的政策建议。
In recent years, Chinese economy keeps a fleet rate of increase. And investment plays an important role in the development of Chinese economy. But because of the restrict of resource and consume demands, "hot invest" phenomenon appears in many industry and regions accompany with the excess increase of the investment, which causes series of problems, such as tight lack of energy and original materials, the excess of productive ability, the distort of economic construction, the repetition of development etc. Because of excessive investment, a flood of capital precipitates at some realms with excess production ability and poor profit ability. Excessive investment also reduces the ability of absorbing labor force in economy increase, making difficulty in the coordination development of economy, environment and society.
Business enterprises are the main participants in economy circulation. "Hot invest" of the macroscopic level and "over-investment" of the microscopic level is inseparable. Over-investment is the investment with negative net present value, which injures the value of whole business enterprise beyond the company growth opportunity or development direction. The Chinese market economy is still at its first stage; furthermore, the ownership structure of most corporate is not reasonable at all. The over-investment trend of Chinese listed company is very obvious and serious under above condition. Over-investment question has become a main hindrance to the quantity promotion and long-term development of Chinese listed company. Moreover, the investment funds of many business are mainly supported by bank, so the low investment efficiency of enterprise means the risk accumulation of financial system.
Because of the separation of ownership and control, the asymmetry of information, and the existence of supervision cost, free cash flow is under the control of manager in modern company. Manager has the capability of investing corporate resource to non-profit projects; moreover, manager's payment usually has a kind of positive correlation with corporate scale. So manager has both ability and motive to throw corporate free cash on non-profit projects that could bring himself private benefit, which leads to corporate over-investment. On the other hand, the big shareholder controls the decision power of the company, providing the possibility of violating small shareholder. The big shareholder inclines to obtain private income which small shareholder can not share. In practice, one of the methods that the big shareholder violates small shareholder is to abuse the investment funds and self transaction. Conflicts among manager, big shareholder, small shareholder and creditor all affect investment behaviors, which could lead to over-investment of enterprises.
Because of the vacancy of the owner, agency problem and conflicts of benefits in Chinese state-owned enterprise become more seriously. When there are plenty of cash flow in enterprise, the manager of state-owned enterprise usually chooses to enlarge investment to extend the scale of enterprise. Through investment, the manager could control more resource and power. If investment gains success and enterprise becomes stronger, the manager could acquire the governmental reward with higher salary. Even if investment encounters failure, the manager need not undertake the loss because corporate governance of state-owned enterprise is poor. So the manager of stated-owned enterprise usually would rather invest items which net present value is under zero than give dividend to the owner. Chinese listed companies which are mostly changed from original state-owned enterprise have not got rid of "investment hunger syndrome"after gaining part of funds from capital market. Chinese listed companies with poor governance are still along the investment behavior pattern of the original state-owned enterprise. In the poor governance condition, the over-investment of listed companies with plenty of cash flow become more and more serious, which leads to low efficiency of internal fund allocation and the "hot invest" in the macroscopic level.
The relation between corporate governance and enterprise investment behavior is very closely. Valid corporate governance can realize the balance among shareholders, creditors and managers etc. through series of system arrangement, dissolve the interest conflicts among stakeholders of business enterprises, and guarantee the scientific investment decision and the operation of enterprise. Exactly on this meaning, Milgorm and Roberts points out, when the firm is being viewed as a series of uncompleted contracts, the validly combination of the power to obtain surplus and the power to control is the key for increasing investment efficiency and operating efficiency. And the substance of corporate governance is series of system arrangement concerning the allocation of the power to obtain surplus and the power to control. Therefore, corporate governance plays an important role in the investment decision process. The level of corporate governance is related to the investment efficiency of the business enterprise directly.
As the main cause of future cash flow increase and enterprise growth, investment behavior not only affects the financial and dividend policy directly, but also relates to the business performance strongly. Business investment behavior should be paid with more academic concerns, but because of its complexity, the research on investment behavior has been in stagnation over a long period of time. Furthermore, the research on Chinese business investment behavior is still in its start stage, which could not explain practical investment behavior.
The paper synthesizes western scholar's latest investment theories, adopts kinds of research method, analyzes the investment behavior of information asymmetry condition under the actual circumstance of the Chinese capital market, examines the sensitivity of and free cash flow, researches the true influence of ownership structure, corporate governance, debt and dividend policy to over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company, explains the formation mechanism of over-investment of Chinese listed company. The empirical research provides theory foundation for the governance of over-investment and the establishment of scientific investment decision mechanism of Chinese listed company.
The paper launches the discussion mainly around five questions.
(1) The theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on the over-investment behavior of listed company. Based on business investment theories and Chinese economy actual condition , the paper analyzes the existence possibility of over-investment of listed company. The paper also establishes a calculating model based on the latest theory to measure over-investment degree of Chinese listed company. The empirical research proves that, over-investment of listed companies exists indeed, and has become more and more serious.
(2) The "catalyst" function and sensitivity analysis of free cash flow on over-investment of listed company. Enterprises obtain investment funds from internal or external financial resources. The internal finance does not need pay interest or dividends, so business investment depends on free cash flow strongly. But if there are no valid corporate governance mechanisms, free cash flow would bring the enterprise very serious agency cost, turning the over-investment motive of the business executive to action. The paper examined the sensitivity between the over-investment degree and free cash flow of Chinese listed company.
(3) The true influence of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms on over-investment of listed company. The ownership structure establishes the composition of shareholders , confirming the structure of decision-making, executive and supervising organization and the relation between these organizations and manager, creating deep influence on the investment decision of enterprise. The function that ownership structure affects corporate value is realized by affecting the cost and efficiency of corporate governance. The appropriate arrangement of ownership structure can promote the efficiency level of corporate governance, moderating benefits of each stakeholder, realizing scientific decision to maximize business value. The paper examines the valid corporate governance mechanisms and the invalid corporate governance mechanisms of restraining over-investment of listed company in China through empirical study.
(4) The empirical examination of the stipulation effect of debt and dividend policies on over-investment of listed company. There are two sides of the debt influence on business investment. On the one side, the shareholder-creditor conflicts could bring asset substitution and under-investment question; On the other hand, the company has to pay for the debt and interest which can decrease the business funds and over-investment behavior. The dividend policy could also affect the internal funds and free cash flow in business enterprise, reducing the chance of being engaged in negative net present value and over-investment. The paper examines the effect of debt and dividend policy of restraining over-investment of listed company in China under the soft stipulation in budget through empirical study.
(5) The prevention and governance of over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company. Based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some suggestions of the prevention and governance of low efficient investment particularly over-investment of Chinese listed company, such as the reform of finance and investment system, the establishment and promotion of inner control system and corporate governance.
The innovation of the paper mainly includes three points.
First, the paper establishes the analysis frame of over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company, and explains the formation mechanism based on the calculating model of over-investment. The paper concerns the phenomenon of low efficiency investment for point of departure. The paper confirms the existence of over-investment of Chinese listed company from theoretical and empirical evidence, examining the sensitivity between free cash flow and over-investment degree. The theoretical and empirical researches above are both helpful to discover true causes of the descending investment efficiency.
Second, the paper discusses corporate governance questions from the rights balance of stakeholders to scientific decision-making degree , studying over-investment behavior in the eye of corporate governance, which makes the realm and theories of corporate governance studies deep and perfect. The paper leads corporate governance into the traditional investment- cash flow analysis model, investigating connections among investment behavior, free cash flow and corporate governance. The paper establishes a theoretical business investment behavior model driven by information asymmetry and agent question, which is examined by empirical study of finance data of Chinese listed company. These researches provide some new valuable methods for business enterprise to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow.
Third,the paper analyzes the effect of ownership structure, corporate governance mechanisms, liabilities and dividend policies on the over-investment degree of listed company through empirical studies. Based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some valuable suggestions of the prevention and governance of over-investment of Chinese listed company.
企业是经济运行的主体,宏观层面的“投资过热”与微观层面的企业“过度投资”是密不可分的。所谓“过度投资”,是指企业的投资超出或偏离了自身的能力和成长机会,投资于净现值为负的非盈利项目,从而损害企业的价值。由于中国市场经济尚处于不成熟阶段,加之股权结构不合理,上市公司“过度投资”行为更为明显和严重,“过度投资”已成为制约中国上市公司质量提升和长期持续发展的主要因素。更值得注意的是,我国相当一部分企业的投资靠银行信贷支持,而投资效率过低意味着信贷回收的前景堪忧以及金融系统风险的积累。
现代企业中所有权与控制权的分离、信息不对称以及监控成本的存在,使自由现金流处于经理人控制之下,经理人具有将资源投入到非盈利项目的能力;同时,经理人的报酬(包括显性报酬和隐性报酬)通常与企业规模正相关;这样,经理人既有能力也有动机将本应发放给股东的红利投入到能够给自己带来私人收益的非盈利项目,从而导致企业过度投资。另一方面,大股东控制了公司的经营决策权,为其掠夺中小股东财富提供了可能。实践中,大股东掠夺小股东获取控制权收益的一个主要方式就是投资资金的滥用以及不正当关联交易。在现代公司运作过程中,股东-经理人冲突引发的代理型治理问题、大股东-中小股东冲突引发的剥夺型治理问题以及股东-债权人冲突引发的债务型治理问题都直接影响着企业的投资决策,其中最主要的体现就是过度投资。
中国的国有企业,由于所有者“虚位”,代理问题和利益冲突更加严重,当企业产生充足的现金流时,国有企业的经营者往往选择通过加大固定资产投资、发展多元化产业或兼并收购等来扩大企业规模。企业通过留存利润增加投资,不用像从金融部门获得融资那样受到严格的审核监督,而且经营者可以控制更多的资源和权力,如果投资顺利、企业规模壮大,还可以获得政府的奖励和更高的薪酬;即使投资项目失败,由于国有企业所有者“虚位”、公司治理机制虚化,也不用承担损失;而分红意味着经营者可控资源的减少和转移,所以往往出现产生高额利润的垄断企业宁愿发展根本不具竞争优势的副业、甚至投资净现值为负的非盈利项目(过度投资),也不向国家或投资者分红的现象。这也是目前出现部门利益凌驾于国家利益、投资效率较低、宏观调控效率不高的根源之一。由于中国上市公司大多由原国有企业改制而成,投资行为并没有摆脱利用财政和银行资金的“投资饥渴症”的影响,在部分投资资金来源于资本市场后,依然沿袭原国有企业的投资行为模式,在过度留存利润和公司治理机制不完善的情况下,普遍存在过度投资行为,导致企业资金配置效率低下和宏观层面的投资过热。
公司治理与企业投资行为存在着不可分割的联系。有效的公司治理能通过一系列制度安排实现股东、债权人和经理人等之间的相互制衡,防范和化解股东-债权人、股东-经理人、大股东-中小股东之间的利益冲突,防范投资风险,保证企业投资决策的科学化和有效运行。正是在这个意义上,Milgorm and Roberts指出,当企业被看作是一组不完备契约时,企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权间的有效结合是提高企业投资效率和经营效率的关键。而公司治理的本质就是关于企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权分配的制度性安排。因此,公司治理在企业投资决策过程中发挥重要作用,公司治理水平直接关系到企业的投资效率。
作为未来现金流量增长的基础和企业成长的主要动因,企业投资行为本应受到学术界的重视,但是由于企业投资行为本身的复杂性,其研究长期处于零散、停滞状态。可喜的是,最近20年来,企业投资—现金流分析范式日趋完善,企业投资不再是“黑箱”,为人们逐步认识和分析企业投资行为提供了理论支持。而目前关于中国企业投资行为的研究还处于起步阶段,与企业的实际投资行为脱钩,还没有对现实条件下中国企业的非效率投资行为作出令人满意的解释。
本文在系统借鉴和吸收西方最新企业投资行为研究成果基础上,综合运用管理学、金融学、信息经济学、计量经济学和公司治理理论,采用文献研究、理论论证、比较分析、统计数据分析、制度分析等研究方法,结合中国资本市场的实际情况,对信息不对称条件下的企业投资行为进行了深入的分析,通过实证研究检验了上市公司过度投资与自由现金流的敏感性,揭示了股权结构、公司治理、负债融资及股利政策等对中国上市公司过度投资的真实影响,阐释了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质,对如何有效控制企业“过度投资”及完善上市公司治理进行了有益的理论分析,提出了有针对性的政策建议。
论文主要围绕以下问题展开:
(1)上市公司存在“过度投资”的理论分析、实证证据及其形成机理。以企业投资理论为基础,结合中国国情,系统分析了上市公司“过度投资”的可能性。借鉴国内外企业投资行为研究的最新成果,建立计量模型,对中国上市公司的过度投资程度进行了衡量,论文通过实证研究证明,相当一部分中国上市公司存在比较严重的过度投资行为,而且近年来有不断加剧的倾向。
(2)自由现金流对上市公司过度投资的“催化”作用及敏感性分析。自由现金流一方面可以提高企业内部融资能力,缓解企业面临的外部融资压力,降低企业因融资约束而发生投资不足的可能性:另一方面,充足的现金流增加了企业经理人的机会主义倾向,如果没有良好的内部治理机制和科学的投资决策机制为保障,自由现金流会给企业带来很严重的代理成本,将企业经营者的过度投资动机“催化”为实际行动。论文通过实证研究发现中国上市公司过度投资与自由现金流之间存在很高的敏感性,证实了“自由现金流”假说。
(3)股权结构、公司治理机制对上市公司过度投资的真实影响。股权结构确立了股东的构成,决定了公司决策机构、执行机构和监督机构的结构以及这些机构与经理人的关系,对公司治理和企业投资决策产生深刻的影响。股权结构对公司价值的影响,是通过影响公司的治理成本、治理效率和企业行为来实现的。适当的股权安排和融资结构选择可促进公司治理、提高治理效率,而好的治理结构又能确保公司经理层得到正好为其投资所需(但又不是更多)的资金来完成净现值为正的项目,协调各利益相关者之间的冲突,实现决策科学化和企业价值最大化。论文通过实证研究分析了股权结构、公司治理机制对上市公司过度投资的真实影响,检验了具体哪些公司治理机制对过度投资起到了有效的抑制作用,哪些公司治理机制尚未真正发挥作用。
(4)负债融资及股利政策对上市公司过度投资约束功效的实证检验。负债对企业投资决策的影响具有两面性:一方面负债带来的股东-债权人冲突催生了股东的资产替代和投资不足行为;另一方面,负债本息的固定支付有利于减少企业的闲置资金,对企业滥用自由现金流的过度投资行为起到抑制作用。利润分配也会影响企业内部资金情况,支付现金股利减少了自由现金流,从而减少了企业从事净现值为负的项目的机会,因此股利发放也可以在一定程度上减轻过度投资问题。论文通过实证研究检验了在预算软约束情况下负债融资及现金股利对上市公司过度投资的约束功能及效果。
(5)上市公司非效率投资尤其是“过度投资”行为的预防和治理。在实证研究的基础上,论文从宏观层面的金融与投资体制改革、微观层面的企业内部控制及公司治理机制完善等角度,有针对性地提出了中国上市公司非效率投资尤其是“过度投资”行为治理的对策和建议。
论文的创新点主要体现在:
第一,结合中国的现实情况,构建了一个中国上市公司“过度投资”行为分析框架,在上市公司过度投资程度计量模型的基础上,通过实证研究揭示了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质。以上市公司非效率投资现象为出发点,在科学衡量企业过度投资程度的基础上,从理论分析、实证研究等方面系统论证了中国上市公司确实存在“过度投资”行为,考察了自由现金流与上市公司过度投资程度的关联性,揭示了中国上市公司“过度投资”行为的形成机理和实质,以利于发现中国上市公司投资效率低下的真实原因。
第二,从权利主体的制衡上升到科学决策高度探讨公司治理问题,并以公司治理视角对企业过度投资行为进行了系统研究,深化和拓展了公司治理问题的研究领域和理论体系。论文在传统的企业投资-现金流分析范式基础上引入公司治理因素,对公司治理、自由现金流和企业投资行为三者间的关联性进行全面系统分析,在借鉴和吸收最新企业投资行为研究成果基础上,建立了一个由信息不对称和代理问题驱动的企业过度投资行为理论模型,并利用中国上市公司的财务数据进行了实证检验,为企业有效降低自由现金流代理成本提供了思路和依据。
第三,通过实证研究,分析和检验了股权结构、各种公司治理机制、负债融资及股利政策等对中国上市公司过度投资程度的真实影响,对上市公司过度投资行为的治理和防范提供了有针对性的政策建议。
In recent years, Chinese economy keeps a fleet rate of increase. And investment plays an important role in the development of Chinese economy. But because of the restrict of resource and consume demands, "hot invest" phenomenon appears in many industry and regions accompany with the excess increase of the investment, which causes series of problems, such as tight lack of energy and original materials, the excess of productive ability, the distort of economic construction, the repetition of development etc. Because of excessive investment, a flood of capital precipitates at some realms with excess production ability and poor profit ability. Excessive investment also reduces the ability of absorbing labor force in economy increase, making difficulty in the coordination development of economy, environment and society.
Business enterprises are the main participants in economy circulation. "Hot invest" of the macroscopic level and "over-investment" of the microscopic level is inseparable. Over-investment is the investment with negative net present value, which injures the value of whole business enterprise beyond the company growth opportunity or development direction. The Chinese market economy is still at its first stage; furthermore, the ownership structure of most corporate is not reasonable at all. The over-investment trend of Chinese listed company is very obvious and serious under above condition. Over-investment question has become a main hindrance to the quantity promotion and long-term development of Chinese listed company. Moreover, the investment funds of many business are mainly supported by bank, so the low investment efficiency of enterprise means the risk accumulation of financial system.
Because of the separation of ownership and control, the asymmetry of information, and the existence of supervision cost, free cash flow is under the control of manager in modern company. Manager has the capability of investing corporate resource to non-profit projects; moreover, manager's payment usually has a kind of positive correlation with corporate scale. So manager has both ability and motive to throw corporate free cash on non-profit projects that could bring himself private benefit, which leads to corporate over-investment. On the other hand, the big shareholder controls the decision power of the company, providing the possibility of violating small shareholder. The big shareholder inclines to obtain private income which small shareholder can not share. In practice, one of the methods that the big shareholder violates small shareholder is to abuse the investment funds and self transaction. Conflicts among manager, big shareholder, small shareholder and creditor all affect investment behaviors, which could lead to over-investment of enterprises.
Because of the vacancy of the owner, agency problem and conflicts of benefits in Chinese state-owned enterprise become more seriously. When there are plenty of cash flow in enterprise, the manager of state-owned enterprise usually chooses to enlarge investment to extend the scale of enterprise. Through investment, the manager could control more resource and power. If investment gains success and enterprise becomes stronger, the manager could acquire the governmental reward with higher salary. Even if investment encounters failure, the manager need not undertake the loss because corporate governance of state-owned enterprise is poor. So the manager of stated-owned enterprise usually would rather invest items which net present value is under zero than give dividend to the owner. Chinese listed companies which are mostly changed from original state-owned enterprise have not got rid of "investment hunger syndrome"after gaining part of funds from capital market. Chinese listed companies with poor governance are still along the investment behavior pattern of the original state-owned enterprise. In the poor governance condition, the over-investment of listed companies with plenty of cash flow become more and more serious, which leads to low efficiency of internal fund allocation and the "hot invest" in the macroscopic level.
The relation between corporate governance and enterprise investment behavior is very closely. Valid corporate governance can realize the balance among shareholders, creditors and managers etc. through series of system arrangement, dissolve the interest conflicts among stakeholders of business enterprises, and guarantee the scientific investment decision and the operation of enterprise. Exactly on this meaning, Milgorm and Roberts points out, when the firm is being viewed as a series of uncompleted contracts, the validly combination of the power to obtain surplus and the power to control is the key for increasing investment efficiency and operating efficiency. And the substance of corporate governance is series of system arrangement concerning the allocation of the power to obtain surplus and the power to control. Therefore, corporate governance plays an important role in the investment decision process. The level of corporate governance is related to the investment efficiency of the business enterprise directly.
As the main cause of future cash flow increase and enterprise growth, investment behavior not only affects the financial and dividend policy directly, but also relates to the business performance strongly. Business investment behavior should be paid with more academic concerns, but because of its complexity, the research on investment behavior has been in stagnation over a long period of time. Furthermore, the research on Chinese business investment behavior is still in its start stage, which could not explain practical investment behavior.
The paper synthesizes western scholar's latest investment theories, adopts kinds of research method, analyzes the investment behavior of information asymmetry condition under the actual circumstance of the Chinese capital market, examines the sensitivity of and free cash flow, researches the true influence of ownership structure, corporate governance, debt and dividend policy to over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company, explains the formation mechanism of over-investment of Chinese listed company. The empirical research provides theory foundation for the governance of over-investment and the establishment of scientific investment decision mechanism of Chinese listed company.
The paper launches the discussion mainly around five questions.
(1) The theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on the over-investment behavior of listed company. Based on business investment theories and Chinese economy actual condition , the paper analyzes the existence possibility of over-investment of listed company. The paper also establishes a calculating model based on the latest theory to measure over-investment degree of Chinese listed company. The empirical research proves that, over-investment of listed companies exists indeed, and has become more and more serious.
(2) The "catalyst" function and sensitivity analysis of free cash flow on over-investment of listed company. Enterprises obtain investment funds from internal or external financial resources. The internal finance does not need pay interest or dividends, so business investment depends on free cash flow strongly. But if there are no valid corporate governance mechanisms, free cash flow would bring the enterprise very serious agency cost, turning the over-investment motive of the business executive to action. The paper examined the sensitivity between the over-investment degree and free cash flow of Chinese listed company.
(3) The true influence of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms on over-investment of listed company. The ownership structure establishes the composition of shareholders , confirming the structure of decision-making, executive and supervising organization and the relation between these organizations and manager, creating deep influence on the investment decision of enterprise. The function that ownership structure affects corporate value is realized by affecting the cost and efficiency of corporate governance. The appropriate arrangement of ownership structure can promote the efficiency level of corporate governance, moderating benefits of each stakeholder, realizing scientific decision to maximize business value. The paper examines the valid corporate governance mechanisms and the invalid corporate governance mechanisms of restraining over-investment of listed company in China through empirical study.
(4) The empirical examination of the stipulation effect of debt and dividend policies on over-investment of listed company. There are two sides of the debt influence on business investment. On the one side, the shareholder-creditor conflicts could bring asset substitution and under-investment question; On the other hand, the company has to pay for the debt and interest which can decrease the business funds and over-investment behavior. The dividend policy could also affect the internal funds and free cash flow in business enterprise, reducing the chance of being engaged in negative net present value and over-investment. The paper examines the effect of debt and dividend policy of restraining over-investment of listed company in China under the soft stipulation in budget through empirical study.
(5) The prevention and governance of over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company. Based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some suggestions of the prevention and governance of low efficient investment particularly over-investment of Chinese listed company, such as the reform of finance and investment system, the establishment and promotion of inner control system and corporate governance.
The innovation of the paper mainly includes three points.
First, the paper establishes the analysis frame of over-investment behavior of Chinese listed company, and explains the formation mechanism based on the calculating model of over-investment. The paper concerns the phenomenon of low efficiency investment for point of departure. The paper confirms the existence of over-investment of Chinese listed company from theoretical and empirical evidence, examining the sensitivity between free cash flow and over-investment degree. The theoretical and empirical researches above are both helpful to discover true causes of the descending investment efficiency.
Second, the paper discusses corporate governance questions from the rights balance of stakeholders to scientific decision-making degree , studying over-investment behavior in the eye of corporate governance, which makes the realm and theories of corporate governance studies deep and perfect. The paper leads corporate governance into the traditional investment- cash flow analysis model, investigating connections among investment behavior, free cash flow and corporate governance. The paper establishes a theoretical business investment behavior model driven by information asymmetry and agent question, which is examined by empirical study of finance data of Chinese listed company. These researches provide some new valuable methods for business enterprise to reduce the agency cost of free cash flow.
Third,the paper analyzes the effect of ownership structure, corporate governance mechanisms, liabilities and dividend policies on the over-investment degree of listed company through empirical studies. Based on the above empirical study, the paper puts forward some valuable suggestions of the prevention and governance of over-investment of Chinese listed company.
引文
[1]中国人民银行曾总结了导致投资过热的五条原因,其中至少有两条是与企业过度投资行为直接相关的。参见:中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2004年第一季度中国货币政策执行报告[M].中国金融出版社,2004.
[2]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[3]参见2006诺贝尔奖获得者、美国财政部顾问埃德蒙德·菲尔普斯(Edmund S Phelps)教授在“中国人文社会科学论坛”(2004)上的演讲:中国需要解决投资低效率的问题。
[4]在宏观层面,常用增量资本产出率(Incremental Capital-Output Ratio,ICOR)来衡量投资效率。增量资本产出率=投资增加量/生产总值增加量,即每增加1元钱的国民生产总值,需要投资几元钱。当ICOR提高时,说明增加单位总产出所需要的资本增晕增大,意味着投资效率下降。中国的增量资本产出率已从20世纪90年代初的不足2上升到最近五年的5,而西方发达国家这一比率在1-2之间。参见:吴敬琏.“十一五”规划和增长方式的转变[Z].中欧国际工商学院“经济增长与创新”管理论坛演讲,2006-4-16.
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[1]统计数字显示,国有赢利企业大部分所获利润的去向是转为所有者权益,即除了部分作流动资金和境外股东分红及内部福利外,大部分留存利润用作新增投资。以中国石油天然气集团公司为例,从2000-2003年,四年的净利润合计为954亿元,而2004年的固定资产就比2000年增加了934亿。中国在1998-2004年合计全社会固定资产投资总额中,国有经济就占13.1万亿,平均每年为18713.5亿,其中赢利国有企业赢利额近5万亿之多,相当大的部分转为投资。参见国家统计局郑京平的文章:郑京平.我国的投资率为何居高难下[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(7):142-144.
[2]高路易(Louis Kuijs),高伟彦(Williae Mako),张春霖.国有企业分红:分多少?分给谁?[R].世界银行驻中国代表处研究报告,2005.10.
[3]正是基于这一认识,国务院总理温家宝2007年5月30日主持召开国务院常务会议,研究部署试行国有资本经营预算工作。会议同意财政部、国资委提出的意见,决定从2007年开始在中央本级试行国有资本经营预算,地方试行的时间、范围和步骤由各省(区、市)及计划单列市人民政府决定。这意味着,国企自1994年以来13年不向政府分红的历史将结束。所谓国有资本经营预算,指的是政府针对国有企业经营性收支的计划,即政府作为股东,对国有企业的利润提取分红和进行再分配。
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[1]国内著名学者李维安教授在谈到公司治理的两个转变时,曾指出,传统的公司治理注重权利主体的相互制衡,但事实上制衡并不是保证各方利益最大化的最有效途径,而只是保证公司科学决策的方式和途径。公司治理的目的是通过协调利益相关者之间的关系实现公司决策的科学化,科学的公司决策不仅是公司的核心同时也是公司治理的核心。参见:李维安,武立东.公司治理教程[M].上海人民出版社,2002.
[2]在微观层面上,非效率投资轻则降低公司的价值和资金配置效率,重则给企业带来灭顶之灾;在宏观层面上,非效率投资尤其是过度投资会带来经济过热,加剧金融风险,危害国民经济的持续发展。
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[1]在现代经济学分析中,“大部分经济分析的基本前提是理性选择(rational choice)假设,即人们对每种可能性的成本和收益的权衡。”“就个人的情况来说,理性假设是指他为追求自身的利益而做出选择和决策”。参见:[美]斯蒂格利茨.经济学[M].中国人民大学出版社,2000,第27页.
[2]实际市场中,企业成长机会受到很多因素的影响,除了企业自身的业务发展情况(财务指标)以外,还有一些难以直接计量的企业特征(如管理能力强弱、社会资本多少、企业经营者魄力等),也会影响企业的成长机会。基于以上考虑,本文以上市公司数据为基础的经济计量模型重点考察上市公司整体层面的过度投资行为。
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[1]本文部分章节经整理后已公开发表。参见:[1]笔者.中国上市公司“过度投资”问题的实证研究[J].金融研究(实务版),2007(9):42-47.
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[1]这与会计上的“投资”含义不完全一致,通常会计上的“投资”是指对外投资,而经济学和财务管理中的投资既包括对外投资,也包括对内投资。本文中的“投资”指的是后者。
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[2]据媒体报道,微软在2003年公司就留有530亿美元现金储备。新浪财经.
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[2]亚当·斯密关于股份公司的经营曾有一段著名的论述:“在钱财的处理上,股份公司的董事为他人尽力,而私人合伙公司的伙员,则纯粹是为自己打算。所以要想使股份公司董事们监视钱财用途像私人合伙公司伙员那样用意周到,那是很难做到的。……疏忽和浪费,常为股份公司业务经营上多少难免的弊端。”显然,斯密已意识到公司治理要解决的一个核心问题——对经营者约束与激励问题,但由于时代局限,他不可能对此做出深入的研究。
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[1]我国学者宁向东提出公司治理问题有两类:一类是代理型公司治理问题,另一类是剥夺型公司治理问题。考虑到美国著名学者布莱尔的观点,“公司治理是指有关公司控制权和剩余索取权分配的一整套法律、文化和制度性安捧,这些安排决定公司的目标,谁拥有公司,如何控制公司,风险和收益如何在公司的一系列组成人员,包括股东、债权人、职工、用户、供应商以及公司所在的社区之间分配等一系列问题。”以及南开大学李维安教授的观点,“公司治理是通过一套包括正式及非正式的制度安捧,来协调公司与所有利害相关者(股东、债权人、供应者、雇员、政府、社区等)之间的利益关系,以保证公司决策的科学化。”可见,协调股东-债权人关系是公司治理的题中应有之义,因此在这里将公司治理问题概括为三类。参见:[1]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2005.
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[2]童盼和陆正飞关于负债融资对企业投资行为的影响进行了较详细的研究综述,本小节内容参考了他们的研究。参见:童盼,陆正飞.负债融资对企业投资行为影响研究:述评与展望[J].会计研究,2005(12):71-76.
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[5]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful:a comment on Kaplan and Zingales[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):695-705.
[6]Kaplan,Steven N.and Luigi Zingales.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of financing constraints[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):707-712.
[1]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学.2002(8):43-47.
[2]何金耿.上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析[J].证券市场导报,2001(9):44-47.
[3]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]Vogt,S.C..The cash flow-investment relationship:Evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms[J].Financial Management,1994(2):3-20.
[1]也就是说,如果具有低质量成长机会的公司出现较高的投资-现金流敏感性,则说明该公司可能存在过度投资;如果具有高质量成长机会的公司出现较高的投资-现金流敏感性,则说明该公司可能投资不足。参见:Vogt,S.C..The cash flow-investment relationship:Evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms[J].Financial Management,1994(2):3-20.
[2]Hovakimian,Gayane and Sheridan Titman.Corporate investment with financial constraints:sensitivity of investment to funds from voluntary asset sales[Z].NBER Working Paper NO.9432,2002.
[3]Richardson,Morgado,Pindado等人近年来的有关研究均采用了类似方法。参见:[1]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[2]Morgado,Artur and Julio Pindado.The underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses——An analysis using panel data[J].European Financial Management,2003(2):163-177.
[4]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]Easterbrook,F..Two agency-cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984(74):650-659.
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[4]Berger,P.G.,E.Ofek and D.L.Yermack.Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions[J].Journal of Finance,1997(50):1411-1438.
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[6]Gaver,J.J.and K.M.Gaver.Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set[J].Financial management,1995(24):19-32.
[1]Jensen,M.and K.J.Murphy.Performance pay and top management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990(2):225-264.
[1]本文所用的投资率指资本形成额与支出法国内生产总值之比,反映了投资对国民经济增长的贡献。
[2]郑京平.我国的投资率为何居高难下[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(7):142-144.
[3]根据国家统计局网站和《2005年中国统计年鉴》,中国统计出版社,2005.
[4]著名经济学家刘国光、吴敬琏、许小年和2006年度诺贝尔经济学奖获得者埃德蒙·菲尔普斯(Edmund S Phelps)等较早就指出这一问题。可参见:[1]方明.让过度投资实现“软着陆”——访著名经济学家刘国光[J].中国投资,2004(8):20-22.
[2]刘芳.吴敬琏、许小年共同把脉“没有温度的高烧”[N].解放日报,2004-6-26.
[3]埃德蒙·菲尔普斯.中国需要解决投资低效率问题[Z].在“中国人文社会科学论坛”上的演讲,2004-6-25.
[4]贺鹏飞.过度投资致使浙江企业陷入困境行业亏损严重[Z].中国新闻网,2005-1-11.
[5]谢国忠.GDP修正并不能改变过度投资的事实[Z].新浪财经,2005-12-25.
[5]统计数据显示,在中国的经济增长中,固定资产投资对GDP增长的贡献率已近60%。2004年全社会固定资产投资增长率为26.6%,2005年为27.2%,2006年上半年投资增长速度更是达到了31.3%的高水平。
[1]中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2004年第一季度中国货币政策执行报告[M].中国金融出版社,2004.
[2]很多研究表明,中国上市公司经理人薪酬与企业规模显著正相关,这从一个侧面说明Jensen的自由现金流代理成本理论的基本逻辑在中国是适用的。参见:魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[3]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]这方面的文献很多,在此仅列出几篇比较经典的文献:[1]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Financing constraints and corporate investment[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988(1):141-195.
[2]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful:a comment on Kaplan and Zingales[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):695-705.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[3]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,2002(8):43-47.
[4]Faccio,M.and M.Lasfer.Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2000(6):71-110.
[1]Goergen,Marc and Luc Renneboog.Investment policy,internal finance and ownership distribution in the UK[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001(7):257-284.
[2]Gedajlovic,Eric R.,Toru Yoshikawa and Motomi Hashimoto.Ownership structure,investment behavior aad firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries[J].Organization Studies,2005(1):7-35.
[3]由于绝大多数中国上市公司都存在控制性大股东,可以认为第一大股东和控股股东的身份是基本一致的,因此在本文中未对两者进行区分。
[4]陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8):28-35.
[1]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[2]La Porta等人对大股东掠夺中小股东现象进行了一系列研究。参见:[1]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999(2):471-517.
[2]Johnson S.,R.LaPorta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000(90):22-27.
[3]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[3]Fama E..Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Eeonomy,1980(88):288-307.
[4]Shleifer A.and R.W.Vishny.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1986(3):461-489.
[1]贾宝丽.投资者结构发生重大转折,机构持股市值已超4成——来自2007年全国证券期货监管会议上的最新数据[N].上海证券报,2007-1-25.
[1]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[2]Margaret M.Blair and Bruce K.Maclaury.Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century[M].Washington,D.C:Brookings Institute,1995.
[3]Fama and Jensen.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983(26):301-325.
[1]詹姆斯·莫里斯.公司治理与高管薪酬[J].南开管理评论,2006(1):13-16.
[2]根据委托代理理论,高管的薪酬要与企业的业绩挂钩才能起到激励的作用。然而,大量的薪酬业绩敏感性分析却没有发现高管薪酮和企业业绩之间明显的相关关系。参见:Jensen Michael,Kevin J.Murphy.Performance pay and top management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990(98):225-264.
[3]该假说也可进一步表述为:经理人只要在一定的范围内不激怒(outrage)股东,通过一定的隐藏(camouflage),管理层就可以收买董事、影响薪酬契约进而实现自身利益最大化。参见:Bebchuk,L.,J.Fried and D.Walker.Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002(69):751-846.
[4]Bebchuk,L.and J.Fried..Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economics Perspective,2003(3):71-92.
[5]在美国,CEO薪酬的增长速度远远高于经济的增长速度,1980-1995年美国GDP的增长率为311%,而同期美国汽车行业CEO的年平均薪酬增长率为716%。1980年美国CEO薪酬与蓝领工人薪酬的平均比例是42:1,而到了1998年,这一比例已经上升到了419:1。
[1]Demsetz,H.,Villalonga.Ownership structure and corporate performance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001(7):209-233.
[2]可参见:[1]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[2]袁国良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].社会科学文献出版社,2000,第494-507页.
[3]参见:[1]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[2]Easterbrook,F..Two agency-cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984(74):650-659.
[1]这也是造成该问题实证检验较为困难的重要原因,因为研究者很难判断负债与投资之间的关系究竟是由哪种理论引起的。
[2]John,K.and L.Senbet.Limited liability,corporate leverage,and public policy[M].New York University and University of Wisconsin-Madison Mimeo,1988.
[3]Stulz,Rene.Managerial discretion and optimal financing choices[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-28.
[4]Barnea和Parrino等都对短期负债在减少过度投资和资产替代等问题方面的作用进行了验证。可参见:[1]Barnea,Amir,Robert Haugen and Lemma Senbet.A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework[J].Journal of Finance,1980(35):1223-1234.
[2]Parrino,R.and M.S.Weisbach.Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999(53):3-42.
[1]童盼.负债期限结构与企业投资规模——来自中国A股上市公司的经验研究[J].经济科学,2005(5):93-101.
[2]Easterbrook,F..Two agency-cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984(74):650-659.
[3]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]Rozeff,Michael S..Growth,beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios[J].Journal of Financial Research,1982(5):249-259.
[5]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[1]Narayanan,M.P..Managerial incentives for short-term results[J].Journal of Finance,1985(40):1469-1484.
[1]Stulz,Rene.Managerial discretion and optimal financing choices[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-27.
[2]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers [J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[3]Shleifer and Vishny.Managerial entrenchment:The case of manager-specific investment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(25):123-140.
[1]La Porta,Rafael,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,and Andrei Shleifer.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999(2):471-516.
[2]袁国良,郑江准,胡志乾.我国上市公司融资偏好和融资能力的实证研究[J].管理世界,1999(3):150-157.
[3]贺振华.寻租、过度投资与地方保护[J].南开经济研究,2006(2):64-73.
[4]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005(7):123-128.
[1]潘敏,金岩.信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资[J].金融研究,2003(1):36-45.
[2]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,2002(8):43-47.
[3]Hovakimian,Gayaneand Sheridan Titman.Corporate investment with financial constraints:sensitivity of investment to funds from voluntary asset sales[Z].NBER Working Paper NO.9432,2002.
[4]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[1]托宾Q=企业的市场价值÷企业的重置成本。托宾Q假说预言,企业资产的边际Q值是决定投资的最重要因素,Q值越大企业越倾向于增加投资。
[2]宋剑峰等通过对中国上市公司数据的实证检验说明,市净率是一个能较好预示中国上市公司未来成长性的指标。饶育蕾等人认为由于中国资本市场不成熟,衡量公司成长性,主营业务收入增长率是一个比较可靠的指标。可参见:[1]宋剑峰.净资产倍率、市盈率与公司的成长性[J].经济研究,2000(8):36-45.
[2]饶育蕾,汪玉英.中困上市公司大股东对投资影响的实证研究[J].南开管理评论.2006(4):51-57.
[1]Hovakimian,Gayaneand Sheridan Titman.Corporate investment with financial constraints:sensitivity of investment to funds from voluntary asset sales[Z].NBER Working Paper NO.9432,2002.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[3]局限之一就是这种方法没有考虑系统风险,即如果整个市场是投资过度(或投资不足)的,用这一方法衡量的企业过度投资程度会存在系统偏差;由于衡量的复杂性,国外学者在相关研究中一般不考虑整个市场存在的系统偏差,本文在实证研究中也未加以考虑。
[4]在Richardson,Morgado,Pindado等人近年来的有关研究均采用了类似方法。
[1]企业内部融资来源主要包括:税后留存利润、计提折旧、企业变卖融资、应收账款融资等。企业内部融资能力的大小取决于企业利润水平、现金流量水平和净资产规模等因素。同外部融资相比,企业内部融资受到的外部限制比较小,融资成本比较低。
[2]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers [J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[3]Myers,S.C.and Nicholas S.Majluf.Corporate financing and investment decision when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):187-221.
[4]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers [J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,2002(8):43-47.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[1]中华人民共和国财政部.企业会计准则——现金流量表[S].2001年修订版.
[2]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]可参见:[1]Devereux,Michael P.and F.Schiantarelli.Investment,financial factors,and cash flow:evidence from UK panel data[A].R.Hubbard(ed.).Asymmetric information,corporate finance,and investment[C].University of Chicago Press,pp.279-306,1990.
[2]Athey,M.J.and P.S.Laumas.Internal funds and corporate investment in India[J].Journal of Development Economics,1994(45):287-303.
[2]Vogt,S.C..The cash flow-investment relationship:Evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms[J].Financial Management,1994(2):3-20.
[1]Miller and Fama.The theory of finance[M].Holt,Rinehart and Winston,1972.
[2]苑德军,刘岱,郭春丽.上市公司股权结构与公司价值关系研究[N].上海证券报,2005-2-22.
[1]一直以来,困绕我国上市公司发展的股权结构两大先天性缺陷是国有股“一股独大”和股权结构的“二元”特征。所谓股权结构的二元特征即同一上市公司的股权被人为分割为流通股和非流通股两类。股权结构的这种制度安排不仅对我国证券市场的运行和发展造成了严重的消极影响,还严重影响到企业融资、企业并购重组等方面。由于截至2006年底,我国上市公司股权分置改革已基本完成,因此本文不再讨论这一问题。
[2]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[1]许小年.以法人机构为主体建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J].改革,1997(5):28-34.
[2]周业安.金融抑制对企业融资能力影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,1999(2):12-19.
[3]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12):23-30.
[4]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者保护[J].经济研究,2001(11):3-11.
[5]朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001(12):66-72.
[6]如白重恩等认为股权集中度和公司价值正相关,而夏立军等则认为股权集中度与公司价值显著负相关。参见:[1]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.
[2]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值.经济研究,2005(5):40-51.
[7]朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001(12):66-72.
[1]在这里之所以仅选择2004年的数据,是考虑到企业投资效果需要时间检验,也有利于将存在过度投资的上市公司与未发生过度投资的上市公司进行比较。同时本文中用到的一些数据及字段需要手工逐个收集,收集始于2005年10月,历时一年有余。
[2]笔者根据证监会网站及上市公司年报对数据库中缺失的数据及未包含的字段进行了补充和整理。
[1]陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8):28-35.
[1]央企2005年实现净利润6276.5亿元,2004年全年的净利润为4000亿元。2003年,包括省级和市级企业在内的所有非金融类国有企业的利润总额达到了7590亿元。中国移动、中国石油、国家电网、中石化、中国电信,这五家企业2005年的利润就占到中央企业当年实现利润的70%。但由于历史原因,国家及政府部门一直没有从这些大型国有企业分红。
[2]国有企业过度留存利润因投资冲动的局限性及治理结构不完善,必然带来过度扩张,其后果很可能导致资金链断裂,三九集团就是很好的例证。
[3]王红茹.国务院今年试点向国企提取分红[J].中国经济周刊,2007(23):6-7.
[4]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[5]Fama E..Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Eeonomy,1980(88):288-307.
[1]股权集中度(Concentration Ratio of Shares)是指全部股东因持股比例的不同所表现出来的股权集中还是分散的数量化指标,是衡量公司的股权分布状态的主要指标。通常用前五大股东或前十大股东持股比例之和或平方和表示。
[2]可参见:[1]许小年.以法人机构为主体建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J].改革,1997(5):28-34.
[2]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12):23-30.
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[1]Brent,A..Some funds try shareholder activism[J].Mutual Fund Market News,2002(10):1-3.
[2]Stuart L.Gillan and Laura T.Starks.Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism:the role of institutional investors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(57):275-305.
[1]曾德明,龙淼,龚红.机构投资者持股对公司绩效的影响研究[J].软科学,2006(1):37-39.
[2]转引自:徐向艺等.公司治理制度安排与组织设计[M].经济科学出版社,2006,第15页.
[3]Stuart L.Gillan and Laura T.Starks.Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism:the role of institutional investors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(57):275-305.
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[4]国内学者关于中国上市公司治理结构的研究很多,在此就不再一一列举。
[1]谢永珍.中国上市公司董事会独立性指数及其实证观察[J].山东社会科学,2005(6):50-54.
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[1]我国上市公司的特殊性,如国有股“一股独大”、国有资产所有者缺位、外部市场监控功能弱化等,使之对独立董事独立性的要求更高,独立董事除了自身要具备一定的条件之外,还必须独立于控股股东。相比大股东直接推荐,由董事会提名委员会提名的董事相对能较多关注利益相关者的利益,但这仅仅是个前提,其关键在于提名委员会成员的构成。
[2]Klein,A..Firm performance and board committee structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998(5):275-303.
[1]谢朝斌.试论股份公司董事会专业委员会及其独立性规制[J].甘肃政法学院学报,2004(6):35-39.
[1]Klein,A..Firm performance and board committee structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998(5):275-303.
[2]比如提名委员会在提名时要多考虑薪酬委员会对经理人的业绩评价,审计委员会要对薪酬委员会通过的报酬计划进行审计等。
[3]李维安.中国上市公司治理评价系统研究[J].南开管理评论,2003(3):13-25.
[1]Main,B..Pay in the boardroom practices and procedures[J].Personnel Review,1993(22):3-14.
[2]Hallock,K.F..Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation[J].Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis,1997(3):331-343.
[3]Conyon,M.J and S.I.Peck.Board control,remuneration committees and top management compensation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1997(2):146-157.
[4]该假说也可进一步表述为:经理人只要在一定的范围内不激怒(outrage)股东,通过一定的隐藏(camouflage),管理层就可以收买董事、影响薪酬契约进而实现自身利益最大化。参见:Bebchuk,L.,J.Fried and D.Walker.Managerial powerand rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of ChicagoLaw Review,2002(69):751-846.
[5]也就是说,管理层薪酬激励并不必然是解决代理问题的工具,它自身也可能成为代理问题的一部分。参见:Bebchuk,L.and J.Fried..Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economics Perspective,2003(3):71-92.
[1]关于经理报酬的影响因素,可参见:肖继辉.关于经理报酬的西方研究动态[J].审计与经济研究,2005(6):92-96.
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[1]笔者也对2001-2003年的数据进行了检验,发现与2004年的统计结果差别不大。
[1]净资产收益率是公司税后利润除以净资产得到的百分比率,用以衡量公司运用自有资本的效率。净资产收益率可衡量公司对股东投入资本的利用效率,它弥补了每股税后利润指标的不足。在反映上市公司经营业绩的指标中,净资产收益率是反映企业经营业绩的一个综合、全面的指标。
[3]添加行业因素、成长性等控制变量后,依然显著。这与魏刚等人的研究结论是一致的。参见:魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[4]这也证明了Jensen的自由现金流量理论在中国的适用性,他指出,与股东相比,经理更关心企业的规模问题,因为大企业经理的社会地位及所获得的各种货币、非货币收入较中小企业高得多。因此,“经理们存在扩张企业规模的动机,这种动机会促使经理将闲置资金投资于能够扩大企业规模的非盈利项目,从而牺牲股东的利益来增加自己的财富,产生过度投资”。参见:Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[IT].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]添加行业因素、成长性等一系列控制变量后,发现对结果影响不大,依然不相关。
[2]杨瑞龙.国有上市公司高管薪酬:宜疏不宜堵[J].资本市场,2006(8):56-57.
[1]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2006):国有控股上市公司治理[R].2006.11.
[2]OGSM是Objective(目的)、Goals(目标)、Strategy(策略)、Measurement(评价与衡量标准)的简称。
[1]Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-360.
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[5]Pindado,Julio and Chabela de la Torre.The effect of ownership structure on under-investment and over-investment process[Z],http://www.ssrn.com,2004.
[1]袁国良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].社会科学文献出版社,2000,第494-507页.
[2]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[3]刘国亮,王加胜.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2000(5):40-45.
[4]在这里之所以仅选择2004年一年的数据,还考虑到有利于将存在过度投资的样本与当年未发生过度投资的样本进行比较。另外,笔者也对2001、2002、2003年的数据进行了检验,发现与2004年的统计结果差别不大。
[5]添加企业规模、行业因素、成长性等一系列控制变量后,发现对结果的影响不大,依然不相关。
[1]这与袁国良、李增泉等人的研究结论是一致的。参见:[1]袁圆良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].社会科学文献出版社,2000,第494-507页.
[2]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[2]《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》自2006年10月份已开始实施。其第五条规定,实施股权激励的上市公司应具备的条件是,“公司治理结构规范,外部董事及独立董事占董事会成员1/2以上;建立以独立董事为主任委员、外部董事及独立董事占多数的薪酬委员会:企业经营稳健、业绩未出现异常波动;近3年无违法违规行为和不良纪录。”“薪酬委员会由外部董事构成,且薪酬委员会制度健全,议事规则完善,运行规范。”
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[1]当企业投资于风险较高的项目时,如果项目成功,债权人只得到事先约定的支付,并不因风险项目的成功获得额外的报酬,但是股东却得到了全部的超额收益:如果项目失败,股东充其量以其在企业的全部投资额偿付债权人,其余损失却由债权人自己承担。参见:Jensen,M.and W.Meckling.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-336.
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[1]江伟,沈艺峰.大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护[J].财经研究,2005(12):95-106.
[2]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):75-84.
[3]何进日,周艺.债务融资对企业过度投资约束的分析[J].湘潭师范学院学报,2004(5):43-45.
[4]油晓峰.我国上市公司负债融资与过度投资治理[J].财贸经济,2006(10):23-25.
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[1]Parrino,R.and M.S.Weisbach.Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999(53):3-42.
[2]国内很多学者都对负债的相机治理及其对过度投资的约束效用进行了实证检验,大多数研究结果显示,负债并未对过度投资起到显著的约束功效。如:兰艳泽.对我国上市公司债务约束功效的实证检验和分析[J].中央财经大学学报,2005(10):76-80.
[3]比如,中国上市公司的债权人主要是国有商业银行,且贷款利率也相对固定,这同国外上市公司以发行债券为主的负债融资存在显著的差别。
[1]在我国资本市场还不健全、信息不完全的情况下,应当充分发挥银行的信息和监督优势,积极地利用债权约束来参与公司治理。
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[1]辛清泉,林斌.债务杠杆与企业投资:双重预算软约束视角[J].财经研究,2006(7):73-83.
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[3]“预算软约束”由Kornai最先提出,当时指的是社会主义国家政府持续救助入不敷出的国有企业,由于政府救助,企业不存在破产威胁,预算约束变软。随着计划经济体制转轨和对市场经济中非市场成分的深入观察,预算软约束的含义被拓展泛化。Dewatripont和Tirole提出了道德风险下的内生化预算软约束理论模型。该模型指出,如果追加的贷款成本低于收回全部贷款本金和利息的可能收益,贷款方就愿意软化预算约束,继续提供贷款而非清算重整企业。本文采用的是Kornai后来在1998年给出的“预算软约束”的狭义概念。参见:[1]Kornai,Janos.Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained systems[J].Econometrica,1979(47):801-819.
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[1]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2):17-27.
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[4]政府通过银行对企业的援助是有成本的。由于政策性贷款,我国的国有银行已经产生了大量的呆账坏账,累积了相当大的金融系统风险。
[1]郭强,帅萍.民企过度投资的经济学分析[J].当代经济管理,2006(2):33-35.
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[1]一般而言,股利支付率太低,容易引起股东不满,损害企业形象,导致股价下跌;股利支付率过高,降低企业再投资能力,增加融资成本,影响未来获利能力。
[2]其中的主流理论之一是股利代理成本理论,该理论认为,现金股利发放能有效的降低代理成本。通过支付股利。公司有资金需求时必须对外融资,公司的经营与财务将受到监督审核,可以减少管理层出于私利盲目扩张或投资低回报的项目或用于个人享受浪费等不利于股东价值最大化的过度投资行为。
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[2]他们还发现,西欧企业如果存在多个大股东会形成互相制衡的局面,而东亚企业的多个大股东则会通过合谋侵害小股东利益。参见:Faccio,Mara,Larry Long,and Leslie Young.Dividends and expropriation[J].American Economic Review,2001(91):54-78.
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[4]见本文第6章第2节对上市公司股权结构的描述性统计,其他学者的研究结果也基本相同。
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[3]参见2006诺贝尔奖获得者、美国财政部顾问埃德蒙德·菲尔普斯(Edmund S Phelps)教授在“中国人文社会科学论坛”(2004)上的演讲:中国需要解决投资低效率的问题。
[4]在宏观层面,常用增量资本产出率(Incremental Capital-Output Ratio,ICOR)来衡量投资效率。增量资本产出率=投资增加量/生产总值增加量,即每增加1元钱的国民生产总值,需要投资几元钱。当ICOR提高时,说明增加单位总产出所需要的资本增晕增大,意味着投资效率下降。中国的增量资本产出率已从20世纪90年代初的不足2上升到最近五年的5,而西方发达国家这一比率在1-2之间。参见:吴敬琏.“十一五”规划和增长方式的转变[Z].中欧国际工商学院“经济增长与创新”管理论坛演讲,2006-4-16.
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[1]统计数字显示,国有赢利企业大部分所获利润的去向是转为所有者权益,即除了部分作流动资金和境外股东分红及内部福利外,大部分留存利润用作新增投资。以中国石油天然气集团公司为例,从2000-2003年,四年的净利润合计为954亿元,而2004年的固定资产就比2000年增加了934亿。中国在1998-2004年合计全社会固定资产投资总额中,国有经济就占13.1万亿,平均每年为18713.5亿,其中赢利国有企业赢利额近5万亿之多,相当大的部分转为投资。参见国家统计局郑京平的文章:郑京平.我国的投资率为何居高难下[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(7):142-144.
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[3]正是基于这一认识,国务院总理温家宝2007年5月30日主持召开国务院常务会议,研究部署试行国有资本经营预算工作。会议同意财政部、国资委提出的意见,决定从2007年开始在中央本级试行国有资本经营预算,地方试行的时间、范围和步骤由各省(区、市)及计划单列市人民政府决定。这意味着,国企自1994年以来13年不向政府分红的历史将结束。所谓国有资本经营预算,指的是政府针对国有企业经营性收支的计划,即政府作为股东,对国有企业的利润提取分红和进行再分配。
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[1]国内著名学者李维安教授在谈到公司治理的两个转变时,曾指出,传统的公司治理注重权利主体的相互制衡,但事实上制衡并不是保证各方利益最大化的最有效途径,而只是保证公司科学决策的方式和途径。公司治理的目的是通过协调利益相关者之间的关系实现公司决策的科学化,科学的公司决策不仅是公司的核心同时也是公司治理的核心。参见:李维安,武立东.公司治理教程[M].上海人民出版社,2002.
[2]在微观层面上,非效率投资轻则降低公司的价值和资金配置效率,重则给企业带来灭顶之灾;在宏观层面上,非效率投资尤其是过度投资会带来经济过热,加剧金融风险,危害国民经济的持续发展。
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[1]在现代经济学分析中,“大部分经济分析的基本前提是理性选择(rational choice)假设,即人们对每种可能性的成本和收益的权衡。”“就个人的情况来说,理性假设是指他为追求自身的利益而做出选择和决策”。参见:[美]斯蒂格利茨.经济学[M].中国人民大学出版社,2000,第27页.
[2]实际市场中,企业成长机会受到很多因素的影响,除了企业自身的业务发展情况(财务指标)以外,还有一些难以直接计量的企业特征(如管理能力强弱、社会资本多少、企业经营者魄力等),也会影响企业的成长机会。基于以上考虑,本文以上市公司数据为基础的经济计量模型重点考察上市公司整体层面的过度投资行为。
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[1]这与会计上的“投资”含义不完全一致,通常会计上的“投资”是指对外投资,而经济学和财务管理中的投资既包括对外投资,也包括对内投资。本文中的“投资”指的是后者。
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[1]我国学者宁向东提出公司治理问题有两类:一类是代理型公司治理问题,另一类是剥夺型公司治理问题。考虑到美国著名学者布莱尔的观点,“公司治理是指有关公司控制权和剩余索取权分配的一整套法律、文化和制度性安捧,这些安排决定公司的目标,谁拥有公司,如何控制公司,风险和收益如何在公司的一系列组成人员,包括股东、债权人、职工、用户、供应商以及公司所在的社区之间分配等一系列问题。”以及南开大学李维安教授的观点,“公司治理是通过一套包括正式及非正式的制度安捧,来协调公司与所有利害相关者(股东、债权人、供应者、雇员、政府、社区等)之间的利益关系,以保证公司决策的科学化。”可见,协调股东-债权人关系是公司治理的题中应有之义,因此在这里将公司治理问题概括为三类。参见:[1]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2005.
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[3]Myers S.C.and Nicholas S.Majluf.Corporate financing and investment decision when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):187-221.
[4]Narayanan,M.P..Managerial incentives for short-term results[J].Journal of Finance,1985(40):1469-1484.
[1]转引自:崔萍.企业过度投资理论研究综述[J].经济经纬,2006(3):130-132.
[2]参见:[1]Lensink,R.,Hong Bo and E.Sterken.Investment,capital market imperfections,and uncertainty[M].Edward Elgar Publishing Limited,2001.
[2]Lensink,R.and E.Sterken.The option to wait to invest and credit rationing:a note on the stiglitz-weiss model[J].Journal of money,credit and banking,2002(34):221-225.
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[4]欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.股权制度安排、信息不对称和企业非效率投资行为[J].当代经济科学,2005(4):72-78.
[1]传统理论在解释信贷市场时,认为资金的价格—利率能调节信贷资金的供给和需求,会使信贷市场最终产生一个均衡利率。在均衡利率水平上,借款者的需求都能得到满足。
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[1]Stulz,Rene.Managerial discretion and optimal financing choices[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-27.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[3]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Financing constraints and corporate investment[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988(1):141-195.
[4]Kaplan,Steven N.and Luigi Zingales.Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997(112):169-215.
[5]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful:a comment on Kaplan and Zingales[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):695-705.
[6]Kaplan,Steven N.and Luigi Zingales.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures of financing constraints[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):707-712.
[1]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学.2002(8):43-47.
[2]何金耿.上市公司投资决策行为的实证分析[J].证券市场导报,2001(9):44-47.
[3]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]Vogt,S.C..The cash flow-investment relationship:Evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms[J].Financial Management,1994(2):3-20.
[1]也就是说,如果具有低质量成长机会的公司出现较高的投资-现金流敏感性,则说明该公司可能存在过度投资;如果具有高质量成长机会的公司出现较高的投资-现金流敏感性,则说明该公司可能投资不足。参见:Vogt,S.C..The cash flow-investment relationship:Evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms[J].Financial Management,1994(2):3-20.
[2]Hovakimian,Gayane and Sheridan Titman.Corporate investment with financial constraints:sensitivity of investment to funds from voluntary asset sales[Z].NBER Working Paper NO.9432,2002.
[3]Richardson,Morgado,Pindado等人近年来的有关研究均采用了类似方法。参见:[1]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[2]Morgado,Artur and Julio Pindado.The underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses——An analysis using panel data[J].European Financial Management,2003(2):163-177.
[4]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]Easterbrook,F..Two agency-cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984(74):650-659.
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[6]Gaver,J.J.and K.M.Gaver.Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set[J].Financial management,1995(24):19-32.
[1]Jensen,M.and K.J.Murphy.Performance pay and top management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990(2):225-264.
[1]本文所用的投资率指资本形成额与支出法国内生产总值之比,反映了投资对国民经济增长的贡献。
[2]郑京平.我国的投资率为何居高难下[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(7):142-144.
[3]根据国家统计局网站和《2005年中国统计年鉴》,中国统计出版社,2005.
[4]著名经济学家刘国光、吴敬琏、许小年和2006年度诺贝尔经济学奖获得者埃德蒙·菲尔普斯(Edmund S Phelps)等较早就指出这一问题。可参见:[1]方明.让过度投资实现“软着陆”——访著名经济学家刘国光[J].中国投资,2004(8):20-22.
[2]刘芳.吴敬琏、许小年共同把脉“没有温度的高烧”[N].解放日报,2004-6-26.
[3]埃德蒙·菲尔普斯.中国需要解决投资低效率问题[Z].在“中国人文社会科学论坛”上的演讲,2004-6-25.
[4]贺鹏飞.过度投资致使浙江企业陷入困境行业亏损严重[Z].中国新闻网,2005-1-11.
[5]谢国忠.GDP修正并不能改变过度投资的事实[Z].新浪财经,2005-12-25.
[5]统计数据显示,在中国的经济增长中,固定资产投资对GDP增长的贡献率已近60%。2004年全社会固定资产投资增长率为26.6%,2005年为27.2%,2006年上半年投资增长速度更是达到了31.3%的高水平。
[1]中国人民银行货币政策分析小组.2004年第一季度中国货币政策执行报告[M].中国金融出版社,2004.
[2]很多研究表明,中国上市公司经理人薪酬与企业规模显著正相关,这从一个侧面说明Jensen的自由现金流代理成本理论的基本逻辑在中国是适用的。参见:魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[3]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]这方面的文献很多,在此仅列出几篇比较经典的文献:[1]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Financing constraints and corporate investment[J].Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1988(1):141-195.
[2]Fazzari,Steven M.,R.Glenn Hubbard and Bruce C.Petersen.Investment-cash flow sensitivities are useful:a comment on Kaplan and Zingales[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2000(115):695-705.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[3]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,2002(8):43-47.
[4]Faccio,M.and M.Lasfer.Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2000(6):71-110.
[1]Goergen,Marc and Luc Renneboog.Investment policy,internal finance and ownership distribution in the UK[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001(7):257-284.
[2]Gedajlovic,Eric R.,Toru Yoshikawa and Motomi Hashimoto.Ownership structure,investment behavior aad firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries[J].Organization Studies,2005(1):7-35.
[3]由于绝大多数中国上市公司都存在控制性大股东,可以认为第一大股东和控股股东的身份是基本一致的,因此在本文中未对两者进行区分。
[4]陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8):28-35.
[1]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[2]La Porta等人对大股东掠夺中小股东现象进行了一系列研究。参见:[1]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999(2):471-517.
[2]Johnson S.,R.LaPorta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000(90):22-27.
[3]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[3]Fama E..Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Eeonomy,1980(88):288-307.
[4]Shleifer A.and R.W.Vishny.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1986(3):461-489.
[1]贾宝丽.投资者结构发生重大转折,机构持股市值已超4成——来自2007年全国证券期货监管会议上的最新数据[N].上海证券报,2007-1-25.
[1]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[2]Margaret M.Blair and Bruce K.Maclaury.Ownership and Control:Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century[M].Washington,D.C:Brookings Institute,1995.
[3]Fama and Jensen.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983(26):301-325.
[1]詹姆斯·莫里斯.公司治理与高管薪酬[J].南开管理评论,2006(1):13-16.
[2]根据委托代理理论,高管的薪酬要与企业的业绩挂钩才能起到激励的作用。然而,大量的薪酬业绩敏感性分析却没有发现高管薪酮和企业业绩之间明显的相关关系。参见:Jensen Michael,Kevin J.Murphy.Performance pay and top management incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990(98):225-264.
[3]该假说也可进一步表述为:经理人只要在一定的范围内不激怒(outrage)股东,通过一定的隐藏(camouflage),管理层就可以收买董事、影响薪酬契约进而实现自身利益最大化。参见:Bebchuk,L.,J.Fried and D.Walker.Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002(69):751-846.
[4]Bebchuk,L.and J.Fried..Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economics Perspective,2003(3):71-92.
[5]在美国,CEO薪酬的增长速度远远高于经济的增长速度,1980-1995年美国GDP的增长率为311%,而同期美国汽车行业CEO的年平均薪酬增长率为716%。1980年美国CEO薪酬与蓝领工人薪酬的平均比例是42:1,而到了1998年,这一比例已经上升到了419:1。
[1]Demsetz,H.,Villalonga.Ownership structure and corporate performance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001(7):209-233.
[2]可参见:[1]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[2]袁国良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].社会科学文献出版社,2000,第494-507页.
[3]参见:[1]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[2]Easterbrook,F..Two agency-cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984(74):650-659.
[1]这也是造成该问题实证检验较为困难的重要原因,因为研究者很难判断负债与投资之间的关系究竟是由哪种理论引起的。
[2]John,K.and L.Senbet.Limited liability,corporate leverage,and public policy[M].New York University and University of Wisconsin-Madison Mimeo,1988.
[3]Stulz,Rene.Managerial discretion and optimal financing choices[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-28.
[4]Barnea和Parrino等都对短期负债在减少过度投资和资产替代等问题方面的作用进行了验证。可参见:[1]Barnea,Amir,Robert Haugen and Lemma Senbet.A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in the agency theoretic framework[J].Journal of Finance,1980(35):1223-1234.
[2]Parrino,R.and M.S.Weisbach.Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999(53):3-42.
[1]童盼.负债期限结构与企业投资规模——来自中国A股上市公司的经验研究[J].经济科学,2005(5):93-101.
[2]Easterbrook,F..Two agency-cost explanations of dividends[J].American Economic Review,1984(74):650-659.
[3]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]Rozeff,Michael S..Growth,beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios[J].Journal of Financial Research,1982(5):249-259.
[5]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[1]Narayanan,M.P..Managerial incentives for short-term results[J].Journal of Finance,1985(40):1469-1484.
[1]Stulz,Rene.Managerial discretion and optimal financing choices[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990(26):3-27.
[2]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers [J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[3]Shleifer and Vishny.Managerial entrenchment:The case of manager-specific investment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988(25):123-140.
[1]La Porta,Rafael,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,and Andrei Shleifer.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999(2):471-516.
[2]袁国良,郑江准,胡志乾.我国上市公司融资偏好和融资能力的实证研究[J].管理世界,1999(3):150-157.
[3]贺振华.寻租、过度投资与地方保护[J].南开经济研究,2006(2):64-73.
[4]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005(7):123-128.
[1]潘敏,金岩.信息不对称、股权制度安排与上市企业过度投资[J].金融研究,2003(1):36-45.
[2]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,2002(8):43-47.
[3]Hovakimian,Gayaneand Sheridan Titman.Corporate investment with financial constraints:sensitivity of investment to funds from voluntary asset sales[Z].NBER Working Paper NO.9432,2002.
[4]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[1]托宾Q=企业的市场价值÷企业的重置成本。托宾Q假说预言,企业资产的边际Q值是决定投资的最重要因素,Q值越大企业越倾向于增加投资。
[2]宋剑峰等通过对中国上市公司数据的实证检验说明,市净率是一个能较好预示中国上市公司未来成长性的指标。饶育蕾等人认为由于中国资本市场不成熟,衡量公司成长性,主营业务收入增长率是一个比较可靠的指标。可参见:[1]宋剑峰.净资产倍率、市盈率与公司的成长性[J].经济研究,2000(8):36-45.
[2]饶育蕾,汪玉英.中困上市公司大股东对投资影响的实证研究[J].南开管理评论.2006(4):51-57.
[1]Hovakimian,Gayaneand Sheridan Titman.Corporate investment with financial constraints:sensitivity of investment to funds from voluntary asset sales[Z].NBER Working Paper NO.9432,2002.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[3]局限之一就是这种方法没有考虑系统风险,即如果整个市场是投资过度(或投资不足)的,用这一方法衡量的企业过度投资程度会存在系统偏差;由于衡量的复杂性,国外学者在相关研究中一般不考虑整个市场存在的系统偏差,本文在实证研究中也未加以考虑。
[4]在Richardson,Morgado,Pindado等人近年来的有关研究均采用了类似方法。
[1]企业内部融资来源主要包括:税后留存利润、计提折旧、企业变卖融资、应收账款融资等。企业内部融资能力的大小取决于企业利润水平、现金流量水平和净资产规模等因素。同外部融资相比,企业内部融资受到的外部限制比较小,融资成本比较低。
[2]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers [J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[3]Myers,S.C.and Nicholas S.Majluf.Corporate financing and investment decision when firms have information that investors do not have[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1984(13):187-221.
[4]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers [J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]周立.自由现金流代理问题的验证[J].中国软科学,2002(8):43-47.
[2]Richardson,Scott Anthony.Corporate governance and the over-investment of surplus cash[D].Dissertation of Michigan University,2003.
[1]中华人民共和国财政部.企业会计准则——现金流量表[S].2001年修订版.
[2]Jensen,M.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]可参见:[1]Devereux,Michael P.and F.Schiantarelli.Investment,financial factors,and cash flow:evidence from UK panel data[A].R.Hubbard(ed.).Asymmetric information,corporate finance,and investment[C].University of Chicago Press,pp.279-306,1990.
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[2]Vogt,S.C..The cash flow-investment relationship:Evidence from U.S.manufacturing firms[J].Financial Management,1994(2):3-20.
[1]Miller and Fama.The theory of finance[M].Holt,Rinehart and Winston,1972.
[2]苑德军,刘岱,郭春丽.上市公司股权结构与公司价值关系研究[N].上海证券报,2005-2-22.
[1]一直以来,困绕我国上市公司发展的股权结构两大先天性缺陷是国有股“一股独大”和股权结构的“二元”特征。所谓股权结构的二元特征即同一上市公司的股权被人为分割为流通股和非流通股两类。股权结构的这种制度安排不仅对我国证券市场的运行和发展造成了严重的消极影响,还严重影响到企业融资、企业并购重组等方面。由于截至2006年底,我国上市公司股权分置改革已基本完成,因此本文不再讨论这一问题。
[2]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer and R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[1]许小年.以法人机构为主体建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J].改革,1997(5):28-34.
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[6]如白重恩等认为股权集中度和公司价值正相关,而夏立军等则认为股权集中度与公司价值显著负相关。参见:[1]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(2):81-91.
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[1]在这里之所以仅选择2004年的数据,是考虑到企业投资效果需要时间检验,也有利于将存在过度投资的上市公司与未发生过度投资的上市公司进行比较。同时本文中用到的一些数据及字段需要手工逐个收集,收集始于2005年10月,历时一年有余。
[2]笔者根据证监会网站及上市公司年报对数据库中缺失的数据及未包含的字段进行了补充和整理。
[1]陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8):28-35.
[1]央企2005年实现净利润6276.5亿元,2004年全年的净利润为4000亿元。2003年,包括省级和市级企业在内的所有非金融类国有企业的利润总额达到了7590亿元。中国移动、中国石油、国家电网、中石化、中国电信,这五家企业2005年的利润就占到中央企业当年实现利润的70%。但由于历史原因,国家及政府部门一直没有从这些大型国有企业分红。
[2]国有企业过度留存利润因投资冲动的局限性及治理结构不完善,必然带来过度扩张,其后果很可能导致资金链断裂,三九集团就是很好的例证。
[3]王红茹.国务院今年试点向国企提取分红[J].中国经济周刊,2007(23):6-7.
[4]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
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[1]股权集中度(Concentration Ratio of Shares)是指全部股东因持股比例的不同所表现出来的股权集中还是分散的数量化指标,是衡量公司的股权分布状态的主要指标。通常用前五大股东或前十大股东持股比例之和或平方和表示。
[2]可参见:[1]许小年.以法人机构为主体建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J].改革,1997(5):28-34.
[2]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12):23-30.
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[1]Brent,A..Some funds try shareholder activism[J].Mutual Fund Market News,2002(10):1-3.
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[1]曾德明,龙淼,龚红.机构投资者持股对公司绩效的影响研究[J].软科学,2006(1):37-39.
[2]转引自:徐向艺等.公司治理制度安排与组织设计[M].经济科学出版社,2006,第15页.
[3]Stuart L.Gillan and Laura T.Starks.Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism:the role of institutional investors[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(57):275-305.
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[4]国内学者关于中国上市公司治理结构的研究很多,在此就不再一一列举。
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[1]我国上市公司的特殊性,如国有股“一股独大”、国有资产所有者缺位、外部市场监控功能弱化等,使之对独立董事独立性的要求更高,独立董事除了自身要具备一定的条件之外,还必须独立于控股股东。相比大股东直接推荐,由董事会提名委员会提名的董事相对能较多关注利益相关者的利益,但这仅仅是个前提,其关键在于提名委员会成员的构成。
[2]Klein,A..Firm performance and board committee structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998(5):275-303.
[1]谢朝斌.试论股份公司董事会专业委员会及其独立性规制[J].甘肃政法学院学报,2004(6):35-39.
[1]Klein,A..Firm performance and board committee structure[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1998(5):275-303.
[2]比如提名委员会在提名时要多考虑薪酬委员会对经理人的业绩评价,审计委员会要对薪酬委员会通过的报酬计划进行审计等。
[3]李维安.中国上市公司治理评价系统研究[J].南开管理评论,2003(3):13-25.
[1]Main,B..Pay in the boardroom practices and procedures[J].Personnel Review,1993(22):3-14.
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[3]Conyon,M.J and S.I.Peck.Board control,remuneration committees and top management compensation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1997(2):146-157.
[4]该假说也可进一步表述为:经理人只要在一定的范围内不激怒(outrage)股东,通过一定的隐藏(camouflage),管理层就可以收买董事、影响薪酬契约进而实现自身利益最大化。参见:Bebchuk,L.,J.Fried and D.Walker.Managerial powerand rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of ChicagoLaw Review,2002(69):751-846.
[5]也就是说,管理层薪酬激励并不必然是解决代理问题的工具,它自身也可能成为代理问题的一部分。参见:Bebchuk,L.and J.Fried..Executive compensation as an agency problem[J].Journal of Economics Perspective,2003(3):71-92.
[1]关于经理报酬的影响因素,可参见:肖继辉.关于经理报酬的西方研究动态[J].审计与经济研究,2005(6):92-96.
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[3]Waston,R.,D.J.Storey,P.W.Arezyk,K.Keaseyand H.short.The remuneration of Non-owner managers in small and medium-sized UK enterprises[J].Journal of Management Studies,1994(31):126-137.
[1]笔者也对2001-2003年的数据进行了检验,发现与2004年的统计结果差别不大。
[1]净资产收益率是公司税后利润除以净资产得到的百分比率,用以衡量公司运用自有资本的效率。净资产收益率可衡量公司对股东投入资本的利用效率,它弥补了每股税后利润指标的不足。在反映上市公司经营业绩的指标中,净资产收益率是反映企业经营业绩的一个综合、全面的指标。
[3]添加行业因素、成长性等控制变量后,依然显著。这与魏刚等人的研究结论是一致的。参见:魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[4]这也证明了Jensen的自由现金流量理论在中国的适用性,他指出,与股东相比,经理更关心企业的规模问题,因为大企业经理的社会地位及所获得的各种货币、非货币收入较中小企业高得多。因此,“经理们存在扩张企业规模的动机,这种动机会促使经理将闲置资金投资于能够扩大企业规模的非盈利项目,从而牺牲股东的利益来增加自己的财富,产生过度投资”。参见:Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[IT].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[1]添加行业因素、成长性等一系列控制变量后,发现对结果影响不大,依然不相关。
[2]杨瑞龙.国有上市公司高管薪酬:宜疏不宜堵[J].资本市场,2006(8):56-57.
[1]上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2006):国有控股上市公司治理[R].2006.11.
[2]OGSM是Objective(目的)、Goals(目标)、Strategy(策略)、Measurement(评价与衡量标准)的简称。
[1]Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-360.
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[1]袁国良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].社会科学文献出版社,2000,第494-507页.
[2]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[3]刘国亮,王加胜.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2000(5):40-45.
[4]在这里之所以仅选择2004年一年的数据,还考虑到有利于将存在过度投资的样本与当年未发生过度投资的样本进行比较。另外,笔者也对2001、2002、2003年的数据进行了检验,发现与2004年的统计结果差别不大。
[5]添加企业规模、行业因素、成长性等一系列控制变量后,发现对结果的影响不大,依然不相关。
[1]这与袁国良、李增泉等人的研究结论是一致的。参见:[1]袁圆良,王怀芳,刘明.上市公司股权激励的实证分析及其相关问题[A].刘树成,沈沛.中国资本市场前沿理论研究文集[C].社会科学文献出版社,2000,第494-507页.
[2]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[2]《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》自2006年10月份已开始实施。其第五条规定,实施股权激励的上市公司应具备的条件是,“公司治理结构规范,外部董事及独立董事占董事会成员1/2以上;建立以独立董事为主任委员、外部董事及独立董事占多数的薪酬委员会:企业经营稳健、业绩未出现异常波动;近3年无违法违规行为和不良纪录。”“薪酬委员会由外部董事构成,且薪酬委员会制度健全,议事规则完善,运行规范。”
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[1]当企业投资于风险较高的项目时,如果项目成功,债权人只得到事先约定的支付,并不因风险项目的成功获得额外的报酬,但是股东却得到了全部的超额收益:如果项目失败,股东充其量以其在企业的全部投资额偿付债权人,其余损失却由债权人自己承担。参见:Jensen,M.and W.Meckling.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-336.
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[1]江伟,沈艺峰.大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护[J].财经研究,2005(12):95-106.
[2]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005(5):75-84.
[3]何进日,周艺.债务融资对企业过度投资约束的分析[J].湘潭师范学院学报,2004(5):43-45.
[4]油晓峰.我国上市公司负债融资与过度投资治理[J].财贸经济,2006(10):23-25.
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[1]Parrino,R.and M.S.Weisbach.Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999(53):3-42.
[2]国内很多学者都对负债的相机治理及其对过度投资的约束效用进行了实证检验,大多数研究结果显示,负债并未对过度投资起到显著的约束功效。如:兰艳泽.对我国上市公司债务约束功效的实证检验和分析[J].中央财经大学学报,2005(10):76-80.
[3]比如,中国上市公司的债权人主要是国有商业银行,且贷款利率也相对固定,这同国外上市公司以发行债券为主的负债融资存在显著的差别。
[1]在我国资本市场还不健全、信息不完全的情况下,应当充分发挥银行的信息和监督优势,积极地利用债权约束来参与公司治理。
[2]史建平,李德峰.国有商业银行激励机制的建立与完善[J].中国金融,2006(10):26-27.
[1]辛清泉,林斌.债务杠杆与企业投资:双重预算软约束视角[J].财经研究,2006(7):73-83.
[2]田利辉.国有产权、预算软约束和中国上市公司杠杆治理[J].管理世界,2005(7):123-128.
[3]“预算软约束”由Kornai最先提出,当时指的是社会主义国家政府持续救助入不敷出的国有企业,由于政府救助,企业不存在破产威胁,预算约束变软。随着计划经济体制转轨和对市场经济中非市场成分的深入观察,预算软约束的含义被拓展泛化。Dewatripont和Tirole提出了道德风险下的内生化预算软约束理论模型。该模型指出,如果追加的贷款成本低于收回全部贷款本金和利息的可能收益,贷款方就愿意软化预算约束,继续提供贷款而非清算重整企业。本文采用的是Kornai后来在1998年给出的“预算软约束”的狭义概念。参见:[1]Kornai,Janos.Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained systems[J].Econometrica,1979(47):801-819.
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[4]辛清泉,林斌.债务杠杆与企业投资:双重预算软约束视角[J].财经研究,2006(7):73-83.
[1]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(2):17-27.
[2]杨善林,王素凤,李敏.国有企业经营者负激励机制设计——“油锅合同”模型解析[J].财经研究,2005(9):114-123.
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[4]政府通过银行对企业的援助是有成本的。由于政策性贷款,我国的国有银行已经产生了大量的呆账坏账,累积了相当大的金融系统风险。
[1]郭强,帅萍.民企过度投资的经济学分析[J].当代经济管理,2006(2):33-35.
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[1]一般而言,股利支付率太低,容易引起股东不满,损害企业形象,导致股价下跌;股利支付率过高,降低企业再投资能力,增加融资成本,影响未来获利能力。
[2]其中的主流理论之一是股利代理成本理论,该理论认为,现金股利发放能有效的降低代理成本。通过支付股利。公司有资金需求时必须对外融资,公司的经营与财务将受到监督审核,可以减少管理层出于私利盲目扩张或投资低回报的项目或用于个人享受浪费等不利于股东价值最大化的过度投资行为。
[3]Jensen,M..Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[4]参见:[1]Rozeff,Michael S..Growth,beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios[J].Journal of Financial Research,1982(5):249-259.
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[1]La Porta R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleiferand R.Vishny.Investor protection and corporate governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):3-28.
[2]他们还发现,西欧企业如果存在多个大股东会形成互相制衡的局面,而东亚企业的多个大股东则会通过合谋侵害小股东利益。参见:Faccio,Mara,Larry Long,and Leslie Young.Dividends and expropriation[J].American Economic Review,2001(91):54-78.
[3]李常青.股利政策理论与实证研究[M].中国人民大学出版社,2001.
[4]见本文第6章第2节对上市公司股权结构的描述性统计,其他学者的研究结果也基本相同。
[1]唐国琼,邹虹.上市公司现金股利政策影响因素的实证研究[J].财经科学,2005(2):147-153.
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