制造业企业研发人员激励机制研究
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摘要
制造业是我国国民经济的重要支柱之一,制造业企业的技术创新能力,决定了企业的生存与发展,是企业竞争优势的直接表现。在现代企业中,战略领导、开发战略相匹配技术和激励技术创新人才高效的工作是企业获取竞争优势的三个重要驱动要素。企业研发人员是企业技术变革的主体,他们是技术创新活动成功与否的关键要素。如何提高研发人员个体绩效,从而提高创新活动的整体绩效是每一个企业所关心的问题。但是,管理学者对研发人员激励的研究成果尚不能满意地指导企业的实践。正是基于理论和实践的需要,本文从研发人员的激励需求出发,提出了研发人员的职业倾向与激励之间的关系假设并进行了验证;在此基础上,从报酬激励和关系激励两个方面对制造业企业的研发人员激励机制进行了研究。所取得的成果对技术创新管理和研发人员的激励方面具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。
通过本论文的研究得出如下结论:
1.在我国制造业企业研发人员职业倾向的研究中,发现研发人员存在职业倾向,而目前的职业倾向分布不利于企业技术创新能力的提高。
2.通过对研发人员职业倾向与激励需求的关系特征分析,发现不同职业倾向的研发人员对激励需求、对激励满意度、对激励措施的重视程度上有显著差异;企业可以通过提高研发人员对激励措施的满意度来达到提高研发人员工作投入度的目的;强激励因素的满足可以对研发人员产生激励,而弱激励的满足可以消除研发人员的不满意;企业可以根据各类职业倾向研发人员的特点,制定研发人员的激励措施。
3.在报酬激励机制设计中,发现引入相对业绩变量,不仅提高研发人员对创新剩余分享程度,而且还降低了风险成本和激励成本;隐性失业威胁可以作为显性激励的替代形式,使得分成合约更加具有激励作用;由于技术风险的存在,研发人员自由交易具有报酬性质的技术成果,会降低分成合约的激励效率。
4.在关系激励机制设计中,发现研发人员的心理需求是构成组织承诺的需要依据;研发人员心理契约的形成与组织环境、研发人员的需求有密切关系;公平是影响研发人员心理契约发展的重要因素;好评对敬业的研发人员具有强激励作用;声誉在心理契约违背后,对研发人员行为选择具有调节作用。
本文主要创新点有:
1.运用实证研究的方法对我国制造业企业的研发人员的职业倾向分布及其形成原因进行了全面的分析。所得出的结论为研发人员激励机制的设计提供了一个新的研究思路。
2.构建了基于职业倾向的激励需求、工作满意度和工作投入之间关系的逻辑模型,提出了关于职业倾向与激励需求、激励满意度和工作投入的研究假设。验证了不同职业倾向研发人员在激励需求上、对激励措施的重视程度上、激励满意度和工作投入之间存在显著性差异。鉴别出提高工作投入的强激励因素和弱激励因素。
3.基于研发人员的职业倾向分布特点,运用委托代理理论从风险分担的角度,设计了基于风险分担报酬契约;首次提出了研发人员隐性失业的概念,并进行隐性失业威胁、技术风险对分成合约设计的影响研究。
4.针对研发人员关系型心理契约特点,运用博弈论进行了关系契约激励机制设计;针对目前学术界对心理契约失衡和心理契约违背的界限不清的现状,厘清了二者之间的关系,明确提出心理契约失衡是心理契约违背的前提,并运用博弈论的方法证明了发生心理契约违背的条件。
China's manufacturing industry is an important pillar of the national economy. Manufacturing enterprises’technological innovation capability is the decisive factor for its survival and development, and is the direct components for its competitive advantages. In modern enterprises, strategic leadership, developing and effectively using the technology in accordance to corporate strategy, and inspiring staff members for technological changes, are three important driving elements for competitiveness. R&D staff is the main force for technological changes, its technological innovation activities are the key elements to success or failure. How to improve the individual performance of R&D staff, so as to enhance the overall innovation performance, is of great concerns for every business. Management scholars have conducted many researches from different angles on the incentive issues of R&D staff, yet none can be of satisfactory guidance to enterprise practices. Because of the need to practice and theory, this paper initiated the research from the incentive demands of R&D staff, proposed and verified hypothesis for the relationship between the professional orientation and incentive, and hence, completed the research from the aspects of payment incentive and relational incentive. Results deducted from this paper are of significant value both to theory and practice regarding technological innovation management and R&D staff’s incentive issues.
Following are important results in this paper:
Firstly, in the research of professional orientation, it is found out that R&D staff has visible professional orientation whose current distribution is not in favor for rising technological innovation capability.
Secondly, in the research of the relationship between professional orientation and incentive demands, it is found out that R&D staff with different professional orientation tends to show significant difference about incentive demands, organization satisfaction and incentive measures. It is possible to enhance work involvement by raising satisfaction to incentive measures. Satisfaction about strong incentive factors can produce positive inspiration while satisfaction about weak incentive factors can eliminate dissatisfaction. The nature of different professional orientation should be considered to design incentive measures.
Thirdly, in the research of payment incentive design, it is found out that, by introducing relative performance variable, it is possible to raise the degree of sharing innovation residual while reducing risk cost and incentive cost. Hidden unemployment threats can be substitute forms for significant incentives, to make sharecropping contract more effective. Due to the technological risk, it will reduce the incentive efficiency of sharecropping contracts if R&D staff can trade their technological achievements freely.
Fourthly, in the relational contract incentive mechanism study, it is found that R&D staff’s psychological demands are important for organization commitment, justice is a key factor for R&D staff’s psychological contract development, favorable comments have strong incentive impact to dedicated R&D staff, and reputations have leverage impact to R&D staff’s behavior choice upon violations to psychological contracts.
Creative points in this paper can be found in four aspects:
Firstly, a thorough study of the professional orientation distribution using empirical study made it possible to disclose a new clue for incentive mechanism design.
Secondly, a logical model on the relationship among professional orientation based incentive demands, job satisfaction, and work involvement was proposed to justify the hypothesis about professional orientation, incentive demands, job satisfaction, and work involvement. It is justified that R&D staff with different professional orientation tends to show significant difference about incentive demands, focus degree to incentive measures, incentive satisfaction, and work involvement. Strong factors and weak factors for rising work involvement are distinguished.
Thirdly, on the basis of the nature of R&D staff’s professional orientation distribution, a design of the mechanism from the aspect of risk-share was proposed using principal-agent theory, and hence the research on the incentive mechanism design under threats of hidden unemployment and share-contract under technical risk was conducted.
Finally, in the field of the nature of R&D staff’s relational psychological contract, the relational psychological contract incentive mechanism was explored using game theory. Against the current unclear academic situation about psychological contract unbalance and psychological contract violation, this paper proposed clear descriptions relative to the situation, and disclosed that psychological contract unbalance is the premise to psychological contract violation. Conditions to show psychological contract violation are justified using game theory.
通过本论文的研究得出如下结论:
1.在我国制造业企业研发人员职业倾向的研究中,发现研发人员存在职业倾向,而目前的职业倾向分布不利于企业技术创新能力的提高。
2.通过对研发人员职业倾向与激励需求的关系特征分析,发现不同职业倾向的研发人员对激励需求、对激励满意度、对激励措施的重视程度上有显著差异;企业可以通过提高研发人员对激励措施的满意度来达到提高研发人员工作投入度的目的;强激励因素的满足可以对研发人员产生激励,而弱激励的满足可以消除研发人员的不满意;企业可以根据各类职业倾向研发人员的特点,制定研发人员的激励措施。
3.在报酬激励机制设计中,发现引入相对业绩变量,不仅提高研发人员对创新剩余分享程度,而且还降低了风险成本和激励成本;隐性失业威胁可以作为显性激励的替代形式,使得分成合约更加具有激励作用;由于技术风险的存在,研发人员自由交易具有报酬性质的技术成果,会降低分成合约的激励效率。
4.在关系激励机制设计中,发现研发人员的心理需求是构成组织承诺的需要依据;研发人员心理契约的形成与组织环境、研发人员的需求有密切关系;公平是影响研发人员心理契约发展的重要因素;好评对敬业的研发人员具有强激励作用;声誉在心理契约违背后,对研发人员行为选择具有调节作用。
本文主要创新点有:
1.运用实证研究的方法对我国制造业企业的研发人员的职业倾向分布及其形成原因进行了全面的分析。所得出的结论为研发人员激励机制的设计提供了一个新的研究思路。
2.构建了基于职业倾向的激励需求、工作满意度和工作投入之间关系的逻辑模型,提出了关于职业倾向与激励需求、激励满意度和工作投入的研究假设。验证了不同职业倾向研发人员在激励需求上、对激励措施的重视程度上、激励满意度和工作投入之间存在显著性差异。鉴别出提高工作投入的强激励因素和弱激励因素。
3.基于研发人员的职业倾向分布特点,运用委托代理理论从风险分担的角度,设计了基于风险分担报酬契约;首次提出了研发人员隐性失业的概念,并进行隐性失业威胁、技术风险对分成合约设计的影响研究。
4.针对研发人员关系型心理契约特点,运用博弈论进行了关系契约激励机制设计;针对目前学术界对心理契约失衡和心理契约违背的界限不清的现状,厘清了二者之间的关系,明确提出心理契约失衡是心理契约违背的前提,并运用博弈论的方法证明了发生心理契约违背的条件。
China's manufacturing industry is an important pillar of the national economy. Manufacturing enterprises’technological innovation capability is the decisive factor for its survival and development, and is the direct components for its competitive advantages. In modern enterprises, strategic leadership, developing and effectively using the technology in accordance to corporate strategy, and inspiring staff members for technological changes, are three important driving elements for competitiveness. R&D staff is the main force for technological changes, its technological innovation activities are the key elements to success or failure. How to improve the individual performance of R&D staff, so as to enhance the overall innovation performance, is of great concerns for every business. Management scholars have conducted many researches from different angles on the incentive issues of R&D staff, yet none can be of satisfactory guidance to enterprise practices. Because of the need to practice and theory, this paper initiated the research from the incentive demands of R&D staff, proposed and verified hypothesis for the relationship between the professional orientation and incentive, and hence, completed the research from the aspects of payment incentive and relational incentive. Results deducted from this paper are of significant value both to theory and practice regarding technological innovation management and R&D staff’s incentive issues.
Following are important results in this paper:
Firstly, in the research of professional orientation, it is found out that R&D staff has visible professional orientation whose current distribution is not in favor for rising technological innovation capability.
Secondly, in the research of the relationship between professional orientation and incentive demands, it is found out that R&D staff with different professional orientation tends to show significant difference about incentive demands, organization satisfaction and incentive measures. It is possible to enhance work involvement by raising satisfaction to incentive measures. Satisfaction about strong incentive factors can produce positive inspiration while satisfaction about weak incentive factors can eliminate dissatisfaction. The nature of different professional orientation should be considered to design incentive measures.
Thirdly, in the research of payment incentive design, it is found out that, by introducing relative performance variable, it is possible to raise the degree of sharing innovation residual while reducing risk cost and incentive cost. Hidden unemployment threats can be substitute forms for significant incentives, to make sharecropping contract more effective. Due to the technological risk, it will reduce the incentive efficiency of sharecropping contracts if R&D staff can trade their technological achievements freely.
Fourthly, in the relational contract incentive mechanism study, it is found that R&D staff’s psychological demands are important for organization commitment, justice is a key factor for R&D staff’s psychological contract development, favorable comments have strong incentive impact to dedicated R&D staff, and reputations have leverage impact to R&D staff’s behavior choice upon violations to psychological contracts.
Creative points in this paper can be found in four aspects:
Firstly, a thorough study of the professional orientation distribution using empirical study made it possible to disclose a new clue for incentive mechanism design.
Secondly, a logical model on the relationship among professional orientation based incentive demands, job satisfaction, and work involvement was proposed to justify the hypothesis about professional orientation, incentive demands, job satisfaction, and work involvement. It is justified that R&D staff with different professional orientation tends to show significant difference about incentive demands, focus degree to incentive measures, incentive satisfaction, and work involvement. Strong factors and weak factors for rising work involvement are distinguished.
Thirdly, on the basis of the nature of R&D staff’s professional orientation distribution, a design of the mechanism from the aspect of risk-share was proposed using principal-agent theory, and hence the research on the incentive mechanism design under threats of hidden unemployment and share-contract under technical risk was conducted.
Finally, in the field of the nature of R&D staff’s relational psychological contract, the relational psychological contract incentive mechanism was explored using game theory. Against the current unclear academic situation about psychological contract unbalance and psychological contract violation, this paper proposed clear descriptions relative to the situation, and disclosed that psychological contract unbalance is the premise to psychological contract violation. Conditions to show psychological contract violation are justified using game theory.
引文
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