政府间财政支出竞争的经济效应研究
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摘要
在中国,中央政府无时不寄望其政策影响并引导着地方政府的行为,藉此证明其强大的影响力和控制力。而地方政府无时不谋划着其行为得到中央政府特殊政策的支持和激励,希望以此来彰显地方政府尤其是地方政府官员的过人“政绩”。于是,中央政府与地方政府在各自的政策空间内,借助各种可资利用的政策工具,进行着或明或暗、形式多样的博弈。有趣的是,博弈的结果往往是中央政府“隆重推出”的政策对地方政府的行为影响日渐式微,而那些看似弱小的地方政府及其种种理性的或非理性的行为却深刻的影响着中央政府的政策时效甚至更替频率。
一个现实的解释是：地方政府会充分利用自己特有的“代理资源”及信息优势与中央政府讨价还价,诱使其做出对自己有利的制度安排；或者在满足自身利益的限度内理解和贯彻上级的制度规则,形成截留、曲解规则等“创新”行为。一旦这些地方政府行为最终酿成了全国性的“问题”,冲击着中央政府的政策权威,中央政府不得不频频出台新政策或重新诠释政策,近些年来每一次“治理整顿”、“宏观调控”和“专项整治”等无不如是。因此,研究地方政府的行为甚或比研究中央政府的政策更有现实性和前瞻性。
从动态的角度看,地方政府的创新行为具有边际收益递减的性质。那些率先采取“边缘”行为的地方政府往往获得超额的政治租金和经济收益。尤其是那些以“试点”和“改革”之名的地方政府行为更是如此。这些丰厚的回报势必诱发了其他同级地方政府之间的攀比和效仿。在预期收益不明确的情况下,中央政府往往在起始阶段摆出“无为”姿态,静观事态发展。这一暧昧态度往往使得模仿过程愈演愈烈,层面愈来愈高,手段愈来愈多样化,效应越来越扑朔迷离,最后就转化成了“地不分东西”的全国性同级政府间的公开竞争。
严格地说,我国同级地方政府之间竞争始于分权(行政性放权和经济性分权)和市场经济体制改革方向确立之后。完整意义上的地方政府间竞争必须具备如下条件：竞争主体、竞争意识、竞争行为。在计划经济时代,中央政府高度集权,虽然也有地方政府之间横向竞争的意识萌芽和行为雏形,但资源配置权完全掌控在中央政府手中,地方各级难以成为真正意义上的竞争主体。因此,地方政府既无竞争的必要,更无竞争的空间。
以放权为目的的改革使得中央与地方由传统的单向依赖的等级规则演变为双向依存的委托代理关系。如何在这个垂直的多级架构中,保证对地方政府的有效控制与正向激励是历届中央政府的难题。这个难题的难处有三：合理的考核机制、最小的监督费用、有效地纠错机制。在当前我国政治治理的技术条件下,以GDP作为考核尺度和官员的选拔任用标准可以作为上述难题的现实解。因为,从纯技术性角度看,作为委托人的中央政府对统计数字和总量指标进行评价要比实地调研成本小得多,因此,理性的中央政府会把GDP、税收增长率、就业率等直观性指标作为评价和奖惩地方官员的主要依据。“上有所好,下必效之”,如此一来,在地方各级政府间提供了一种看似公平的“标尺竞争”。在这一竞争的“大旗”下,“谁拥有资源,谁就胜出”,似乎深入“官”心。于是,近些年,我国地方政府疲于争市场、争项目、争能源、争资金之中,硝烟弥漫的“桑蚕大战”、“馒头办大战”、“招商引资大战”也因之此起彼伏。
竞争性的政府必然催生竞争性的财政。因为,地方政府的竞争行为必然见之于地方财政收支之中。因此,财政竞争既是政府竞争的结果,也是政府竞争的手段。资源的稀缺性和财政自利动机是政府间财政竞争的直接原因。从形式上看,地方政府间财政竞争势必要经历以税收竞争为主到以财政支出竞争为主的发展历程。特别的,随着税收制度的完善和规范,地方政府通过种种制度内或制度外的优惠税收政策来获取经济资源的空间越来越小。各级地方政府也因之转向了供给优质的地方公共产品的支出竞争,并且伴随着财政分权体制的日益规范,财政支出竞争将逐渐成为政府间财政竞争的主要手段。
如果说,政府间财政支出竞争其实是特定制度背景下的特定财政行为。那么,财政支出竞争有效与否主要取决于制度的科学性和行为的规范性。在我国当前的政治、经济条件下,地方政府间财政支出竞争行为将产生何种效应?这些效应将以何方式传导和扩散?不容乐观的是,我国目前的财政支出竞争面临着制度环境不完善、政府财政行为不规范的双重特征,两者相互催生、相互促进,一直影响着经济社会的可持续发展。如何理顺竞争环境、规范竞争行为?这就是本文研究的逻辑起点和现实意义之所在。
基于此,本文的研究试图解决如下问题：1、作为一种政府行为,财政支出竞争现象是否存在?如果存在,如何检验和判定?2、基于区域经济差异性,我国地方政府间财政支出竞争力的差异性如何衡量?3、政府间财政支出竞争手段多样,在不同的发展阶段这些竞争手段地位如何变迁?这些多样化的手段组合将对资源流动和经济发展产生何种影响?4、竞争是效率的源泉,财政支出竞争又是普遍的,而各地经济社会条件客观差异性较大,竞争对各地经济发展效应的整体影响如何系统化分析?
本文认为政府间财政支出竞争的经济效应在本质上是财政竞争行为在既定的制度环境下的行为后果。因此,本文伴着“制度环境——竞争行为——竞争能力——传导机制——行为效应”的思路展开研究：首先,在既定的制度背景下,构建了财政支出竞争的理论分析框架。分析了财政支出竞争的缘起、形式、种类、效应传导机制。随后,本文将在上述的理论框架下对我国地方政府间财政支出竞争存在性进行实证检验,从宏观上把握我国政府间财政支出竞争的特征和程度。之后,本文按照主成分法,根据保障能力、发展能力、调节能力三个层次检验了我国地方政府间财政支出竞争力的差异性。在以上的分析基础上,本文紧接着依次分析了政府间财政支出竞争对基础设施、资本流动、劳动力流动、地区经济差距等的影响。最后,在前文研究的基础上提出若干建议。
具体说来,全文共分为八章,在逻辑上主要为前后因果或并列关系。第一章为导言。主要进行了概念界定和文献综述,形成本文的研究框架和研究任务。第二章作为全文的理论框架,其功效如“文眼”笼罩全文。该部分分析了地方政府间财政支出竞争的理论基础、财政支出竞争的必然性、我国财政支出竞争的制度环境及效应假说等。第三章为全文研究的发端,运用多种计量方法证实了我国地方政府间财政支出竞争的存在性,为后文的研究提供现实背景。第四章基于趋同与差异的视角,研究了地方政府间财政支出竞争对基础设施空间分布的影响。第五、第六章运用面板数据分析了地方政府间财政支出竞争导致了资本和劳动力在区域间流动格局的差异性。这是全文的重点和难点,也是本文的核心和创新点之所在。第七章从地方政府间财政支出竞争的视角解释了我国区域经济发展水平的差距。第八章为全文的结语,在总结全文的基础上,提出政策建议。
纵观全文,按照“原创性”这一标准,本论文的主要创新之处表现为以下四个方面：1、对政府间财政支出竞争进行了分类。根据财政支出的最终受益归宿的差异,本文将财政支出竞争分为物本竞争、民本竞争、官本竞争。较之过去的的经济性支出、社会性支出、维持性支出相比,更具动态性和针对性；2、对我国政府间财政支出竞争存在性进行了检验。国内不乏对研究财政支出竞争问题的研究,但少有对其存在性的检验,在一定程度上导致了研究的严谨性缺失。即便是进行了看似的计量分析,其变量选取难免缺乏科学性。本文按照收敛性标准、空间相关性标准、变异系数标准对我国地方政府间财政支出竞争的存在性进行了多方位的检验,既恪守了科学研究的严谨性又使得后文的计量分析具有连贯性；3、从本质上说,地方政府间财政支出竞争是地方各级政府为了吸引更多的稀缺或优质经济资源流入本辖区,竞相供给更好的地方公共产品组合,以期对资源主体的经济行为产生有利于本辖区利益的决策。因此,本文具体分析了地方政府间财政支出竞争对要素流动以及经济差距的经济效应。
当然,由于本人水平有限,对照财政支出竞争这一经济现象应该研究的内容,尚有以下问题亟待研究：1、财政支出对资本流动产生深刻的影响固然不假,但是单纯以外资为研究对象,势必影响结论的准确性,现实的情况是,东部地区以吸引外资为重点,广大的中西部在自知之明的心理作用下,更多的以吸引东部地区剩余资金为己任。例如,活跃在西部地区的温州炒煤团就可以证明。因此,应该深入研究财政支出竞争对含内资的所有资本流动的影响。2、财政支出对人口流动的影响应该是有所选择的。作为地方政府而言,偏好高素质人才和高纳税能力的人口流入。因此,应该细化研究财政支出竞争对人口流入结构的影响,方能保证结论的完整性和科学性。3、财政支出竞争的效应还应当包括收入分配效应和公民福利效应。比如地方政府基于快出政绩的需要,对资本和人口采取不同的财政待遇,势必形成了结构性福利差异,比如公共服务的非均等化供给等等。本文尚未涉猎这些内容,有待今后的研究加以弥补。
In China, the central government kept the hope that the impact of its policies and guide the behavior of local governments, so as to demonstrate its strong influence and control. The local governments want their behavior to be ever-present special policies the central government's support and incentives, hoping to display the local government, especially local government officials a "performance." As a result, the central government and local governments in their policy space, using a variety of policy tools available to carry out an overt or covert, form a variety of game. Interestingly, the game results are often the central government "grand launch of policy on the impact of declining local government behavior, and those who seem weak local governments and their various rational or irrational behavior has a profound impact on the central government The Government's policy prescription or even change the frequency.
A realistic explanation is that local government will take full advantage of their own "agent resources" to bargain with the central government,which tempts it to make institutional arrangements to their advantage; or to meet their own interests within the limits of understanding and implementing the system of higher level rules, the formation of withholding, distorting rules, "innovative" behavior, once these local actions eventually led to a national "problem", impact on the policy of the central government authority to compel the central government has frequently introduced new policies or re-interpretation of the policy, and each time " rectification "and" macro-control, "just a few. Therefore, the study of the behavior of local governments, or even more than to look at the reality of the central government's policy and forward-looking.
Said strictly that between our country same level Local authority competes begins in the decentralization (administrative to release authority after efficient decentralization) and the market economy system reform direction establishment. In planned economy time, Central authorities highly centralization, although the regional governments struggle the application central investment plan and the financial transfer payment, although also has between the Local authority the crosswise competition seed, but the final decision-making power controls completely in the Central authorities hand, because the Local authority does not have the decentralization also not to have the competitor. On the contrary, the planned economy time, has the serious longitudinal government competition but actually.
From the dynamic point of view, the conduct of local government has the nature of diminishing marginal returns. Those who take the lead in "marginal" behavior of the local governments tend to ge over the political rents and economic benefits. Especially those with "innovation", "Pilot" and "reform" in the name of local government behavior even more so. These good returns is bound to induce the other at the same level comparisons between local governments and to follow. The imitation process becomes stronger, higher and higher levels, means more and more diversified, more and more complicated and confusing effect, we end up converted into ", both in East and West, " a nationwide open competition between governments at the same level.
In theory, the standardization of local governments compete to produce the following consequences: First, objectively speaking, is conducive to the effective supply of public goods. Second, provided the impetus for institutional innovation and the environment. However, China's special governance structure can easily be turned into a negative sum game (mainly reflected the increase in transaction costs and resource allocation distortions), such competition to enlarge and strengthen the local government and even distort the economic behavior of some of the variation. In particular, the number is expanding as the core performance standards is to further strengthen the degree of alienation of local government behavior.
Competitive government is bound to birth competitive finance. Because the competitive behavior of local governments must be found in the local financial revenue and expenditure being. In essence, the local government fiscal competition between local governments at all levels in order to attract more inflow of scarce economic resources or the quality of this area and competing supply a better mix of local public goods and taxes, with a view to the main directly or indirectly, investments in resources or consumer behavior in this area is conducive to the interests of decision-making. Can be seen that the scarcity of resources and financial self-interest motives are inter-governmental fiscal competition, the direct cause.
From the formal point of view, fiscal competition between local governments to tax competition is bound to go through to the main competition of financial expenditure-based development process. In particular, with the tax system, improve and standardize the local government within the system or a system through various preferential tax policies to outside access to economic resources of space getting smaller and smaller. Local governments also gained from turning the supply of quality local public goods spending competition and accompanied by fiscal decentralization system and the increasingly standardized, high quality of local public goods and public services expenditure as the main features of competition will gradually become the Government the principal means of competition among financial.
If we say that inter-governmental fiscal expenditure competition is indeed a specific system in the context of a specific financial actions. So, the financial expenditure to compete effectively depends largely on whether or not the system of scientific and normative acts. So, in our country's current political and economic conditions, local competitive behavior between the expenditure will have what effect? These effects will be of the mode of transmission and spread? Is not optimistic that China's current expenditure is facing competition in imperfect institutional environment, government finance act does not regulate the dual characteristics of both with each other birth and promote each other, seriously affecting the economic and social sustainable development. How to rationalize the competitive environment, regulate competitive behavior? This is the logical starting point of this study and practical significance lies.
This study attempts to address the following questions:1, as a government action, the existence of competition in the financial expenditure? If there is, how to test and decide? 2, the Intergovernmental expenditure competition in many ways, at different stages of development of these means of competition status changes? Combination of these diverse means of how the effects of change? 3, competition is a source of efficiency, fiscal expenditures whether competition will help improve the performance of China's local governments to run? What if can improve the way? 4, since the financial expenditure competition is common, with the objective economic and social conditions around the differences in greater economic development around the effects of competition on the overall impact on how a systematic analysis? 5, how healthy and orderly competition in intergovernmental fiscal spending to induce transformation of the government to realize the public nature of return?
This paper argues that inter-governmental economic effects of fiscal spending to compete in the competitive behavior is essentially a financial system in a given environment, the consequences of the behavior. Based on this, this article accompanied by "the institutional environment-competitive behavior-transmission mechanisms-behavioral effects, " the idea of a study: first, in the context of the established system, constructed expenditure framework for theoretical analysis of competition. Analysis of competition in the financial expenditure the origin, form, type, effect of transmission mechanism. Subsequently, this article the theoretical framework of the above-mentioned local governments in China under the existence of competition between the financial expenditure of empirical testing, from the macro inter-governmental fiscal spending my grasp the characteristics and extent of competition. After you verify the existence of China's fiscal expenditure competition among local governments, this paper based on the original definition of the financial expenditure of competition, followed by analysis of competition in inter-governmental fiscal spending on infrastructure, capital flows, labor mobility, regional economic disparities, the level of basic public services, the impact of. Finally, in the former text of the study based on the number of recommendations.
Specifically, the text is divided into nine chapters, logically, mainly around the relationship between cause and effect, or side by side. Chapter I Introduction. Carried out to define the main concepts and literature review, forming the framework of this research and the research tasks. Chapter II as the full text of the theoretical framework, its efficacy, such as "Man eyes" shrouded text. This section analyzes the financial expenditure of competition among local governments, the theoretical basis spread mechanism, determine the principles. Chapter III of the study for the full text of the originator, using a variety of measurement methods among local governments in China confirmed the existence of competition in financial expenditure for the study later in providing a realistic background. Chapter IV based on the perspective of convergence and differences in research expenditures among local governments to compete for infrastructure spatial distribution. The fifth, sixth chapter the use of panel data analysis of the local result of competition between the expenditure of capital and labor mobility in the pattern of inter-regional differences. This is the full text of the important and difficult, but also the core and innovative point of this article lies. Chapter VII of the inter-local government expenditures from the perspective of competition to explain the level of China's regional economic development gap. Chapter VIII examines the financial expenditure competition among local governments in China whether the "Tiebout effect", an analysis of its equalization of basic public services, the impact of the process. Chapter IX for the full text of the conclusion, on the basis of summing up the full text put forward policy recommendations.
Throughout text, according to "original" of this standard, the main innovations in this paper the performance of the following three aspects:one, to compete inter-governmental fiscal expenditure are classified.2, for our government the existence of competition between the financial expenditure has been tested.3, a comprehensive analysis of China's intergovernmental fiscal expenditure on the economic effects of competition.
一个现实的解释是：地方政府会充分利用自己特有的“代理资源”及信息优势与中央政府讨价还价,诱使其做出对自己有利的制度安排；或者在满足自身利益的限度内理解和贯彻上级的制度规则,形成截留、曲解规则等“创新”行为。一旦这些地方政府行为最终酿成了全国性的“问题”,冲击着中央政府的政策权威,中央政府不得不频频出台新政策或重新诠释政策,近些年来每一次“治理整顿”、“宏观调控”和“专项整治”等无不如是。因此,研究地方政府的行为甚或比研究中央政府的政策更有现实性和前瞻性。
从动态的角度看,地方政府的创新行为具有边际收益递减的性质。那些率先采取“边缘”行为的地方政府往往获得超额的政治租金和经济收益。尤其是那些以“试点”和“改革”之名的地方政府行为更是如此。这些丰厚的回报势必诱发了其他同级地方政府之间的攀比和效仿。在预期收益不明确的情况下,中央政府往往在起始阶段摆出“无为”姿态,静观事态发展。这一暧昧态度往往使得模仿过程愈演愈烈,层面愈来愈高,手段愈来愈多样化,效应越来越扑朔迷离,最后就转化成了“地不分东西”的全国性同级政府间的公开竞争。
严格地说,我国同级地方政府之间竞争始于分权(行政性放权和经济性分权)和市场经济体制改革方向确立之后。完整意义上的地方政府间竞争必须具备如下条件：竞争主体、竞争意识、竞争行为。在计划经济时代,中央政府高度集权,虽然也有地方政府之间横向竞争的意识萌芽和行为雏形,但资源配置权完全掌控在中央政府手中,地方各级难以成为真正意义上的竞争主体。因此,地方政府既无竞争的必要,更无竞争的空间。
以放权为目的的改革使得中央与地方由传统的单向依赖的等级规则演变为双向依存的委托代理关系。如何在这个垂直的多级架构中,保证对地方政府的有效控制与正向激励是历届中央政府的难题。这个难题的难处有三：合理的考核机制、最小的监督费用、有效地纠错机制。在当前我国政治治理的技术条件下,以GDP作为考核尺度和官员的选拔任用标准可以作为上述难题的现实解。因为,从纯技术性角度看,作为委托人的中央政府对统计数字和总量指标进行评价要比实地调研成本小得多,因此,理性的中央政府会把GDP、税收增长率、就业率等直观性指标作为评价和奖惩地方官员的主要依据。“上有所好,下必效之”,如此一来,在地方各级政府间提供了一种看似公平的“标尺竞争”。在这一竞争的“大旗”下,“谁拥有资源,谁就胜出”,似乎深入“官”心。于是,近些年,我国地方政府疲于争市场、争项目、争能源、争资金之中,硝烟弥漫的“桑蚕大战”、“馒头办大战”、“招商引资大战”也因之此起彼伏。
竞争性的政府必然催生竞争性的财政。因为,地方政府的竞争行为必然见之于地方财政收支之中。因此,财政竞争既是政府竞争的结果,也是政府竞争的手段。资源的稀缺性和财政自利动机是政府间财政竞争的直接原因。从形式上看,地方政府间财政竞争势必要经历以税收竞争为主到以财政支出竞争为主的发展历程。特别的,随着税收制度的完善和规范,地方政府通过种种制度内或制度外的优惠税收政策来获取经济资源的空间越来越小。各级地方政府也因之转向了供给优质的地方公共产品的支出竞争,并且伴随着财政分权体制的日益规范,财政支出竞争将逐渐成为政府间财政竞争的主要手段。
如果说,政府间财政支出竞争其实是特定制度背景下的特定财政行为。那么,财政支出竞争有效与否主要取决于制度的科学性和行为的规范性。在我国当前的政治、经济条件下,地方政府间财政支出竞争行为将产生何种效应?这些效应将以何方式传导和扩散?不容乐观的是,我国目前的财政支出竞争面临着制度环境不完善、政府财政行为不规范的双重特征,两者相互催生、相互促进,一直影响着经济社会的可持续发展。如何理顺竞争环境、规范竞争行为?这就是本文研究的逻辑起点和现实意义之所在。
基于此,本文的研究试图解决如下问题：1、作为一种政府行为,财政支出竞争现象是否存在?如果存在,如何检验和判定?2、基于区域经济差异性,我国地方政府间财政支出竞争力的差异性如何衡量?3、政府间财政支出竞争手段多样,在不同的发展阶段这些竞争手段地位如何变迁?这些多样化的手段组合将对资源流动和经济发展产生何种影响?4、竞争是效率的源泉,财政支出竞争又是普遍的,而各地经济社会条件客观差异性较大,竞争对各地经济发展效应的整体影响如何系统化分析?
本文认为政府间财政支出竞争的经济效应在本质上是财政竞争行为在既定的制度环境下的行为后果。因此,本文伴着“制度环境——竞争行为——竞争能力——传导机制——行为效应”的思路展开研究：首先,在既定的制度背景下,构建了财政支出竞争的理论分析框架。分析了财政支出竞争的缘起、形式、种类、效应传导机制。随后,本文将在上述的理论框架下对我国地方政府间财政支出竞争存在性进行实证检验,从宏观上把握我国政府间财政支出竞争的特征和程度。之后,本文按照主成分法,根据保障能力、发展能力、调节能力三个层次检验了我国地方政府间财政支出竞争力的差异性。在以上的分析基础上,本文紧接着依次分析了政府间财政支出竞争对基础设施、资本流动、劳动力流动、地区经济差距等的影响。最后,在前文研究的基础上提出若干建议。
具体说来,全文共分为八章,在逻辑上主要为前后因果或并列关系。第一章为导言。主要进行了概念界定和文献综述,形成本文的研究框架和研究任务。第二章作为全文的理论框架,其功效如“文眼”笼罩全文。该部分分析了地方政府间财政支出竞争的理论基础、财政支出竞争的必然性、我国财政支出竞争的制度环境及效应假说等。第三章为全文研究的发端,运用多种计量方法证实了我国地方政府间财政支出竞争的存在性,为后文的研究提供现实背景。第四章基于趋同与差异的视角,研究了地方政府间财政支出竞争对基础设施空间分布的影响。第五、第六章运用面板数据分析了地方政府间财政支出竞争导致了资本和劳动力在区域间流动格局的差异性。这是全文的重点和难点,也是本文的核心和创新点之所在。第七章从地方政府间财政支出竞争的视角解释了我国区域经济发展水平的差距。第八章为全文的结语,在总结全文的基础上,提出政策建议。
纵观全文,按照“原创性”这一标准,本论文的主要创新之处表现为以下四个方面：1、对政府间财政支出竞争进行了分类。根据财政支出的最终受益归宿的差异,本文将财政支出竞争分为物本竞争、民本竞争、官本竞争。较之过去的的经济性支出、社会性支出、维持性支出相比,更具动态性和针对性；2、对我国政府间财政支出竞争存在性进行了检验。国内不乏对研究财政支出竞争问题的研究,但少有对其存在性的检验,在一定程度上导致了研究的严谨性缺失。即便是进行了看似的计量分析,其变量选取难免缺乏科学性。本文按照收敛性标准、空间相关性标准、变异系数标准对我国地方政府间财政支出竞争的存在性进行了多方位的检验,既恪守了科学研究的严谨性又使得后文的计量分析具有连贯性；3、从本质上说,地方政府间财政支出竞争是地方各级政府为了吸引更多的稀缺或优质经济资源流入本辖区,竞相供给更好的地方公共产品组合,以期对资源主体的经济行为产生有利于本辖区利益的决策。因此,本文具体分析了地方政府间财政支出竞争对要素流动以及经济差距的经济效应。
当然,由于本人水平有限,对照财政支出竞争这一经济现象应该研究的内容,尚有以下问题亟待研究：1、财政支出对资本流动产生深刻的影响固然不假,但是单纯以外资为研究对象,势必影响结论的准确性,现实的情况是,东部地区以吸引外资为重点,广大的中西部在自知之明的心理作用下,更多的以吸引东部地区剩余资金为己任。例如,活跃在西部地区的温州炒煤团就可以证明。因此,应该深入研究财政支出竞争对含内资的所有资本流动的影响。2、财政支出对人口流动的影响应该是有所选择的。作为地方政府而言,偏好高素质人才和高纳税能力的人口流入。因此,应该细化研究财政支出竞争对人口流入结构的影响,方能保证结论的完整性和科学性。3、财政支出竞争的效应还应当包括收入分配效应和公民福利效应。比如地方政府基于快出政绩的需要,对资本和人口采取不同的财政待遇,势必形成了结构性福利差异,比如公共服务的非均等化供给等等。本文尚未涉猎这些内容,有待今后的研究加以弥补。
In China, the central government kept the hope that the impact of its policies and guide the behavior of local governments, so as to demonstrate its strong influence and control. The local governments want their behavior to be ever-present special policies the central government's support and incentives, hoping to display the local government, especially local government officials a "performance." As a result, the central government and local governments in their policy space, using a variety of policy tools available to carry out an overt or covert, form a variety of game. Interestingly, the game results are often the central government "grand launch of policy on the impact of declining local government behavior, and those who seem weak local governments and their various rational or irrational behavior has a profound impact on the central government The Government's policy prescription or even change the frequency.
A realistic explanation is that local government will take full advantage of their own "agent resources" to bargain with the central government,which tempts it to make institutional arrangements to their advantage; or to meet their own interests within the limits of understanding and implementing the system of higher level rules, the formation of withholding, distorting rules, "innovative" behavior, once these local actions eventually led to a national "problem", impact on the policy of the central government authority to compel the central government has frequently introduced new policies or re-interpretation of the policy, and each time " rectification "and" macro-control, "just a few. Therefore, the study of the behavior of local governments, or even more than to look at the reality of the central government's policy and forward-looking.
Said strictly that between our country same level Local authority competes begins in the decentralization (administrative to release authority after efficient decentralization) and the market economy system reform direction establishment. In planned economy time, Central authorities highly centralization, although the regional governments struggle the application central investment plan and the financial transfer payment, although also has between the Local authority the crosswise competition seed, but the final decision-making power controls completely in the Central authorities hand, because the Local authority does not have the decentralization also not to have the competitor. On the contrary, the planned economy time, has the serious longitudinal government competition but actually.
From the dynamic point of view, the conduct of local government has the nature of diminishing marginal returns. Those who take the lead in "marginal" behavior of the local governments tend to ge over the political rents and economic benefits. Especially those with "innovation", "Pilot" and "reform" in the name of local government behavior even more so. These good returns is bound to induce the other at the same level comparisons between local governments and to follow. The imitation process becomes stronger, higher and higher levels, means more and more diversified, more and more complicated and confusing effect, we end up converted into ", both in East and West, " a nationwide open competition between governments at the same level.
In theory, the standardization of local governments compete to produce the following consequences: First, objectively speaking, is conducive to the effective supply of public goods. Second, provided the impetus for institutional innovation and the environment. However, China's special governance structure can easily be turned into a negative sum game (mainly reflected the increase in transaction costs and resource allocation distortions), such competition to enlarge and strengthen the local government and even distort the economic behavior of some of the variation. In particular, the number is expanding as the core performance standards is to further strengthen the degree of alienation of local government behavior.
Competitive government is bound to birth competitive finance. Because the competitive behavior of local governments must be found in the local financial revenue and expenditure being. In essence, the local government fiscal competition between local governments at all levels in order to attract more inflow of scarce economic resources or the quality of this area and competing supply a better mix of local public goods and taxes, with a view to the main directly or indirectly, investments in resources or consumer behavior in this area is conducive to the interests of decision-making. Can be seen that the scarcity of resources and financial self-interest motives are inter-governmental fiscal competition, the direct cause.
From the formal point of view, fiscal competition between local governments to tax competition is bound to go through to the main competition of financial expenditure-based development process. In particular, with the tax system, improve and standardize the local government within the system or a system through various preferential tax policies to outside access to economic resources of space getting smaller and smaller. Local governments also gained from turning the supply of quality local public goods spending competition and accompanied by fiscal decentralization system and the increasingly standardized, high quality of local public goods and public services expenditure as the main features of competition will gradually become the Government the principal means of competition among financial.
If we say that inter-governmental fiscal expenditure competition is indeed a specific system in the context of a specific financial actions. So, the financial expenditure to compete effectively depends largely on whether or not the system of scientific and normative acts. So, in our country's current political and economic conditions, local competitive behavior between the expenditure will have what effect? These effects will be of the mode of transmission and spread? Is not optimistic that China's current expenditure is facing competition in imperfect institutional environment, government finance act does not regulate the dual characteristics of both with each other birth and promote each other, seriously affecting the economic and social sustainable development. How to rationalize the competitive environment, regulate competitive behavior? This is the logical starting point of this study and practical significance lies.
This study attempts to address the following questions:1, as a government action, the existence of competition in the financial expenditure? If there is, how to test and decide? 2, the Intergovernmental expenditure competition in many ways, at different stages of development of these means of competition status changes? Combination of these diverse means of how the effects of change? 3, competition is a source of efficiency, fiscal expenditures whether competition will help improve the performance of China's local governments to run? What if can improve the way? 4, since the financial expenditure competition is common, with the objective economic and social conditions around the differences in greater economic development around the effects of competition on the overall impact on how a systematic analysis? 5, how healthy and orderly competition in intergovernmental fiscal spending to induce transformation of the government to realize the public nature of return?
This paper argues that inter-governmental economic effects of fiscal spending to compete in the competitive behavior is essentially a financial system in a given environment, the consequences of the behavior. Based on this, this article accompanied by "the institutional environment-competitive behavior-transmission mechanisms-behavioral effects, " the idea of a study: first, in the context of the established system, constructed expenditure framework for theoretical analysis of competition. Analysis of competition in the financial expenditure the origin, form, type, effect of transmission mechanism. Subsequently, this article the theoretical framework of the above-mentioned local governments in China under the existence of competition between the financial expenditure of empirical testing, from the macro inter-governmental fiscal spending my grasp the characteristics and extent of competition. After you verify the existence of China's fiscal expenditure competition among local governments, this paper based on the original definition of the financial expenditure of competition, followed by analysis of competition in inter-governmental fiscal spending on infrastructure, capital flows, labor mobility, regional economic disparities, the level of basic public services, the impact of. Finally, in the former text of the study based on the number of recommendations.
Specifically, the text is divided into nine chapters, logically, mainly around the relationship between cause and effect, or side by side. Chapter I Introduction. Carried out to define the main concepts and literature review, forming the framework of this research and the research tasks. Chapter II as the full text of the theoretical framework, its efficacy, such as "Man eyes" shrouded text. This section analyzes the financial expenditure of competition among local governments, the theoretical basis spread mechanism, determine the principles. Chapter III of the study for the full text of the originator, using a variety of measurement methods among local governments in China confirmed the existence of competition in financial expenditure for the study later in providing a realistic background. Chapter IV based on the perspective of convergence and differences in research expenditures among local governments to compete for infrastructure spatial distribution. The fifth, sixth chapter the use of panel data analysis of the local result of competition between the expenditure of capital and labor mobility in the pattern of inter-regional differences. This is the full text of the important and difficult, but also the core and innovative point of this article lies. Chapter VII of the inter-local government expenditures from the perspective of competition to explain the level of China's regional economic development gap. Chapter VIII examines the financial expenditure competition among local governments in China whether the "Tiebout effect", an analysis of its equalization of basic public services, the impact of the process. Chapter IX for the full text of the conclusion, on the basis of summing up the full text put forward policy recommendations.
Throughout text, according to "original" of this standard, the main innovations in this paper the performance of the following three aspects:one, to compete inter-governmental fiscal expenditure are classified.2, for our government the existence of competition between the financial expenditure has been tested.3, a comprehensive analysis of China's intergovernmental fiscal expenditure on the economic effects of competition.
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