我国上市家族企业的代理成本及其治理研究
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摘要
本文针对学术界关于家族企业代理成本问题的争论,采用了2006年339家上市家族企业的数据,首先,分析了家族管理模式对上市家族企业代理成本的影响;其次,探讨了治理机制对上市家族企业的代理成本的影响效果;最后,本文研究了高管人员的薪酬机制对上市家族企业代理成本的作用。
本文得出以下主要结论:(1)总体而言,家族管理模式有利于降低企业的代理成本。其中,创业家族管理者对降低企业的代理成本的效应显著,第二代家族管理者降低代理成本的效应不显著。家族企业选择家族管理模式还是专业管理模式,受到企业的经营特征、家族自利倾向和上市时间的影响。(2)对上市家族企业而言,机构投资者持股比例、流动负债比例对代理成本发挥正面作用,两职合一、资产负债率对代理成本发挥负面影响,大股东持股比例、股权制衡度、董事会规模、独立董事比例与代理成本的关系不显著。家族管理企业与专业管理企业的治理机制对代理成本作用效果有不同之处:在家族管理模式中,大股东持股比例、董事会规模与代理成本负相关,但是这两类治理机制对专业管理企业的代理成本没有发挥显著作用。(3)高管人员薪酬机制对降低上市家族企业代理成本的作用显著。高管人员的家族化背景对薪酬机制效果有负向的调节效应,意味着职业经理人薪酬机制的效果比家族管理者更明显。家族自利倾向对薪酬机制效果也有负向的调节效应,意味着家族自利倾向越明显,薪酬机制的作用效果越差。
基于本文的研究结论,本文提出以下建议:(1)对上市家族企业而言,首先,应该谨慎考虑管理模式的选择;其次,有针对性地运用上市家族企业的治理机制,吸引机构投资者对本公司投资,在债务融资方面,应该优先采用短期债务融资方式;最后,适当加强对职业经理人的激励强度,并合理调整薪酬结构,实施专业管理模式的企业,可将薪酬差距适当加大,实施家族管理模式的企业,其薪酬差距不能太大。(2)对监管层而言,首先,要培育职业经理人市场,通过建立职业经理人信息库、完善法制环境和发展中介机构的方法加强对职业经理人的约束;其次,完善相关制度,更好地发挥独立董事制度和债务融资的效果;最后,实施分类监管,加强对控制性家族和高管人员“合谋”行为的监管。
The study focuses on the controversy of family business agency costs in the academic community,and uses 339 listed family business data in 2006.Firstly,the paper analyses the impact from family management pattern to family business agency costs.Secondly,the paper studies the influence from governance mechanisms of listed family business to agency costs.Thirdly,the paper studies the effect on the family business agency costs by implementing salary and bonus incentive mechanism for executives.
The paper comes to the following conclusions by empirical research.(1)Overall, the family management pattern is advantageous in reducing enterprise's agency cost. The effect of entrepreneur in family business to reduce enterprise's agency cost is remarkable,and the effect of the second generation of family successor to reduce the agency cost is not remarkable.Whether the Family business chooses the family management pattern or professional management pattern depends on three factors: enterprise's management characteristic,the family self-interest tendency and the length of time of the listed company.(2)For listed family business,the proportion of institutional investor stocks and the proportion of current liability can reduce agency costs;two duties unite and asset-liability ratio display negative influence on the agency cost;and the relations between the proportion of major stockholder stocks, stockholder's rights keeping in balance,the board scale,the independent director proportion and the agency cost are not remarkable.The governance mechanisms have different effect on agency cost between family management pattern and professional management pattern:in the family management pattern,the proportion of major stockholder stocks and the board scale have negative influence on the agency cost,but these two kinds of governance mechanisms have not played any remarkable part to the agency cost of professional management pattern.(3)The effect of executive salary and bonus to reduce the listed family business agency cost is remarkable.The executive's family background has the negative adjustment effect to the compensation effect,and it means that salary and bonus incentive mechanism's effect of the professional manager is more obvious than the family manager's.The family self-interest tendency also has the negative adjustment effect on salary and bonus incentive mechanism effect,and it means that the salary and bonus incentive mechanism functions comparatively worse when the family self-interest tendency is more obvious.
Based on the conclusion of this thesis,the paper proposes following suggestions. (1) As for the listed family business,firstly,the listed family business should consider the choice of management pattern discretely;Secondly,the listed family business should utilize the governance mechanisms correctly,attracting institutional investors to join the corporate,and to select the current debt financing method at first;Finally, the listed family business should promote more positively the salary and bonus incentive mechanism for the professional manager,and adjust salary and bonus structure reasonably.For professional management pattern's enterprise,it may enlarge the pay gap suitably;For family management pattern's enterprise,its pay gap cannot be too big.(2) As for the government,firstly,it must cultivate the professional manager market,such as to establish professional manager database,to improve legal environment and to develop intermediaries institution.Secondly,it should improve related system to improve the effect of independent director and the debt financing. Finally,it should implement classification supervision to prohibit the collusion of the executive and the member who holds the family business.
本文得出以下主要结论:(1)总体而言,家族管理模式有利于降低企业的代理成本。其中,创业家族管理者对降低企业的代理成本的效应显著,第二代家族管理者降低代理成本的效应不显著。家族企业选择家族管理模式还是专业管理模式,受到企业的经营特征、家族自利倾向和上市时间的影响。(2)对上市家族企业而言,机构投资者持股比例、流动负债比例对代理成本发挥正面作用,两职合一、资产负债率对代理成本发挥负面影响,大股东持股比例、股权制衡度、董事会规模、独立董事比例与代理成本的关系不显著。家族管理企业与专业管理企业的治理机制对代理成本作用效果有不同之处:在家族管理模式中,大股东持股比例、董事会规模与代理成本负相关,但是这两类治理机制对专业管理企业的代理成本没有发挥显著作用。(3)高管人员薪酬机制对降低上市家族企业代理成本的作用显著。高管人员的家族化背景对薪酬机制效果有负向的调节效应,意味着职业经理人薪酬机制的效果比家族管理者更明显。家族自利倾向对薪酬机制效果也有负向的调节效应,意味着家族自利倾向越明显,薪酬机制的作用效果越差。
基于本文的研究结论,本文提出以下建议:(1)对上市家族企业而言,首先,应该谨慎考虑管理模式的选择;其次,有针对性地运用上市家族企业的治理机制,吸引机构投资者对本公司投资,在债务融资方面,应该优先采用短期债务融资方式;最后,适当加强对职业经理人的激励强度,并合理调整薪酬结构,实施专业管理模式的企业,可将薪酬差距适当加大,实施家族管理模式的企业,其薪酬差距不能太大。(2)对监管层而言,首先,要培育职业经理人市场,通过建立职业经理人信息库、完善法制环境和发展中介机构的方法加强对职业经理人的约束;其次,完善相关制度,更好地发挥独立董事制度和债务融资的效果;最后,实施分类监管,加强对控制性家族和高管人员“合谋”行为的监管。
The study focuses on the controversy of family business agency costs in the academic community,and uses 339 listed family business data in 2006.Firstly,the paper analyses the impact from family management pattern to family business agency costs.Secondly,the paper studies the influence from governance mechanisms of listed family business to agency costs.Thirdly,the paper studies the effect on the family business agency costs by implementing salary and bonus incentive mechanism for executives.
The paper comes to the following conclusions by empirical research.(1)Overall, the family management pattern is advantageous in reducing enterprise's agency cost. The effect of entrepreneur in family business to reduce enterprise's agency cost is remarkable,and the effect of the second generation of family successor to reduce the agency cost is not remarkable.Whether the Family business chooses the family management pattern or professional management pattern depends on three factors: enterprise's management characteristic,the family self-interest tendency and the length of time of the listed company.(2)For listed family business,the proportion of institutional investor stocks and the proportion of current liability can reduce agency costs;two duties unite and asset-liability ratio display negative influence on the agency cost;and the relations between the proportion of major stockholder stocks, stockholder's rights keeping in balance,the board scale,the independent director proportion and the agency cost are not remarkable.The governance mechanisms have different effect on agency cost between family management pattern and professional management pattern:in the family management pattern,the proportion of major stockholder stocks and the board scale have negative influence on the agency cost,but these two kinds of governance mechanisms have not played any remarkable part to the agency cost of professional management pattern.(3)The effect of executive salary and bonus to reduce the listed family business agency cost is remarkable.The executive's family background has the negative adjustment effect to the compensation effect,and it means that salary and bonus incentive mechanism's effect of the professional manager is more obvious than the family manager's.The family self-interest tendency also has the negative adjustment effect on salary and bonus incentive mechanism effect,and it means that the salary and bonus incentive mechanism functions comparatively worse when the family self-interest tendency is more obvious.
Based on the conclusion of this thesis,the paper proposes following suggestions. (1) As for the listed family business,firstly,the listed family business should consider the choice of management pattern discretely;Secondly,the listed family business should utilize the governance mechanisms correctly,attracting institutional investors to join the corporate,and to select the current debt financing method at first;Finally, the listed family business should promote more positively the salary and bonus incentive mechanism for the professional manager,and adjust salary and bonus structure reasonably.For professional management pattern's enterprise,it may enlarge the pay gap suitably;For family management pattern's enterprise,its pay gap cannot be too big.(2) As for the government,firstly,it must cultivate the professional manager market,such as to establish professional manager database,to improve legal environment and to develop intermediaries institution.Secondly,it should improve related system to improve the effect of independent director and the debt financing. Finally,it should implement classification supervision to prohibit the collusion of the executive and the member who holds the family business.
引文
1 参看:格兰特·戈登,奈杰尔·尼克尔森(英).家族战争[M].海口:南海出版公司,2008,162-172页。
2 参看:格兰特·戈登,奈杰尔·尼克尔森(英).家族战争[M].海口:南海出版公司,2008,137-143页。
3 参看:格兰特·戈登,奈杰尔·尼克尔森(英).家族战争[M].海口:南海出版公司,2008,214-230页。
4 以下三个上市家族企业的相关案例参看:2007年证券市场主体违法违规情况报告,深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2008年。
5 关于学术界对家族企业代理问题争论的具体阐述,请参看本文第二章的文献综述部分。
6 由于本文是从家族控制权的角度定义上市家族企业,所以在本文中,家族控制上市公司和上市家族企业的含义是相同的。
7 本文对上市家族企业的判断标准参考了申明浩(2008)、王明琳等(2006)和苏启林等(2003)的判断标准。
8 值得注意的是,正如李明辉(2005)所言,对于代理成本的计量,尚朱有简便、有效的方法,这两个指标测算的只是代理成本的一部分,而不是对代理成本数值的准确计算或估计。当然,采用管理费用率和总资产周转率作为替代指标是目前受到学术界所认可的方法,因此,本文也采用这种方法。
9 中国注册会计师协会编,会计-2006年CPA统一教材,中国财政经济出版社,2006年4月第1版,第203页,转引自李寿喜(2007)。
1 这些观点的总结主要参考了以下文献:Fama和Jensen(1983 a,1983 b,1985),Schulze 等人(2001),王明琳等(2005)。
2 这些观点的总结主要参考了以下文献:Stark等(1998),王志明等(2004),王明琳等(2005)。
3 这些观点的总结主要参考了以下文献:Schulze等人(2001,2003),王明琳等(2005),王彦(2006),申明浩(2007)。
1 关于亲缘系数计算的具体论述可参阅,刘鹤玲:动物利他行为与人类利他主义,科学出版社,2008,第32页。
2 此案例来源于,李忱、陶学禹:家族企业完善制度管理,政府作用不容忽视--由“龙威”公司风波引发的思考,河北建筑科技学院学报(社科版),2003年第3期。
3 此案例来源于,黄湘源、牛文文、李珉:黄河变局,中国企业家,2000年第3期。
1 克林·盖尔西克等:《家族企业的繁衍--家族企业的生命周期》,经济日报出版社,1998年版,第23页。
2 这样的处理方式参考了谌新民(2003)和鲁海帆(2007)。
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2 参看:格兰特·戈登,奈杰尔·尼克尔森(英).家族战争[M].海口:南海出版公司,2008,137-143页。
3 参看:格兰特·戈登,奈杰尔·尼克尔森(英).家族战争[M].海口:南海出版公司,2008,214-230页。
4 以下三个上市家族企业的相关案例参看:2007年证券市场主体违法违规情况报告,深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2008年。
5 关于学术界对家族企业代理问题争论的具体阐述,请参看本文第二章的文献综述部分。
6 由于本文是从家族控制权的角度定义上市家族企业,所以在本文中,家族控制上市公司和上市家族企业的含义是相同的。
7 本文对上市家族企业的判断标准参考了申明浩(2008)、王明琳等(2006)和苏启林等(2003)的判断标准。
8 值得注意的是,正如李明辉(2005)所言,对于代理成本的计量,尚朱有简便、有效的方法,这两个指标测算的只是代理成本的一部分,而不是对代理成本数值的准确计算或估计。当然,采用管理费用率和总资产周转率作为替代指标是目前受到学术界所认可的方法,因此,本文也采用这种方法。
9 中国注册会计师协会编,会计-2006年CPA统一教材,中国财政经济出版社,2006年4月第1版,第203页,转引自李寿喜(2007)。
1 这些观点的总结主要参考了以下文献:Fama和Jensen(1983 a,1983 b,1985),Schulze 等人(2001),王明琳等(2005)。
2 这些观点的总结主要参考了以下文献:Stark等(1998),王志明等(2004),王明琳等(2005)。
3 这些观点的总结主要参考了以下文献:Schulze等人(2001,2003),王明琳等(2005),王彦(2006),申明浩(2007)。
1 关于亲缘系数计算的具体论述可参阅,刘鹤玲:动物利他行为与人类利他主义,科学出版社,2008,第32页。
2 此案例来源于,李忱、陶学禹:家族企业完善制度管理,政府作用不容忽视--由“龙威”公司风波引发的思考,河北建筑科技学院学报(社科版),2003年第3期。
3 此案例来源于,黄湘源、牛文文、李珉:黄河变局,中国企业家,2000年第3期。
1 克林·盖尔西克等:《家族企业的繁衍--家族企业的生命周期》,经济日报出版社,1998年版,第23页。
2 这样的处理方式参考了谌新民(2003)和鲁海帆(2007)。
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