风险投资过程中的协同风险管理研究
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摘要
面对知识经济和全球一体化的挑战,发展高新技术产业、提升综合国力已成为当务之急。发达国家的实践证明,风险投资在支持创新活动的开展和高新技术产业化方面,有着独特的、不可替代的重要作用,是高新技术产业发展的“助推器”、经济增长的“发动机”。高新技术企业创业是一个动态的技术经济过程,有着超越成熟性企业的传统经济学特性。风险投资高风险的特点,是由高新技术企业创业的经济学特性和未来发展的不确定性等诸多因素造成的。风险投资金融经济价值作用的发挥,需要建立一套行之有效的风险管理机制,弥补由于技术创新和技术转化所固有的高风险与传统投资保守的运作机制之间的缺失。
风险投资过程是一个动态的开放的非线性复杂系统,面临的风险更大,更具有复杂性。加强对风险投资过程风险管理的系统性研究,一方面有利于提高风险投资的风险管理水平,促进资源的优化配置;另一方面对丰富和发展风险投资风险管理理论也具有重要意义。
论文基于前人的研究成果,把风险投资过程分为融资、投资和撤出三个子过程,从风险投资家的角度,以协同度概念为核心,运用协同学理论,分别对融资、投资和撤出三个子过程的风险管理进行研究,在此基础上,研究风险投资过程的风险管理,建立了风险投资过程协同度测度模型,并对影响风险投资过程协同度的要素进行比较研究,主要研究内容如下:
风险投资过程风险管理的研究基础方面,阐述了风险与风险投资的定义和特征,分析了风险投资的运行过程,在此基础上,比较了风险投资风险的静态、动态和复杂性的特征,指出风险投资过程是一个动态的开放的非线性复杂系统,从而为运用协同学理论研究风险投资过程提供了可能。基于协同学理论,揭示了风险投资过程的协同学特征、动力机制和风险特性,提出协同度概念并把它作为风险投资过程风险管理的依据和判据。在分析风险管理含义的基础上,阐述了风险投资风险管理的理论基础,提出了基于协同学的风险投资过程风险管理框架。
风险投资过程中融资的风险管理方面,阐述了风险投资的融资机制,包括风险资本的来源、募集策略和风险投资机构的组织制度,指出有限合伙制的组织制度运作效率最高。基于协同学理论,探讨了融资过程的协同机理,指出价值发现是融资过程的序参量,它支配融资系统的演进方向;融资协同度是融资过程风险管理的依据和判据。在此基础上,研究了基于协同学的融资过程风险管理。
风险投资过程中投资的风险管理方面,阐述了高新技术企业的创业经济学特性及其协同关系,高新技术企业创业的经济学特性是风险投资高风险的来源因素之一。分析了高新技术企业风险投资的投资机制,比较了风险投资投资决策的影响因素,提出了一个完整的风险投资决策SNM模型。基于协同学的理论,探讨了投资过程的协同机理,指出价值揭示是投资过程的序参量,它支配投资系统的演进方向;投资协同度是投资过程风险管理的依据和判据。在此基础上,研究了基于协同学的投资过程风险管理。
风险投资过程中撤出的风险管理方面,阐述了风险投资的撤出机制,比较了风险投资的主要撤出方式及其效果,股票上市是最理想的撤出方式;分析了风险投资撤出机制的重要作用,撤出是风险投资循环的中心环节。基于协同学的理论,探讨了撤出过程的协同机理,指出价值实现是撤出过程的序参量,它支配撤出系统的演进方向;撤出协同度是撤出过程风险管理的依据和判据。在此基础上,研究了基于协同学的撤出过程风险管理。
融资—投资—撤出过程的协同风险管理方面,阐述了风险投资过程协同的原理,指出风险投资金融经济价值的实现是风险投资过程的序参量,它支配着风险投资过程系统的演进方向。探讨了风险投资过程与要素协同的内涵和框架,构建了风险投资过程协同的CCS三阶段模型。在此基础上,建立了风险投资过程的协同度测度模型,并从理论和实证方面分析了风险投资过程协同度测度模型的有效性,指出它是风险投资过程风险管理的依据和判据,为风险投资风险管理的理论和实践提供了新的工具和途径。在此基础上,研究了风险投资过程金融经济价值实现的协同风险管理。
最后,在结论部分对本文的研究内容进行了总结,归纳了主要创新之处,并对本文未涉及的其他相关问题进行了展望。
Facing the challenges from knowledge-based economy and global integration, to develop hi-tech industries and to enhance the comprehensive national strength are very urgent. The practices of the developed country show that venture capital at the field of supporting innovation activities and hi-tech industries has a unique and irreplaceable role. It is a "roll booster" of hi-tech industries and a "motor" of economic growth. The business venture of hi-tech industries is a dynamic technical economic process. The high risk characteristics of venture capital is induced by the economic characteristics, future development's uncertainty and many other factors of hi-tech business venture. The exertion of venture capital financial value needs a set of effective risk management mechanism. This mechanism fetch up the shortage between the hi-tech investment operation mechanism and traditional investment operation mechanism, which are inherent in technology innovation and technical transformation.
The venture capital process is a dynamic on-limits and nonlinear complicated system, with higher risk and is more complicated. Increasing the study on the risk management during the venture capital process systematically will, on the one hand, enhance the risk management level of venture capital, and help to optimize the collocation of the resources; on the other hand, help to develop and enrich risk management theory of venture capital.
Based on the studies made by other people before, the venture capital process is divided to three sub processes, which are financing, investing and exiting. And from the view of a venture capital expert, this paper taking the conception of the synergy degree as the core, using Synergy Theory, studies separately the process of the three sub processes, financing, investing and exiting. And based on these studies, the risk management of the whole venture capital process is studied and synergy degree measurement model is set up, factors that may affect the synergy degree during the venture capital process is studied comparatively. The main studies and results are as follows:
The research basis of the risk management during the venture capital process is studied. The definition and characteristics of risk and venture capital are expatiated. The operation process of venture capital is analyzed. Based on these studies, the static, dynamic and complex characteristics of venture capital risk are compared. Venture capital process as a dynamic, on-limits and nonlinear complicated system is pointed out, which makes the studies on venture capital process by Synergetics becomes possible. Based on Synergetics, synergetic characteristics dynamic mechanism and risk characteristics of venture capital process are analyzed. The conception of synergetic degree is pointed out and is used as the gist and criterion of the risk management during venture capital process. Based on the analysis on the definition of risk management, risk management theory basis of venture capital is expatiated, risk management framework of venture capital process based on Synergetics Theory is bring forwarded. Risk management of financing during venture capital process is studied.
Financing mechanism of venture capital is expatiated, including the source of capital, collecting strategy and organizational system of venture capital institution. Limited Partnership organizational system operation has the highest efficiency. Based on the Synergetics Theory, synergetic mechanism of financing process is studied. Value discovery is the order parameter of financing process, which decides the evolution direction of financing system. Synergetic degree of financing is the gist and criterion of the risk management during financing process. Based on these studies, risk management of financing process based on Synergetics Theory is studied.
Risk management of investment during the venture capital process is studied. The venture economic characteristics and synergetic relationships of hi-tech industries are expatiated. Economic characteristics of hi-tech industries business venture is one of the main sources of venture capital high risk. Investment mechanism of hi-tech industries is analyzed. The impacting factors of making venture capital investment decision are compared. A complete venture capital decision making SNM model is brought forward. Based on the Synergetics Theory, synergetic mechanism of investment process is analyzed. Value discovery is the order parameter of investment process, which decides the evolution directions of investment system. Synergetic degree of investment is the gist and criterion of the risk management during investment process. Based on these studies, risk management of investment process based on Synergetics Theory is studied.
Exiting risk management during venture capital is studied. The exiting mechanism of venture capital is expatiated. Main exiting way and its effection are compared. The best exiting way is to be listed in the stock market. The important role of exiting mechanism of venture capital is analyzed. Exiting is the core of venture capital circle. Based on Synergetics Theory, synergetic mechanism of exiting process is studied. Value realization is the order parameter of exiting process, which decides the evolution directions of exiting system. Synergetic degree of exiting is the gist and criterion of the risk management during existing process. Based on these studies, risk management of exiting process based on Synergetics Theory is studied.
Synergetic risk management of financing-investment-exiting is studied. Synergetics Theory of venture capital processes is expatiated. The economic value realization of the venture capital is the order parameter of venture capital processes, which decides the evolution directions of the venture capital processes. The meaning and framework of synergy between venture capital processes and its factors are studied. Synergetic CCS three phase models of venture capital processes is set up. Based on this, synergetic degree measurement model of venture capital processes is set up. The effectiveness of synergetic degree measurement model during venture capital processes is studied from the aspect of theory and practices. The synergetic degree measurement model is the gist and criterion of risk management during the venture capital processes, which provides a new instrument and way for the theory and practice of venture capital risk management. Based on this, the risk management during the processes of venture capital based on synergetic theory is studied.
At last, in the conclusion part the studies of this paper is summarized, especially the main innovation points and the related problems which have not been studied in this paper are viewed.
风险投资过程是一个动态的开放的非线性复杂系统,面临的风险更大,更具有复杂性。加强对风险投资过程风险管理的系统性研究,一方面有利于提高风险投资的风险管理水平,促进资源的优化配置;另一方面对丰富和发展风险投资风险管理理论也具有重要意义。
论文基于前人的研究成果,把风险投资过程分为融资、投资和撤出三个子过程,从风险投资家的角度,以协同度概念为核心,运用协同学理论,分别对融资、投资和撤出三个子过程的风险管理进行研究,在此基础上,研究风险投资过程的风险管理,建立了风险投资过程协同度测度模型,并对影响风险投资过程协同度的要素进行比较研究,主要研究内容如下:
风险投资过程风险管理的研究基础方面,阐述了风险与风险投资的定义和特征,分析了风险投资的运行过程,在此基础上,比较了风险投资风险的静态、动态和复杂性的特征,指出风险投资过程是一个动态的开放的非线性复杂系统,从而为运用协同学理论研究风险投资过程提供了可能。基于协同学理论,揭示了风险投资过程的协同学特征、动力机制和风险特性,提出协同度概念并把它作为风险投资过程风险管理的依据和判据。在分析风险管理含义的基础上,阐述了风险投资风险管理的理论基础,提出了基于协同学的风险投资过程风险管理框架。
风险投资过程中融资的风险管理方面,阐述了风险投资的融资机制,包括风险资本的来源、募集策略和风险投资机构的组织制度,指出有限合伙制的组织制度运作效率最高。基于协同学理论,探讨了融资过程的协同机理,指出价值发现是融资过程的序参量,它支配融资系统的演进方向;融资协同度是融资过程风险管理的依据和判据。在此基础上,研究了基于协同学的融资过程风险管理。
风险投资过程中投资的风险管理方面,阐述了高新技术企业的创业经济学特性及其协同关系,高新技术企业创业的经济学特性是风险投资高风险的来源因素之一。分析了高新技术企业风险投资的投资机制,比较了风险投资投资决策的影响因素,提出了一个完整的风险投资决策SNM模型。基于协同学的理论,探讨了投资过程的协同机理,指出价值揭示是投资过程的序参量,它支配投资系统的演进方向;投资协同度是投资过程风险管理的依据和判据。在此基础上,研究了基于协同学的投资过程风险管理。
风险投资过程中撤出的风险管理方面,阐述了风险投资的撤出机制,比较了风险投资的主要撤出方式及其效果,股票上市是最理想的撤出方式;分析了风险投资撤出机制的重要作用,撤出是风险投资循环的中心环节。基于协同学的理论,探讨了撤出过程的协同机理,指出价值实现是撤出过程的序参量,它支配撤出系统的演进方向;撤出协同度是撤出过程风险管理的依据和判据。在此基础上,研究了基于协同学的撤出过程风险管理。
融资—投资—撤出过程的协同风险管理方面,阐述了风险投资过程协同的原理,指出风险投资金融经济价值的实现是风险投资过程的序参量,它支配着风险投资过程系统的演进方向。探讨了风险投资过程与要素协同的内涵和框架,构建了风险投资过程协同的CCS三阶段模型。在此基础上,建立了风险投资过程的协同度测度模型,并从理论和实证方面分析了风险投资过程协同度测度模型的有效性,指出它是风险投资过程风险管理的依据和判据,为风险投资风险管理的理论和实践提供了新的工具和途径。在此基础上,研究了风险投资过程金融经济价值实现的协同风险管理。
最后,在结论部分对本文的研究内容进行了总结,归纳了主要创新之处,并对本文未涉及的其他相关问题进行了展望。
Facing the challenges from knowledge-based economy and global integration, to develop hi-tech industries and to enhance the comprehensive national strength are very urgent. The practices of the developed country show that venture capital at the field of supporting innovation activities and hi-tech industries has a unique and irreplaceable role. It is a "roll booster" of hi-tech industries and a "motor" of economic growth. The business venture of hi-tech industries is a dynamic technical economic process. The high risk characteristics of venture capital is induced by the economic characteristics, future development's uncertainty and many other factors of hi-tech business venture. The exertion of venture capital financial value needs a set of effective risk management mechanism. This mechanism fetch up the shortage between the hi-tech investment operation mechanism and traditional investment operation mechanism, which are inherent in technology innovation and technical transformation.
The venture capital process is a dynamic on-limits and nonlinear complicated system, with higher risk and is more complicated. Increasing the study on the risk management during the venture capital process systematically will, on the one hand, enhance the risk management level of venture capital, and help to optimize the collocation of the resources; on the other hand, help to develop and enrich risk management theory of venture capital.
Based on the studies made by other people before, the venture capital process is divided to three sub processes, which are financing, investing and exiting. And from the view of a venture capital expert, this paper taking the conception of the synergy degree as the core, using Synergy Theory, studies separately the process of the three sub processes, financing, investing and exiting. And based on these studies, the risk management of the whole venture capital process is studied and synergy degree measurement model is set up, factors that may affect the synergy degree during the venture capital process is studied comparatively. The main studies and results are as follows:
The research basis of the risk management during the venture capital process is studied. The definition and characteristics of risk and venture capital are expatiated. The operation process of venture capital is analyzed. Based on these studies, the static, dynamic and complex characteristics of venture capital risk are compared. Venture capital process as a dynamic, on-limits and nonlinear complicated system is pointed out, which makes the studies on venture capital process by Synergetics becomes possible. Based on Synergetics, synergetic characteristics dynamic mechanism and risk characteristics of venture capital process are analyzed. The conception of synergetic degree is pointed out and is used as the gist and criterion of the risk management during venture capital process. Based on the analysis on the definition of risk management, risk management theory basis of venture capital is expatiated, risk management framework of venture capital process based on Synergetics Theory is bring forwarded. Risk management of financing during venture capital process is studied.
Financing mechanism of venture capital is expatiated, including the source of capital, collecting strategy and organizational system of venture capital institution. Limited Partnership organizational system operation has the highest efficiency. Based on the Synergetics Theory, synergetic mechanism of financing process is studied. Value discovery is the order parameter of financing process, which decides the evolution direction of financing system. Synergetic degree of financing is the gist and criterion of the risk management during financing process. Based on these studies, risk management of financing process based on Synergetics Theory is studied.
Risk management of investment during the venture capital process is studied. The venture economic characteristics and synergetic relationships of hi-tech industries are expatiated. Economic characteristics of hi-tech industries business venture is one of the main sources of venture capital high risk. Investment mechanism of hi-tech industries is analyzed. The impacting factors of making venture capital investment decision are compared. A complete venture capital decision making SNM model is brought forward. Based on the Synergetics Theory, synergetic mechanism of investment process is analyzed. Value discovery is the order parameter of investment process, which decides the evolution directions of investment system. Synergetic degree of investment is the gist and criterion of the risk management during investment process. Based on these studies, risk management of investment process based on Synergetics Theory is studied.
Exiting risk management during venture capital is studied. The exiting mechanism of venture capital is expatiated. Main exiting way and its effection are compared. The best exiting way is to be listed in the stock market. The important role of exiting mechanism of venture capital is analyzed. Exiting is the core of venture capital circle. Based on Synergetics Theory, synergetic mechanism of exiting process is studied. Value realization is the order parameter of exiting process, which decides the evolution directions of exiting system. Synergetic degree of exiting is the gist and criterion of the risk management during existing process. Based on these studies, risk management of exiting process based on Synergetics Theory is studied.
Synergetic risk management of financing-investment-exiting is studied. Synergetics Theory of venture capital processes is expatiated. The economic value realization of the venture capital is the order parameter of venture capital processes, which decides the evolution directions of the venture capital processes. The meaning and framework of synergy between venture capital processes and its factors are studied. Synergetic CCS three phase models of venture capital processes is set up. Based on this, synergetic degree measurement model of venture capital processes is set up. The effectiveness of synergetic degree measurement model during venture capital processes is studied from the aspect of theory and practices. The synergetic degree measurement model is the gist and criterion of risk management during the venture capital processes, which provides a new instrument and way for the theory and practice of venture capital risk management. Based on this, the risk management during the processes of venture capital based on synergetic theory is studied.
At last, in the conclusion part the studies of this paper is summarized, especially the main innovation points and the related problems which have not been studied in this paper are viewed.
引文
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27 R.M.Stulz, H.Johnson. An Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial Economics. 1985, 14: 501-525
28 Raphael Amit, James Brander, Christoph Zott. Why do Veture Capital Firms Exit? Theory and Canadian Evidence. Journal of Business Venturing. 1998, 18: 441-466
29 K.Schmidt. Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Finance. 2003, 58(3): 1139-1166
30 Giorgino Macro. Public Models to Support Venture Capital Market. Interna-tional Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management. 2006, 6(5): 444
31 Rin Macro Da, Nicodano Giovanna, Sembenelli Alessandro. Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Markets. Journal of Public Economics. 2006, 90: 1699-1723
32 Bates Timothy, Bradford William, Rubin Julia Sass. The Viability of the Minority-Oriented Venture Capital Industry under Alternative Financing Arrangements. Economic Development Quarterly. 2006, 20(2): 178-191
33 Poterba, James. How Burdensome are Capital Gains Taxes? Evidence from the United States. Journal of Public Economics. 1987, 33: 157-172
34 Jensen, C.Michael. Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 1991, 4: 13-33
35 Sahlman, A.William, Howard H.Stevenson. Capital Market Myopia. Journal of Business Venturing. 1985, 1: 7-30
36 S.Black Bernard, J.Gilson Ronald. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets. Journal of Financial Economics. 1998, 4: 243-277
37 Gompers, A.Paul, Josh Lerner. What Drives Venture Capital Fund Raising. Economic Activity-Microeconomics. 1998, 7(2): 149-192
38 Florida, L.Richard, Martin Kenny. VC, High Technology and Regional Development. Regional studies. 1988, 22: 33-48
39 Martin Jose, Balboa Marina. Sela-regulation in European Venture Capital and Private Equity Markets. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management. 2006, 6(5): 395
40 Armour John, Cumming Douglas. The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley. Oxford Economic Papers. 2006, 58(4): 596
41 Darek Klonowski. Venture Capital Contracting in Transition Economics: Evidence from Poland. Post-Communist Economics. 2006, 18(3): 327-343
42 Bigus Jochen. Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism and Patent Law. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2006, 33(7): 939-960
43 W.A.Sahlman. The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27: 473-521
44 M.Ueda. Banks Versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening and Expropriation. Journal of Finance. 2004, 59(2): 601-621
45 T.T.Tyebjee, V.Albert Bruno. A Model of Venture Capitalist Investment Activity. Management Science. 1984, 30(9): 1030-1095
46 Mainprize Brent, Hindle Kevin. Assessing the Efficacy and Standar-dization Potential of Five Competing Venture Capital Investment Evaluation Approaches. The Journal of Private Equity. 2005, 9(1): 6-16
47 J.Hall, C.W.Hofer. Venture Capitalists Decision Criteria in New Venture Evaluation. IEEE Engineering Management Review. 1993, 21(2): 49-59
48 V.H.Fried, R.D.Hisrich. Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making. Financial Management. 1994, 23(3): 28-37
49 T.Eckhardt Jonathan, Scott Shane, Frederic Delmar. Multistage Selection and the Financing of New Venture. Management Science. 2006, 52(2): 220-232
50 Vanacker Tom, Manigart Sophie. Venture Capitalists Selection Process: The Case of Biotechnology Proposals. International Journal of Technology Management. 2006, 34(2): 28-46
51 Lu qing, Hwang peter, K.Wang Clement. Agency Risk Control Through Reprisal. Journal of Business Venturing. 2006, 21: 369-384
52 Hogan, Teresa, Huston, Elaine. What Factors Determine the Use of Venture Capital? Evidence from the Irish Software Sector. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 2005, 7(3): 257-285
53 Le Bas Christian, Picard Fabienne. Models for Allocating Public Venture Capital to Innovation Projects: Lessons from a French Public Agency. International Journal of Technology Management. 2006, 34(2): 185-198
54 Cumming Douglas. The Determinants of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical Evidence. The Journal of Business. 2006, 79(4): 1083-1126
55 K.Schmidt. Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Finance. 2003, 58(3): 1139-1166
56 R.Repullo, J.Suarez. Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach. Review of Finance. 2004, 8: 75-108
57 L.Marx. Efficient Venture Capital Financing Combining Debt and Equity. Review of Economic Design. 1998, 3: 371-387
58 F.Cornelli, O.Yosha. Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities. Review of Economic Studies. 2003, 70: 1-32
59 M.Gorman, W.A.Sahlman. What do Venture Capital Do? Journal of Business Venturing. 1989, 4: 231-248
60 J.Lerner. The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments. Financial Management. 1994, 23(3): 16-27
61 J.Lerner. Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms. Financial Management. 1995, 50(1): 301-318
62 W.A.Sahlman. Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 1988, 1: 23-36
63 P.Gompers. Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital. Journal of Finance. 1995, 50(5): 1461-1489
64 C.Barry, C.Muscarella, J.Pervy. The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Creation of a Public Company. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27: 445-471
65 Gompers, A.Paul. The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital. The Journal of Finance. 1994, 23(2): 1-30
66 B.A.Jain, Q.Kini. Venture Capitalist Participation and the Post-issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms. Managerial and Decision Economics. 1995, 16: 593-606
67 Alon Brav, A.Paul. Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Conpanies. The Journal of Finance. 1997, (5): 1791-1798
68 L.A.Jeng, P.C.Wells. The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence Across Countries. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2000, 6: 237-290
69 W.Neus, U.Walz. Exit Timing of Venture Capitalists in the Course of an Initial Public Offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2005, 14: 253-277
70 Thompson, Kevin, Mcleod, Alistair. Credit Portfolio Risk Time for Multi- period Capital Models. The Journal of Finance. 2005, 18(10): 74
71 Giot Pierre. IPOs, Trade Sales and Liquidations: Modelling Venture Capital Exits Using Survival Analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance. 2007, 31(3): 679-702
72 Holger Patzelt, Dodo Knyphausen-Aufse zu, Ilona Arnodt. How do Venture Capitalists Spread Risk by Diversification within Specialised Life Science Portfolios. International Journal of Technology Management. 2006, 34(1): 105-125
73 Kut Can, Pramborg Bengt, Smolarski Jan. Risk Management in European Private Equity Funds: Survey Evidence. The Journal of Private Equity. 2006, 9(3): 15-42
74 Liu Chung Chu, Chen ShiouYu. The Management of Risk by Taiwanese Venture Capital Firms Operating in China. International Journal of Manage-ment. 2006, 23(3): 419-429
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12 W.A.Sahlman. The Structure and Governance of Venture-capital Organizations. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27: 473-521
13 Yoram Landskroner, Jacob Paroush. Venture Capital: Structure and incentives. International Review of Economics and Finance. 1995, (4): 300-350
14 P.Gompers, J.Lerner. The Use of Convenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements. Journal of Law and Economics. 1996, (10): 463-498
15 Kaplan,N.Steven, P. Stromberg. Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring. American Economics Review. 2001, 91(2): 426-430
16 Y.S. Chan, D.R. Siegel, A.V. Thakor. Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts. International Economic Review. 1990, 31: 365-381
17 T.Hellmann. The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts. Rand Journal of Economics. 1998, 29: 57-76
18 T.Hellmann, M.Puri. Venture Capital and Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance. 2002, 57(1): 169-197
19 D.Bergemann, U.Hege. Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning.Jouranl of Banking & Finance. 1998, 22: 703-735
20 A.R. Admati, P.Pleiderer. Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists. Journal of Finance. 1994, (6): 371-402
21 C.Catherie. Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists. Journal of Finance. 2003, 58(5): 2059-2086
22 Kaplan, N.Steven, P.Stromberg. Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts. The Review of Economic Studies. 2003, 70(4): 281-315
23 R.Amit, L.Glosten, E.Muller. Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments and Risk Sharing. Management Science. 1990, 36(10): 1232-1245
24 Kaplan, N.Steven, P.Stromberg. Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capital Analyses. Journal of Finance. 2004, 59(5): 2177-2210
25 J.Trester. Venture Capital Contracting under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Banking & Finance. 1998, 22: 675-699
26 I.A.Cooper, W.T.Carleton. Dynamics of Borrower-lender Interaction: Partitioning Final Payoff in Venture Capital Finance. Finance. 1979, 34: 517-529
27 R.M.Stulz, H.Johnson. An Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial Economics. 1985, 14: 501-525
28 Raphael Amit, James Brander, Christoph Zott. Why do Veture Capital Firms Exit? Theory and Canadian Evidence. Journal of Business Venturing. 1998, 18: 441-466
29 K.Schmidt. Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Finance. 2003, 58(3): 1139-1166
30 Giorgino Macro. Public Models to Support Venture Capital Market. Interna-tional Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management. 2006, 6(5): 444
31 Rin Macro Da, Nicodano Giovanna, Sembenelli Alessandro. Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Markets. Journal of Public Economics. 2006, 90: 1699-1723
32 Bates Timothy, Bradford William, Rubin Julia Sass. The Viability of the Minority-Oriented Venture Capital Industry under Alternative Financing Arrangements. Economic Development Quarterly. 2006, 20(2): 178-191
33 Poterba, James. How Burdensome are Capital Gains Taxes? Evidence from the United States. Journal of Public Economics. 1987, 33: 157-172
34 Jensen, C.Michael. Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 1991, 4: 13-33
35 Sahlman, A.William, Howard H.Stevenson. Capital Market Myopia. Journal of Business Venturing. 1985, 1: 7-30
36 S.Black Bernard, J.Gilson Ronald. Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets. Journal of Financial Economics. 1998, 4: 243-277
37 Gompers, A.Paul, Josh Lerner. What Drives Venture Capital Fund Raising. Economic Activity-Microeconomics. 1998, 7(2): 149-192
38 Florida, L.Richard, Martin Kenny. VC, High Technology and Regional Development. Regional studies. 1988, 22: 33-48
39 Martin Jose, Balboa Marina. Sela-regulation in European Venture Capital and Private Equity Markets. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management. 2006, 6(5): 395
40 Armour John, Cumming Douglas. The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley. Oxford Economic Papers. 2006, 58(4): 596
41 Darek Klonowski. Venture Capital Contracting in Transition Economics: Evidence from Poland. Post-Communist Economics. 2006, 18(3): 327-343
42 Bigus Jochen. Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism and Patent Law. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2006, 33(7): 939-960
43 W.A.Sahlman. The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27: 473-521
44 M.Ueda. Banks Versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening and Expropriation. Journal of Finance. 2004, 59(2): 601-621
45 T.T.Tyebjee, V.Albert Bruno. A Model of Venture Capitalist Investment Activity. Management Science. 1984, 30(9): 1030-1095
46 Mainprize Brent, Hindle Kevin. Assessing the Efficacy and Standar-dization Potential of Five Competing Venture Capital Investment Evaluation Approaches. The Journal of Private Equity. 2005, 9(1): 6-16
47 J.Hall, C.W.Hofer. Venture Capitalists Decision Criteria in New Venture Evaluation. IEEE Engineering Management Review. 1993, 21(2): 49-59
48 V.H.Fried, R.D.Hisrich. Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making. Financial Management. 1994, 23(3): 28-37
49 T.Eckhardt Jonathan, Scott Shane, Frederic Delmar. Multistage Selection and the Financing of New Venture. Management Science. 2006, 52(2): 220-232
50 Vanacker Tom, Manigart Sophie. Venture Capitalists Selection Process: The Case of Biotechnology Proposals. International Journal of Technology Management. 2006, 34(2): 28-46
51 Lu qing, Hwang peter, K.Wang Clement. Agency Risk Control Through Reprisal. Journal of Business Venturing. 2006, 21: 369-384
52 Hogan, Teresa, Huston, Elaine. What Factors Determine the Use of Venture Capital? Evidence from the Irish Software Sector. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 2005, 7(3): 257-285
53 Le Bas Christian, Picard Fabienne. Models for Allocating Public Venture Capital to Innovation Projects: Lessons from a French Public Agency. International Journal of Technology Management. 2006, 34(2): 185-198
54 Cumming Douglas. The Determinants of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical Evidence. The Journal of Business. 2006, 79(4): 1083-1126
55 K.Schmidt. Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Finance. 2003, 58(3): 1139-1166
56 R.Repullo, J.Suarez. Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach. Review of Finance. 2004, 8: 75-108
57 L.Marx. Efficient Venture Capital Financing Combining Debt and Equity. Review of Economic Design. 1998, 3: 371-387
58 F.Cornelli, O.Yosha. Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities. Review of Economic Studies. 2003, 70: 1-32
59 M.Gorman, W.A.Sahlman. What do Venture Capital Do? Journal of Business Venturing. 1989, 4: 231-248
60 J.Lerner. The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments. Financial Management. 1994, 23(3): 16-27
61 J.Lerner. Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms. Financial Management. 1995, 50(1): 301-318
62 W.A.Sahlman. Aspects of Financial Contracting in Venture Capital. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 1988, 1: 23-36
63 P.Gompers. Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital. Journal of Finance. 1995, 50(5): 1461-1489
64 C.Barry, C.Muscarella, J.Pervy. The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Creation of a Public Company. Journal of Financial Economics. 1990, 27: 445-471
65 Gompers, A.Paul. The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital. The Journal of Finance. 1994, 23(2): 1-30
66 B.A.Jain, Q.Kini. Venture Capitalist Participation and the Post-issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms. Managerial and Decision Economics. 1995, 16: 593-606
67 Alon Brav, A.Paul. Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Conpanies. The Journal of Finance. 1997, (5): 1791-1798
68 L.A.Jeng, P.C.Wells. The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence Across Countries. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2000, 6: 237-290
69 W.Neus, U.Walz. Exit Timing of Venture Capitalists in the Course of an Initial Public Offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2005, 14: 253-277
70 Thompson, Kevin, Mcleod, Alistair. Credit Portfolio Risk Time for Multi- period Capital Models. The Journal of Finance. 2005, 18(10): 74
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