闭环供应链中再制造件的质量水平选择和价格决策
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摘要
在闭环供应链系统中,再制造件的质量水平主要由新制造件中可再制造部分的质量水平和再制造过程中新加入的不可再制造部分的质量水平构成。可再制造部分由闭环供应链系统中的制造商或第三方回收,其数量、质量等信息存在高度不确定性,并对制造商的回收、再制造件的质量水平和再制造效率产生重要影响。再制造件和新制造件进入同一市场进行价格和质量竞争时,异质性的消费者会根据其效用最大化原则进行选购。因此,消费者行为也会对再制造过程中不可再制造部分的质量水平选择产生影响。本文运用博弈论、运筹学、市场学及产业经济学等学科的理论和方法,研究在单个制造商和单个销售商构成的分散式闭环供应链中,制造商如何制定质量处罚比例和质量抽检比例,从而对销售商回收的可再制造部分数量和质量实施检查和监督;并研究单个再制造商垄断或存在新件制造商竞争时,再制造商如何通过选择再制造过程中新加入的不可再制造部分的质量水平来确定再制造件的最优质量水平、以及再制造件的价格决策。
本文首先探讨了闭环供应链中制造商对销售商回收的可再制造部分数量和质量实施检查和监督的策略。研究给出了制造商最优的质量处罚比例、销售商的最优检查比例和最优回收比例,以及制造商的最优检查比例;还探讨了制造商实施质量监督的临界条件。
其次综合考虑新制造件和再制造件的内在质量水平关系、新制造件对再制造件的数量限制关系、以及不同消费者对单位产品质量的价值评价存在的差异,研究了闭环供应链中单个制造商的再制造件最优价格和质量水平决策。研究表明在市场存在同一品牌新制造件和再制造件的情况下,当给定离散的新加入的不可再制造部分质量水平时,存在唯一的再制造件价格使得制造商的利润最大。
然后综合考虑新制造件与再制造件的内在质量水平关系、新制造件对再制造件的数量限制关系、以及不同消费者对单位产品质量的价值评价存在的差异,研究了完全回收模式下,闭环供应链中新件制造商和再制造商的一级价格歧视策略。研究表明:销售期内不存在多余库存的再制造件时,再制造商并不会完全满足产品单位质量的价值评价较低的市场,而是部分进入原来新制造件的市场。随着再制造过程中新加入的不可再制造部分质量水平的增加、或者随着新制造件中可再制造部分质量水平对再制造件质量水平影响程度的增加,再制造件的市场覆盖范围会向产品单位质量的价值评价较高的消费者转移。仅再制造商采取一级价格歧视时,竞争双方存在均衡的质量和价格。
最后,综合考虑新制造件与再制造件的内在质量水平关系、新制造件对再制造件的数量限制关系、以及不同消费者的价格敏感性差异,采用单一的成本函数簇研究了自由回收模式下,新件制造商和再制造商之间的两阶段质量和价格竞争。研究表明:再制造件在第一周期期初进入市场时,新件制造商的利润与新制造件和再制造件的变动成本无关;新制造件和再制造件的质量差异越大,新件制造商的利润越高;研究给出了新件制造商的均衡利润存在下限的充分条件。
In the closed-loop supply chain system, the quality level of remanufactured product is composed of the quality level of the remanufacturable part in used product and the quality level of unremanufacturable part selected by the remanufacturer in the process of remanufacturing. The information on quantity and quality of the remanufacturable part collected by collectors or 3LPs is uncertain and effects on remanufacturer’efficiency of reclaiming and remanufacturing. Secondly, when the new and remanufactured products, which are competing on price and quality level, are in the same market, the heterogeneous consumer will select one of the both based on the principia of his own utility-maximization. Therefore, consumer behavior will have impact on the quality and price decision-making of remanufacturer.
By adopting theories and methods of Game Theory、Operations Research、Marketing Science and Industrial Economics, this research studies the manufacturer how to decide the penalty rate of defective remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on incoming items from retailer to supervise the quantity and quality of remanufacturable part and how to decide the optimal price and quality level in monopoly or competitive market.
At first, we study the quality inspection policy in the single period decentralized closed-loop supply chain composed by a manufacturer and a retailer. We consider the manufacturer, how to decide the penalty rate of defective remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on remanufacturable part from retailer, and the retailer how to decide the return rate of remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on remanufacturable part from consumer. We derive the optimal penalty rate, return rate, inspection rate of the manufacturer and retailer, the threshold and means that the manufacturer adopts in inspection actions.
Then we construct the relationship of quality level between the remanufactured product and the new one. Considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the same product characteristics, we prove that when both new and remanufactured products with same brand in the market, given discrete unremanufacturable part’s quality level, the manufacturer has an exclusive price of remanufactured product to maximize his profit.
And then, considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the product characteristics, we study the first-degree price discrimination policy of remanufacturer and manufacturer based on complete recycling model. The results indicate that if there is no surplus remanufacturerd product in the sale period, the remanufacturer won’t entirely match the need of the low-end market but enter the high-end market partly. With the quality of unremanufacturable part or with the influenced by the quality of the remanufacturable part increased, the market coverage of remanufacturer will move to the one with higher valuation. If only the manufacturer adopts the first-degree price discrimination policy, there exit the equilibrium quality and price.
At last, considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous price sensitivity, we use a single cost function class to study the price and quality competition between the manufacturer and remanufacturer based on free recycling model. The results indicate that when the remanufacturerd product enters the market at the beginning of the first period, the manufacturer has the largest profit in the event of the largest quality gap. We obtain the sufficient condition under which the remanufacturer has a lower limit equilibrium profit.
本文首先探讨了闭环供应链中制造商对销售商回收的可再制造部分数量和质量实施检查和监督的策略。研究给出了制造商最优的质量处罚比例、销售商的最优检查比例和最优回收比例,以及制造商的最优检查比例;还探讨了制造商实施质量监督的临界条件。
其次综合考虑新制造件和再制造件的内在质量水平关系、新制造件对再制造件的数量限制关系、以及不同消费者对单位产品质量的价值评价存在的差异,研究了闭环供应链中单个制造商的再制造件最优价格和质量水平决策。研究表明在市场存在同一品牌新制造件和再制造件的情况下,当给定离散的新加入的不可再制造部分质量水平时,存在唯一的再制造件价格使得制造商的利润最大。
然后综合考虑新制造件与再制造件的内在质量水平关系、新制造件对再制造件的数量限制关系、以及不同消费者对单位产品质量的价值评价存在的差异,研究了完全回收模式下,闭环供应链中新件制造商和再制造商的一级价格歧视策略。研究表明:销售期内不存在多余库存的再制造件时,再制造商并不会完全满足产品单位质量的价值评价较低的市场,而是部分进入原来新制造件的市场。随着再制造过程中新加入的不可再制造部分质量水平的增加、或者随着新制造件中可再制造部分质量水平对再制造件质量水平影响程度的增加,再制造件的市场覆盖范围会向产品单位质量的价值评价较高的消费者转移。仅再制造商采取一级价格歧视时,竞争双方存在均衡的质量和价格。
最后,综合考虑新制造件与再制造件的内在质量水平关系、新制造件对再制造件的数量限制关系、以及不同消费者的价格敏感性差异,采用单一的成本函数簇研究了自由回收模式下,新件制造商和再制造商之间的两阶段质量和价格竞争。研究表明:再制造件在第一周期期初进入市场时,新件制造商的利润与新制造件和再制造件的变动成本无关;新制造件和再制造件的质量差异越大,新件制造商的利润越高;研究给出了新件制造商的均衡利润存在下限的充分条件。
In the closed-loop supply chain system, the quality level of remanufactured product is composed of the quality level of the remanufacturable part in used product and the quality level of unremanufacturable part selected by the remanufacturer in the process of remanufacturing. The information on quantity and quality of the remanufacturable part collected by collectors or 3LPs is uncertain and effects on remanufacturer’efficiency of reclaiming and remanufacturing. Secondly, when the new and remanufactured products, which are competing on price and quality level, are in the same market, the heterogeneous consumer will select one of the both based on the principia of his own utility-maximization. Therefore, consumer behavior will have impact on the quality and price decision-making of remanufacturer.
By adopting theories and methods of Game Theory、Operations Research、Marketing Science and Industrial Economics, this research studies the manufacturer how to decide the penalty rate of defective remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on incoming items from retailer to supervise the quantity and quality of remanufacturable part and how to decide the optimal price and quality level in monopoly or competitive market.
At first, we study the quality inspection policy in the single period decentralized closed-loop supply chain composed by a manufacturer and a retailer. We consider the manufacturer, how to decide the penalty rate of defective remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on remanufacturable part from retailer, and the retailer how to decide the return rate of remanufacturable part and the inspection rate on remanufacturable part from consumer. We derive the optimal penalty rate, return rate, inspection rate of the manufacturer and retailer, the threshold and means that the manufacturer adopts in inspection actions.
Then we construct the relationship of quality level between the remanufactured product and the new one. Considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the same product characteristics, we prove that when both new and remanufactured products with same brand in the market, given discrete unremanufacturable part’s quality level, the manufacturer has an exclusive price of remanufactured product to maximize his profit.
And then, considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous valuations for the product characteristics, we study the first-degree price discrimination policy of remanufacturer and manufacturer based on complete recycling model. The results indicate that if there is no surplus remanufacturerd product in the sale period, the remanufacturer won’t entirely match the need of the low-end market but enter the high-end market partly. With the quality of unremanufacturable part or with the influenced by the quality of the remanufacturable part increased, the market coverage of remanufacturer will move to the one with higher valuation. If only the manufacturer adopts the first-degree price discrimination policy, there exit the equilibrium quality and price.
At last, considering the relationship of quality level, quantity constrained, and consumers with heterogeneous price sensitivity, we use a single cost function class to study the price and quality competition between the manufacturer and remanufacturer based on free recycling model. The results indicate that when the remanufacturerd product enters the market at the beginning of the first period, the manufacturer has the largest profit in the event of the largest quality gap. We obtain the sufficient condition under which the remanufacturer has a lower limit equilibrium profit.
引文
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