专利池的形成：理论与实证研究
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摘要
专利池(Patent Pool)能有效解决当前日益严重的“专利灌丛”问题已得到理论和实践证明。近年来,美国、日本、欧盟等国家和地区反垄断机关对专利池的态度也越来越宽容。然而,专利池并未如人们所预期的那样大量涌现,而只是集中于电子、通信领域,而且数量有限。在人们寄予厚望的生物技术领域,至今尚未出现一个真正的专利池。
对于这一现象,本文提出了一种新的较为完整的解释:专利池的形成实际上是一个“囚徒困境”问题。在静态博弈中,尽管各专利权人组成专利池无论对于专利权人还是社会福利而言都是更有效率的选择,但组成专利池并不是一个纳什均衡结果。无论是纯授权人还是纵向综合制造商都有动机背离合作充当池外授权人,从而导致专利池难以形成。最终各专利权人各自单独授权从而得到一个较坏的结果,陷入“囚徒的困境”。但是在动态重复博弈中,如果出现可置信的威胁,专利权人则有可能达成合作组成专利池。这些可置信的威胁包括:权力机关或者技术标准组织的压力、反垄断诉讼的威胁以及替代技术和新技术的竞争威胁。
其次,本文逐一分析了交易成本、下游市场结构、技术标准化、反垄断规制等影响专利池形成的各种因素,指出当前专利池主要集中于电子、通信产业而鲜见于生物技术领域的主要原因是:不同产业在下游市场结构、技术标准化程度等影响因素上存在差异。结成专利池将使各方的交易成本显著下降。拥有较多专利的专利权人加入专利池节约交易成本的效果要小于拥有较少专利的专利权人,特别是当它们原已建有专利授权部门时;当下游市场是垄断性市场时,特别是当下游垄断厂商拥有大量必要专利时,专利池很难形成;技术标准化的发展对专利池的形成有重要促进作用;反垄断规制对专利池形成的影响主要体现在影响专利权人组建专利池意愿、入池专利构成和专家评估机制、专利池授权条款等方面。
最后,本文分析了专利池对于我国自主创新和市场竞争的影响,并提出了对策建议。专利池既有促进我国自主创新的作用,也存在妨碍创新的因素。关于专利池对竞争的影响,本文认为,由于国情相异,我国与发达国家关注的焦点应当有所不同。现阶段我们应当重点关注专利池以下两种垄断行为:一是利用市场支配地位收取过高的专利费,二是事实上排除专利池成员单独对外许可。本文建议:我们应当重视专利池的积极作用,欢迎并鼓励专利池在我国的出现;建立和完善反垄断制度,合理规制专利池的反竞争行为;提高自主创新能力,加强应对国外专利池的协同与合作。
A patent pool is a joint licensing arrangement among patent holders, through which patent holders license their patents in a package to third parties or to one another. It has been widely accepted that patent pool can help to resolve the“patent thickets problem”which is becoming serious in these years. As a result, the antitrust authorities in the United States, Japan and Europe have taken more positive attitudes to patent pool than one decade ago. However, patent pool did not emerge massively as people anticipate. Recent patent pools mainly emerged in electronic and telecommunication industry while rarely emerged in other areas which also meet patent thicket problems, such as biotechnology industry. Regarding the Paradox, this paper argues that even forming a patent pool is not only Pareto efficient to patent holders but also to society, but it is difficult to be formed. The reason is that every patent holder, no matter specialized research firm or vertically integrated manufacturing firm, has incentive to stay outside a pool and license its patents independently. That is, cooperating and forming a patent pool is not a Nash Equilibrium. However, in dynamic repeated games, the prisoners’dilemma could be overcome by credible threats and promises. That is, being compelled by the authorities or standard setting organization, threat of antitrust litigation and competition from competitors of substitute or new generation technology could help to compel patent holders to cooperate and form a pool.
This paper also analyses some factors including transaction cost, downstream market structure, technology standardization and antitrust regulations which impact upon the formation of patent pool. This paper argues that recent patent pools mainly emerging in electronic and telecommunication industry while rarely existing in biotechnology field is due to the difference in the downstream market structure and technology standardization. While patent holders join a patent pool, the transaction cost of related entities will be reduced. In addition, the more patents the patent holder owns, the efficiency of saving transaction cost is lower, especially when the patent holder has already had a patent licensing department. While the downstream market is monopolistic, especially when the monopolistic maker also owns massive patents, it is difficult to form a patent pool. Technology standardization can promote the formation of pools. The antitrust regulation on patent pool can restrict patentee’s will to pool their patents and could affect the independent evaluation of necessary patents as well as patent licensing items.
Finally, this paper researches the impact of patent pool on the innovation and competition in China. When considering the impact of patent pool on market competition in China, in my opinion, we should focus on the different issues comparing to that in western countries for China has different situations from that in the west. At present, China should mainly focus on two kinds of antitrust actions of patent pool: One is charging excessively high licensing fees by virtue of its market power; the other is actually excluding its members to licensing their patents independently. As a result, this paper suggests that we should focus on the pro-competition impact of patent pool and welcome the formation of it. On the other hand, we still need to improve our IPR antitrust system and to restrict the anti-competition impact of patent pool.
对于这一现象,本文提出了一种新的较为完整的解释:专利池的形成实际上是一个“囚徒困境”问题。在静态博弈中,尽管各专利权人组成专利池无论对于专利权人还是社会福利而言都是更有效率的选择,但组成专利池并不是一个纳什均衡结果。无论是纯授权人还是纵向综合制造商都有动机背离合作充当池外授权人,从而导致专利池难以形成。最终各专利权人各自单独授权从而得到一个较坏的结果,陷入“囚徒的困境”。但是在动态重复博弈中,如果出现可置信的威胁,专利权人则有可能达成合作组成专利池。这些可置信的威胁包括:权力机关或者技术标准组织的压力、反垄断诉讼的威胁以及替代技术和新技术的竞争威胁。
其次,本文逐一分析了交易成本、下游市场结构、技术标准化、反垄断规制等影响专利池形成的各种因素,指出当前专利池主要集中于电子、通信产业而鲜见于生物技术领域的主要原因是:不同产业在下游市场结构、技术标准化程度等影响因素上存在差异。结成专利池将使各方的交易成本显著下降。拥有较多专利的专利权人加入专利池节约交易成本的效果要小于拥有较少专利的专利权人,特别是当它们原已建有专利授权部门时;当下游市场是垄断性市场时,特别是当下游垄断厂商拥有大量必要专利时,专利池很难形成;技术标准化的发展对专利池的形成有重要促进作用;反垄断规制对专利池形成的影响主要体现在影响专利权人组建专利池意愿、入池专利构成和专家评估机制、专利池授权条款等方面。
最后,本文分析了专利池对于我国自主创新和市场竞争的影响,并提出了对策建议。专利池既有促进我国自主创新的作用,也存在妨碍创新的因素。关于专利池对竞争的影响,本文认为,由于国情相异,我国与发达国家关注的焦点应当有所不同。现阶段我们应当重点关注专利池以下两种垄断行为:一是利用市场支配地位收取过高的专利费,二是事实上排除专利池成员单独对外许可。本文建议:我们应当重视专利池的积极作用,欢迎并鼓励专利池在我国的出现;建立和完善反垄断制度,合理规制专利池的反竞争行为;提高自主创新能力,加强应对国外专利池的协同与合作。
A patent pool is a joint licensing arrangement among patent holders, through which patent holders license their patents in a package to third parties or to one another. It has been widely accepted that patent pool can help to resolve the“patent thickets problem”which is becoming serious in these years. As a result, the antitrust authorities in the United States, Japan and Europe have taken more positive attitudes to patent pool than one decade ago. However, patent pool did not emerge massively as people anticipate. Recent patent pools mainly emerged in electronic and telecommunication industry while rarely emerged in other areas which also meet patent thicket problems, such as biotechnology industry. Regarding the Paradox, this paper argues that even forming a patent pool is not only Pareto efficient to patent holders but also to society, but it is difficult to be formed. The reason is that every patent holder, no matter specialized research firm or vertically integrated manufacturing firm, has incentive to stay outside a pool and license its patents independently. That is, cooperating and forming a patent pool is not a Nash Equilibrium. However, in dynamic repeated games, the prisoners’dilemma could be overcome by credible threats and promises. That is, being compelled by the authorities or standard setting organization, threat of antitrust litigation and competition from competitors of substitute or new generation technology could help to compel patent holders to cooperate and form a pool.
This paper also analyses some factors including transaction cost, downstream market structure, technology standardization and antitrust regulations which impact upon the formation of patent pool. This paper argues that recent patent pools mainly emerging in electronic and telecommunication industry while rarely existing in biotechnology field is due to the difference in the downstream market structure and technology standardization. While patent holders join a patent pool, the transaction cost of related entities will be reduced. In addition, the more patents the patent holder owns, the efficiency of saving transaction cost is lower, especially when the patent holder has already had a patent licensing department. While the downstream market is monopolistic, especially when the monopolistic maker also owns massive patents, it is difficult to form a patent pool. Technology standardization can promote the formation of pools. The antitrust regulation on patent pool can restrict patentee’s will to pool their patents and could affect the independent evaluation of necessary patents as well as patent licensing items.
Finally, this paper researches the impact of patent pool on the innovation and competition in China. When considering the impact of patent pool on market competition in China, in my opinion, we should focus on the different issues comparing to that in western countries for China has different situations from that in the west. At present, China should mainly focus on two kinds of antitrust actions of patent pool: One is charging excessively high licensing fees by virtue of its market power; the other is actually excluding its members to licensing their patents independently. As a result, this paper suggests that we should focus on the pro-competition impact of patent pool and welcome the formation of it. On the other hand, we still need to improve our IPR antitrust system and to restrict the anti-competition impact of patent pool.
引文
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