无形人力资本研究
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摘要
人力资本理论认为,人力资本不能与其所有者分离。而在现实经济中,有一种人力资本,是可以与其所有者分离的,这种人力资本,本文定义为“无形人力资本”。无形人力资本由“知名度”和“信誉度”两个维度构成,其中,知名度所起的作用更大,这不仅是因为“信誉度”更难测量,而且是因为信誉度必须以知名度为前提。一个人必须具有一定程度的信誉度和知名度,才算具有无形人力资本,这个程度,就是“阀值”。“阀值”具有“水涨船高”的特征。相对于无形人力资本,我们就把传统意义上的人力资本归为“有形人力资本”。无形人力资本具有以下特征:首先是与其所有者可以部分分离,这是无形人力资本区别于有形人力资本的本质特征。由这一本质特征,可以推导出无形人力资本的其他特征,主要包括:1、无形人力资本的价值创造,主要取决于使用者的努力程度;2、无形人力资本在使用过程中价值的发挥,不仅与其所有者所拥有的无形人力资本密切相关,也与使用者的知名度密切相关;3、无形人力资本具有部分可抵押性;4、无形人力资本是有形人力资本的附属物,但对有形人力资本有促进作用,两者是相互促进的;5、相对于有形人力资本而言,无形人力资本更显同质性。
在分析了无形人力资本的概念和特征之后,本文对无形人力资本的形成机理和价值创造过程进行了分析。知名度的形成,在传统社会采取的是“口碑相传”的方式,而在现代社会,则主要依赖现代传媒技术,因此,与一个人的职业特征、个人成就、受大众关注的程度等因素密切相关。知名度存在“遗忘效应”和“倍加效应”(或称“扩散效应”),两者对知名度的影响方向相反,因此,知名度的增减,由两种效应的综合影响而定。信誉度是在重复博弈的基础上建立起来的,信誉度的高低,由交往面、交往程度两个因素决定。因此,信誉度受到信息传递速度、法律制度、产权结构等因素的影响。无形人力资本之所以能够创造价值,一方面是因为可以降低交易成本,这主要是因为信誉度的作用;另一方面则是因为可以产生广告效应,这主要是因为知名度。所以,就不难理解,企业为什么要高价使用无形人力资本。
企业所有权安排是近年来广受关注的问题,本文结合无形人力资本概念,对此也进行了分析。根据主流企业理论,之所以“资本雇佣劳动”比“劳动雇佣资本”更合理,主要是因为在信息不对称以及合同不完备的条件下,由于人力资本与其所有者的不可分离性,使得人力资本不能像物质资本那样具有抵押功能,并且存在“偷懒”和“搭便车”等机会主义行为。引入无形人力资本概念后,由于无形人力资本的部分可分离性、部分可抵押性,使得以上推导的前提发生了改变。采用状态依存所有权中的“满意的利润”的分析视角,那么,“资本雇佣劳动”是可能的。这也就能解释为什么有些名人既不需要投入物质资本,也不需要到企业工作,就可以拥有企业的股份等现象。
理论必须要能够对现实进行解释,并能得到验证。既然无形人力资本能够创造价值,那么,就应该对个人收入产生影响。本文利用上市公司数据,对总经理薪酬与无形人力资本之间的关系进行了分析,结果发现,无形人力资本与总经理薪酬之间存在显著的正相关关系,并进一步验证了无形人力资本有一个“阀值”的判断。无形人力资本的测度,则采用了从google网上的“相关网页数”作为无形人力资本的测量值。
According to the traditional theory of human capital, the essential difference between human capital and material capital is the inseparability of human capital from its owner. However, in the real economy exists a sort of human capital defined in the text as intangible human capita(IHC) which is detachable from its owner. It is made of dimensions of popularity and credibility and popularity functionally matters more than credibility not only because it’s much more difficult to fathom credibility but also because popularity is the precondition of credibility. Having intangible human capital only means someone’s popularity and credibility reach to a certain degree called threshold value which features“When the river rises, the boat floats high.”Comparing with intangible human capital , traditional human capital is counter-defined as tangible human capital . Partial-detachability from its owner is foremost substantial to distinguish intangible human capital from tangible human capital and deductive to bring it about some other characteristics as followed :
1. Value development of intangible human capital probably depends on the users’endeavor rather than owners’endeavor ; 2. Value development of intangible human capital connects closely with owners own intangible human capital and users’popularity as well , on the general basis of mutual stimulation between owners and users ; 3. Intangible human capital is partial mortgageable; 4. Intangible human capital is affiliated with, however, promotive to tangible human capital. They are interactive positively ; 5. Intangible human capital presents more comparatively homogeneity.
After definition and feature analysis, this article analyzed the formation mechanism and value creation process of intangible human capital. Popularity formation , once spread in word-of-mouth in traditional society , relies primarily upon modern media technology in contemporary society and closely relates to someone’s profession trait , individual achievement , public concern and etc. Popularity has Forgetting Effect and Multiplying Effect (or Diffusion Effect), both of which affect popularity in an opposite direction thus jointly determine its up-and-down. Based on repeating game, credibility is set up and determined by communication scope and association degree and influenced by information spread speed, legal system, property right structure and etc. Intangible human capital is able to create value because it could reduce transaction cost under the effect of credibility on the one hand and produce Advertising Effect under the effect of popularity on the other hand. It’s not difficult to understand why enterprises use intangible human capital in high price .
This article also used the conception of intangible human capital to analyze the popular issue of enterprise ownership arrangement in recent years. According to mainstream enterprise theories, capital employ labor is more reasonable than labor employ capital because under the condition of asymmetric information and incomplete contract, the inseparability of human capital from its owner disables the mortgage function owned by material capital though and produces opportunistic behavior such as shirking and free ride. However, the aforesaid precondition of deduction is changed after introducing conception of intangible human capital of partial separable and mortgegeable. Analyzing with the respective of satisfied profit in state-contingent ownership theory, capital employ labor is possible and able to explain why some celebrities could possess enterprises’stock without investing material capital or working.
Theories must be able to interpret reality and be verified. After using statistics of listed companies and studying the relationship between CEOs’compensation and intangible human capital with , this article found out their positive co-relationship and verified the judgment of a threshold value in intangible human capital . The measurement of intangible human capital adopted the quantity of relative webpage from Google as measuring value.
在分析了无形人力资本的概念和特征之后,本文对无形人力资本的形成机理和价值创造过程进行了分析。知名度的形成,在传统社会采取的是“口碑相传”的方式,而在现代社会,则主要依赖现代传媒技术,因此,与一个人的职业特征、个人成就、受大众关注的程度等因素密切相关。知名度存在“遗忘效应”和“倍加效应”(或称“扩散效应”),两者对知名度的影响方向相反,因此,知名度的增减,由两种效应的综合影响而定。信誉度是在重复博弈的基础上建立起来的,信誉度的高低,由交往面、交往程度两个因素决定。因此,信誉度受到信息传递速度、法律制度、产权结构等因素的影响。无形人力资本之所以能够创造价值,一方面是因为可以降低交易成本,这主要是因为信誉度的作用;另一方面则是因为可以产生广告效应,这主要是因为知名度。所以,就不难理解,企业为什么要高价使用无形人力资本。
企业所有权安排是近年来广受关注的问题,本文结合无形人力资本概念,对此也进行了分析。根据主流企业理论,之所以“资本雇佣劳动”比“劳动雇佣资本”更合理,主要是因为在信息不对称以及合同不完备的条件下,由于人力资本与其所有者的不可分离性,使得人力资本不能像物质资本那样具有抵押功能,并且存在“偷懒”和“搭便车”等机会主义行为。引入无形人力资本概念后,由于无形人力资本的部分可分离性、部分可抵押性,使得以上推导的前提发生了改变。采用状态依存所有权中的“满意的利润”的分析视角,那么,“资本雇佣劳动”是可能的。这也就能解释为什么有些名人既不需要投入物质资本,也不需要到企业工作,就可以拥有企业的股份等现象。
理论必须要能够对现实进行解释,并能得到验证。既然无形人力资本能够创造价值,那么,就应该对个人收入产生影响。本文利用上市公司数据,对总经理薪酬与无形人力资本之间的关系进行了分析,结果发现,无形人力资本与总经理薪酬之间存在显著的正相关关系,并进一步验证了无形人力资本有一个“阀值”的判断。无形人力资本的测度,则采用了从google网上的“相关网页数”作为无形人力资本的测量值。
According to the traditional theory of human capital, the essential difference between human capital and material capital is the inseparability of human capital from its owner. However, in the real economy exists a sort of human capital defined in the text as intangible human capita(IHC) which is detachable from its owner. It is made of dimensions of popularity and credibility and popularity functionally matters more than credibility not only because it’s much more difficult to fathom credibility but also because popularity is the precondition of credibility. Having intangible human capital only means someone’s popularity and credibility reach to a certain degree called threshold value which features“When the river rises, the boat floats high.”Comparing with intangible human capital , traditional human capital is counter-defined as tangible human capital . Partial-detachability from its owner is foremost substantial to distinguish intangible human capital from tangible human capital and deductive to bring it about some other characteristics as followed :
1. Value development of intangible human capital probably depends on the users’endeavor rather than owners’endeavor ; 2. Value development of intangible human capital connects closely with owners own intangible human capital and users’popularity as well , on the general basis of mutual stimulation between owners and users ; 3. Intangible human capital is partial mortgageable; 4. Intangible human capital is affiliated with, however, promotive to tangible human capital. They are interactive positively ; 5. Intangible human capital presents more comparatively homogeneity.
After definition and feature analysis, this article analyzed the formation mechanism and value creation process of intangible human capital. Popularity formation , once spread in word-of-mouth in traditional society , relies primarily upon modern media technology in contemporary society and closely relates to someone’s profession trait , individual achievement , public concern and etc. Popularity has Forgetting Effect and Multiplying Effect (or Diffusion Effect), both of which affect popularity in an opposite direction thus jointly determine its up-and-down. Based on repeating game, credibility is set up and determined by communication scope and association degree and influenced by information spread speed, legal system, property right structure and etc. Intangible human capital is able to create value because it could reduce transaction cost under the effect of credibility on the one hand and produce Advertising Effect under the effect of popularity on the other hand. It’s not difficult to understand why enterprises use intangible human capital in high price .
This article also used the conception of intangible human capital to analyze the popular issue of enterprise ownership arrangement in recent years. According to mainstream enterprise theories, capital employ labor is more reasonable than labor employ capital because under the condition of asymmetric information and incomplete contract, the inseparability of human capital from its owner disables the mortgage function owned by material capital though and produces opportunistic behavior such as shirking and free ride. However, the aforesaid precondition of deduction is changed after introducing conception of intangible human capital of partial separable and mortgegeable. Analyzing with the respective of satisfied profit in state-contingent ownership theory, capital employ labor is possible and able to explain why some celebrities could possess enterprises’stock without investing material capital or working.
Theories must be able to interpret reality and be verified. After using statistics of listed companies and studying the relationship between CEOs’compensation and intangible human capital with , this article found out their positive co-relationship and verified the judgment of a threshold value in intangible human capital . The measurement of intangible human capital adopted the quantity of relative webpage from Google as measuring value.
引文
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②Mincer可以说是专心研究人力资本理论的经济学家,在其大量的著述中,虽然没有对人力资本作出专门的定义,但从其研究的视角可以看出,他所理解的人力资本就是由教育、在职培训、劳动流动和工作变动几个方面的投入而形成的。明塞尔的论文,参阅中译本:明塞尔,2001:《人力资本研究》,张凤林译,北京:中国经济出版社。
③《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》(中译本),北京:经济科学出版社,1996年,第736页。
①吴震棚、韩文秀:《人力资本概念的扩展》,《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》2004年第2期(4月):第172页。
②郭玉林:《隐性人力资本的价值度量》,《中国工业经济》2002年第7期:第84页。
①张维迎:《法律制度的信誉基础》,《经济研究》2002年第1期:第7页。
②Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson(1982),“Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’Dilemma”, Journal of Economic Theory, 27: 245-252。
②Coase, R. H. (1937),“The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4, 386-405。Coase的这篇划时代的论文,开创了交易费用经济学的先河。1991年,他在获得诺贝尔经济学奖时的题为《生产的制度结构》的演说词中,谈到《企业的性质》一文时,是这样说的:“这篇论文的最重要的东西,是将交易费用明确地引入经济分析。”(转引自费方域:《企业的产权分析》,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2006年,第21页)
另据迈克尔·迪屈奇(Michael Dietrich)的考证,马克思早在《资本论》第一卷中就已经探索了“倘若价格机制能够有效地配置资源,那为何在公司内仍需对资源配置进行计划和指导”的问题(见迈克尔·迪屈奇,1999:《交易成本经济学——关于公司的新的经济意义》,经济科学出版社,第21页注释1)。
①德姆塞茨:《所有权、控制与企业——论经济活动的组织》,段毅才等译,北京:经济科学出版社,1999年,第14页。
②Coase,R.H.(1960),“The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics,3:1-44
①Samuelson,P.A.(1957),“Wage and Interest: A Modern Dissection of Marxian Economic Models”, American Economic Review, 47:pp894。
①Schultz,T.W.(1968),“Institutions and the Rising Economic Value of Man”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 50(December):1113-1122,Schultz的这一观点主要参见该文的第1120页。其实马克思主义者早就持有这样的洞见,如毛泽东著名的论断:“人民,只有人民,才是创造世界历史的真正动力。”
②North,D. and R.P.Thomas(1973),“The Rise of Western World: A New Economic History”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,此处所引观点参见该书第23页。转引自V.W.拉坦:“诱致性制度变迁理论”,载[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994年,第333页。
③转引自王宏昌:《诺贝尔经济学金获得者演讲集》(下册),中国社会科学出版社,1997年,第251页。
②李仕明、韩轶:《“智能雇佣资本”与企业所有权安排》,《经济体制改革》1998年第6期:第119-122页。
②Mincer, J.(1958), Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, Journal of Political Economy, 66, August, 281- 302(该文的中译本见雅各布·明塞尔:《人力资本研究》,张凤林译,中国经济出版社,2001年,第25-58页)
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⑤Hogan,T. and L.McPheters(1980),“Executive Compensation:Performance versus Personal Characteristics”, Southern Economic Journal, 46(April):1060-1068
⑥Coughlan,A.T, and R.M. Schmidt(1985),“Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(April): 43-66
⑦Jensen,M.C.and K.J.Murphy(1990),“Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, Journal of Political Economy,98(2):225-264
⑧Mehran,H.(1995),“Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 38
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