中国银行卡市场的弱双边市场特征及其价格结构策略研究
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摘要
从产业链的角度来看,银行卡服务可以分解成发卡环节、收单环节以及跨行转接环节。围绕跨行转接服务,发卡环节和收单环节逐步演变成为发卡市场和收单市场。由于两大子市场终端用户对平台服务的需求具有“鸡蛋相生”的特征,双边市场语境下的市场交易量与价格之间的关系发生了微妙但却重要的变化,经由平台实现的交易量对价格水平不再敏感,却对价格结构或者相对价格水平的变化反应敏感。
双边市场理论的核心词汇是网络外部性与多产品(服务)定价,本文正是围绕这两大关键词对中国银行卡市场的现实问题展开研究。基于现有文献研究的不足和中国银行卡市场运行的现实情况,本文研究的主要内容包括银行卡市场双边市场特征检验、银行卡市场联合需求函数估计、垄断性卡组织的多产品定价策略与交换费的形成机制、平台共存与中国银行卡市场的改革绩效、银行卡组织的网间接入定价、中国银行卡市场规制及其二次二重改革建议。本文的研究结果发现：
1、中国银行卡市场具备弱双边市场特征。从增量的角度来看,收单市场受理网络的扩张势必引起持卡用户基础的几何增加,而类似的效应反过来不如前者显著；在中国银行卡产业的早期阶段,持卡人用户基础的变化并未引起收单网络规模的显著扩大,直到近期方才渐显。本文将中国银行卡市场的这种特征称为弱双边市场特征。
2、银行卡市场的联合需求函数既非发卡市场需求与收单市场需求的简单相加,亦非两者简单相乘。发卡市场与收单市场在银行卡双边市场联合需求形成与变化过程中的地位与功能呈现出非对称特征,即中国银行卡市场的联合需求是发卡市场拉动的需求,收单市场有待进一步挖掘其应有的驱动功能。中国银行卡市场联合需求函数特征表明其经历了一个平稳增长的过程后,或许将迎来一道风水岭。
3、对提供多产品或服务的垄断性卡组织而言,在单卡情形下,卡组织宜将持卡人的借记卡使用费水平设置在信用卡费率之下,同时将借记卡商户扣率设置于信用卡商户扣率水平之上。就不同用户承担的费率而言,收单机构市场势力显著地影响持卡人费率水平与商户扣率的大小比较。在满足持卡人最低参与约束的双卡情形下,最优商户扣率比单卡条件下的任何一种产品的商户扣率都要低。
4、无论是开放式卡组织还是封闭式卡组织,每一类卡组织在特定阶段都有适合其生存的空间,“赢者通吃”并非银行卡市场的常态,卡组织共生共存的条件是交叉网络外部性强度要么相对高,要么就是足够低。与此同时,两类卡组织都共同面临着生存陷阱,从这个意义上讲,银行卡市场具有其固有的脆弱性。实证研究结果表明,维持中国银行卡市场两类平台共存局面的原因在于交叉网络外部性足够弱。并且,作为其中的主要原因,正是中国银行卡市场所具有的弱交叉网络外部性,造成了中国银行卡市场组织形式“封转开”改革后,开放式卡组织市场绩效非但没有显著提升反而降低。
5、发卡市场中的持卡人风险将通过风险挤出效应和需求挤入(挤出)效应两条途径影响卡组织在发卡市场的市场定位与市场份额；收单市场差异化程度并不直接作用于卡组织在收单市场的定价,反而直接影响卡组织在发卡市场的费率结构与利润水平。收单市场差异化程度高低也将直接决定新进入者的市场生存空间,这进一步说明,“赢者通吃”未必是银行卡市场的常态。
6、在网络规模对称情形下,卡组织利润最大化的歧视性价格结构能够激励被接入方向竞争对手开放网络,在实现网间接入的同时获得最高的综合加价；此时,网间接入费仅影响持卡人费率在额外费和转出费之间的分配,零网间接入费不宜成为规制者的政策目标值,这一结论在网络规模非对称情形下同样适用。
中国银行卡市场的低效率源自制度层面和行业自身的弱交叉网络外部性属性,就目前看来,单纯地引入竞争机制未必能带来市场绩效的显著改善。就中国银行卡市场的改革思路而言,本文建议从短期与长期两个角度综合考虑,设计“二次二重”改革的路径,在完善中国银行卡市场运行的制度基础之后,在适当的时机考虑引入适当数量的竞争性卡组织,实现产业的可持续发展。
产业组织领域的许多学者将双边市场理论进行了拓展与深化,站在巨人的肩膀上,对模型任何微小但却有实质意义的改进都可能是创新。基于此,本文的贡献包括以下四个方面：
1、运用归属曲线模型,本文从实证的角度完成了银行卡市场双边性特征检验的基础性研究工作,澄清了中国银行卡市场的本质性特征；
2、区别于双边市场的其他文献局限于对双边用户需求分别设置需求函数,本文运用Copula函数构造方法给出了一个定义良好且能够刻画中国银行卡市场双边市场特征的联合需求函数,更加切中双边市场用户需求高度依赖相互依存的关系；
3、已有理论文献在构建平台竞争模型时回避了不同类型卡组织的竞争与定价策略问题。本文考察了不同类型卡组织的竞争问题,并回归到Evans (2003)和Rochet and Tirole (2006)对双边市场性质与宗旨的原始定义,基于卡组织交易量最大化目标对平台共存的边界条件进行了界定。基于理论模型,本文运用双重差分模型实证分析了中国银行卡市场组织形式“封转开”改革的绩效；
4、本文将持卡人风险异质性与中间市场(渠道)竞争引入平台竞争模型,考察了银行卡市场风险特征与卡组织市场绩效之间的关系。银行卡发卡市场是不同风险类型的持卡人的集合,银行卡网络渠道竞争也正风起云涌,现有文献尚未将这两大重要的事实纳入研究模型。因而,持卡人风险类型与中间市场竞争的引入既弥补了现有文献忽略风险因素的不足从而更加贴近信贷市场的现实特征,又为平台竞争理论提供了更多的洞见。
From the perspective of industrial chain, the payment service of bankcard is composed of issuing sector, acquiring sector and interbank exchange service sector. Linked by interbank exchange service, issuing sector and acquiring sector evolve into issuing markets and acquiring card market. Due to the attribute of Chicken and Egg between both sub-markets, the relationship between transactional volume and price in two-sided markets dramatically changes. The transactional volume through a platform is not sensitive to price level but price structure.
Therefore, we may find that the core words in two-sided markets, i.e. network externality effect and muti-product pricing. Based on them, this thesis carries out an research on the realistic issues in China's bankcard market, with its focus on the empirical testing of two-sidedness, an estimation of the joint demand function, price structure strategies for a multi-product monopoly, platform co-existence and its frontier, access pricing between networks and the suggestions for a sustainable development in China's bankcard market. Based on mathematical deduction and empirical analysis, this thesis arrives at some significant conclusions as below.
1. China's paymentcard industry is characterized with an attribute of weak two-sided markets.
The second chapter turns to Attachment Curves Model and econometrical method and accomplishes an empirical testing on the two-sided character of China's bankcard market. The results suggest that China's paymentcard industry is characterized with a weak and one-way two-sidedness, that is, the expansion of acquiring market necessarily gives rise to a geometric increase in the user-base of cardholder, while a similar cross-network effect is not apparent in turn. The increase in the user-base of cardholder did not result in an expansion of acquiring network until recent years.
2. The joint demand function in China's paymentcard market is neither the sum nor the product of issuing market and acquiring market but a complicated Copula structure between them.
The third chapter applies Copula functions to capture the non-linear and complex relationship between marginal demands, and moreover, estimates the joint demand function in China's paymentcard industry, only to find that the t Copula function fits the relationship between issuing market and acquiring market. The joint demand function increases in the issuing market demand while it does not response sensitively to the acquiring market demand, and the profound and realistic reason lies in the distorted profit distribution system. According to our forecast, undergoing a stable growth, the joint demand function in China's payment card industry may encounter a watershed.
3. Referring to the theory of two-sided markets, the fourth chapter analyzes the pricing strategies under single-product and multi-product circumstance. It reveals that the debit cardholder fee is higher than that of credit while the merchant discount of debit is also higher than that of credit under single-product circumstance, and thus, the ratio of merchants who are willing to accept debit card is much lower that of credit card. However, the merchant discount under multi-product circumstance may be lower than the minimal level of that under single-product circumstance when the market power of merchants is weak enough.
4. Each kind of platform has it room to survive, and the winner does not necessarily take all, moreover, if the strength of cross-group network externality is relatively high or low enough, platforms could co-exist.
A two-sided market is characterized with cross-group network externality; the fifth chapter builds a two-stage game model and analyzes the effect of cross-group network externality on the competition among platforms and its performance. The theoretical model suggests that each kind of platform has it room to survive, and the winner does not necessarily take all, moreover, if the strength of cross-group network externality is relatively high or low enough, platforms could co-exist.In this sense, an inherent vulnerability can be attributed to paymentcard market. The empirical results reveal that the reason of platform co-existence in China payment card industry lies in its low enough cross-group network externality; strickingly, however, it is the one-way, asymmetric and low enough cross-group network externality that results in a reduction of performance rather than improvement since the first reform in China paymentcard industry.
5. The risk heterogeneity of cardholder and the degree of differentiation in acquiring market give birth to three niche markets for new entrants.
Issuing market is composed of cardholders with diverse risks, while acquiring market is essential to the whole transactional process. In order to consolidate the operational foundation, a payment card platform must divide and conquer both markets. This sixth chapter puts forward an incumbent-entrant model with payment or tax in acquiring market to explore the effect of risk features on positioning and pricing in issuing market for the entrant and to design the optimal incentive transfer payments in acquiring market. Results suggest that cardholder risk will exert an impressive effect on the positioning and pricing decision through risk Crowding-out channel and demand Crowding-out/in channel. The differentiation degree in acquiring market does not determine the pricing decision directly; however it does affect the pricing decision and profit level in issuing market. An entrant can still seek niche markets to obtain advantages over the incumbents as long as it is well and wisely positioned.
6. A discriminant pricing structure may stimulate the incumbent to open its network to competitiors, and an access fee affect the distribution of cardholder fee only.
Economic incentive rather than technology compatibility determines the network opening decision for an incumbent; the seventh chapter explores the pricing structure strategy for achieving an interconnection between networks. Under the circumstance of an asymmetric network scale, a discriminant pricing structure may stimulate the incumbent to open its network to competitiors, obtaining the highest price margin. Meanwhile, an access fee affect the distribution of cardholder fee between surcharging fees and transferring fees and thus zeor access fee may not a desirable policy target. As the gap of acquiring networks grows, the incumbent may raise the surcharging fee and reduce its transferring fee, while the new entrant will reduce the surcharging fee and raise its transferring fee.
As far as the reform of China's paymentcard market concerned, an introduction of competitive payment systems does not necessarily result in performance improvement; a secondary and dual reform is needed for China's payment card market to obtain further development.
Scholars in indusrial organization have been entending and deepening the theory of two-sided markets. At present, any small but significant improvement in theoretical model may result in innovative achievements. Based on this logic, there are four solid contributions in this dissertation.
Firstly, this dissertation accomplishes a fundamental research on the testing of two-sidedness, clearing the essential feature of paymentcard market.
Secondly, this dissertation breaks the confinement of literature and employes the Copula function to construct a well-defined joint demand function in paymentcard market, capturing the Chicken and Egg relationship in two-sided markets.
Thirdly, this dissertation returns to the primitive mission of payment system (Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole,2006) and defines the survival frontier for open-ended platform and closed platform, and then carries out an empirical testing on the performance of the reform since 2002 in China's paymentcard market.
Lastly, this dissertation synthesizes the risk heterogeneity of cardholder and the degree of differentiation in acquiring market into the model of platform competition, providing us with more insights on market segmenting and targeting, which is significantly different from related literature.
双边市场理论的核心词汇是网络外部性与多产品(服务)定价,本文正是围绕这两大关键词对中国银行卡市场的现实问题展开研究。基于现有文献研究的不足和中国银行卡市场运行的现实情况,本文研究的主要内容包括银行卡市场双边市场特征检验、银行卡市场联合需求函数估计、垄断性卡组织的多产品定价策略与交换费的形成机制、平台共存与中国银行卡市场的改革绩效、银行卡组织的网间接入定价、中国银行卡市场规制及其二次二重改革建议。本文的研究结果发现：
1、中国银行卡市场具备弱双边市场特征。从增量的角度来看,收单市场受理网络的扩张势必引起持卡用户基础的几何增加,而类似的效应反过来不如前者显著；在中国银行卡产业的早期阶段,持卡人用户基础的变化并未引起收单网络规模的显著扩大,直到近期方才渐显。本文将中国银行卡市场的这种特征称为弱双边市场特征。
2、银行卡市场的联合需求函数既非发卡市场需求与收单市场需求的简单相加,亦非两者简单相乘。发卡市场与收单市场在银行卡双边市场联合需求形成与变化过程中的地位与功能呈现出非对称特征,即中国银行卡市场的联合需求是发卡市场拉动的需求,收单市场有待进一步挖掘其应有的驱动功能。中国银行卡市场联合需求函数特征表明其经历了一个平稳增长的过程后,或许将迎来一道风水岭。
3、对提供多产品或服务的垄断性卡组织而言,在单卡情形下,卡组织宜将持卡人的借记卡使用费水平设置在信用卡费率之下,同时将借记卡商户扣率设置于信用卡商户扣率水平之上。就不同用户承担的费率而言,收单机构市场势力显著地影响持卡人费率水平与商户扣率的大小比较。在满足持卡人最低参与约束的双卡情形下,最优商户扣率比单卡条件下的任何一种产品的商户扣率都要低。
4、无论是开放式卡组织还是封闭式卡组织,每一类卡组织在特定阶段都有适合其生存的空间,“赢者通吃”并非银行卡市场的常态,卡组织共生共存的条件是交叉网络外部性强度要么相对高,要么就是足够低。与此同时,两类卡组织都共同面临着生存陷阱,从这个意义上讲,银行卡市场具有其固有的脆弱性。实证研究结果表明,维持中国银行卡市场两类平台共存局面的原因在于交叉网络外部性足够弱。并且,作为其中的主要原因,正是中国银行卡市场所具有的弱交叉网络外部性,造成了中国银行卡市场组织形式“封转开”改革后,开放式卡组织市场绩效非但没有显著提升反而降低。
5、发卡市场中的持卡人风险将通过风险挤出效应和需求挤入(挤出)效应两条途径影响卡组织在发卡市场的市场定位与市场份额；收单市场差异化程度并不直接作用于卡组织在收单市场的定价,反而直接影响卡组织在发卡市场的费率结构与利润水平。收单市场差异化程度高低也将直接决定新进入者的市场生存空间,这进一步说明,“赢者通吃”未必是银行卡市场的常态。
6、在网络规模对称情形下,卡组织利润最大化的歧视性价格结构能够激励被接入方向竞争对手开放网络,在实现网间接入的同时获得最高的综合加价；此时,网间接入费仅影响持卡人费率在额外费和转出费之间的分配,零网间接入费不宜成为规制者的政策目标值,这一结论在网络规模非对称情形下同样适用。
中国银行卡市场的低效率源自制度层面和行业自身的弱交叉网络外部性属性,就目前看来,单纯地引入竞争机制未必能带来市场绩效的显著改善。就中国银行卡市场的改革思路而言,本文建议从短期与长期两个角度综合考虑,设计“二次二重”改革的路径,在完善中国银行卡市场运行的制度基础之后,在适当的时机考虑引入适当数量的竞争性卡组织,实现产业的可持续发展。
产业组织领域的许多学者将双边市场理论进行了拓展与深化,站在巨人的肩膀上,对模型任何微小但却有实质意义的改进都可能是创新。基于此,本文的贡献包括以下四个方面：
1、运用归属曲线模型,本文从实证的角度完成了银行卡市场双边性特征检验的基础性研究工作,澄清了中国银行卡市场的本质性特征；
2、区别于双边市场的其他文献局限于对双边用户需求分别设置需求函数,本文运用Copula函数构造方法给出了一个定义良好且能够刻画中国银行卡市场双边市场特征的联合需求函数,更加切中双边市场用户需求高度依赖相互依存的关系；
3、已有理论文献在构建平台竞争模型时回避了不同类型卡组织的竞争与定价策略问题。本文考察了不同类型卡组织的竞争问题,并回归到Evans (2003)和Rochet and Tirole (2006)对双边市场性质与宗旨的原始定义,基于卡组织交易量最大化目标对平台共存的边界条件进行了界定。基于理论模型,本文运用双重差分模型实证分析了中国银行卡市场组织形式“封转开”改革的绩效；
4、本文将持卡人风险异质性与中间市场(渠道)竞争引入平台竞争模型,考察了银行卡市场风险特征与卡组织市场绩效之间的关系。银行卡发卡市场是不同风险类型的持卡人的集合,银行卡网络渠道竞争也正风起云涌,现有文献尚未将这两大重要的事实纳入研究模型。因而,持卡人风险类型与中间市场竞争的引入既弥补了现有文献忽略风险因素的不足从而更加贴近信贷市场的现实特征,又为平台竞争理论提供了更多的洞见。
From the perspective of industrial chain, the payment service of bankcard is composed of issuing sector, acquiring sector and interbank exchange service sector. Linked by interbank exchange service, issuing sector and acquiring sector evolve into issuing markets and acquiring card market. Due to the attribute of Chicken and Egg between both sub-markets, the relationship between transactional volume and price in two-sided markets dramatically changes. The transactional volume through a platform is not sensitive to price level but price structure.
Therefore, we may find that the core words in two-sided markets, i.e. network externality effect and muti-product pricing. Based on them, this thesis carries out an research on the realistic issues in China's bankcard market, with its focus on the empirical testing of two-sidedness, an estimation of the joint demand function, price structure strategies for a multi-product monopoly, platform co-existence and its frontier, access pricing between networks and the suggestions for a sustainable development in China's bankcard market. Based on mathematical deduction and empirical analysis, this thesis arrives at some significant conclusions as below.
1. China's paymentcard industry is characterized with an attribute of weak two-sided markets.
The second chapter turns to Attachment Curves Model and econometrical method and accomplishes an empirical testing on the two-sided character of China's bankcard market. The results suggest that China's paymentcard industry is characterized with a weak and one-way two-sidedness, that is, the expansion of acquiring market necessarily gives rise to a geometric increase in the user-base of cardholder, while a similar cross-network effect is not apparent in turn. The increase in the user-base of cardholder did not result in an expansion of acquiring network until recent years.
2. The joint demand function in China's paymentcard market is neither the sum nor the product of issuing market and acquiring market but a complicated Copula structure between them.
The third chapter applies Copula functions to capture the non-linear and complex relationship between marginal demands, and moreover, estimates the joint demand function in China's paymentcard industry, only to find that the t Copula function fits the relationship between issuing market and acquiring market. The joint demand function increases in the issuing market demand while it does not response sensitively to the acquiring market demand, and the profound and realistic reason lies in the distorted profit distribution system. According to our forecast, undergoing a stable growth, the joint demand function in China's payment card industry may encounter a watershed.
3. Referring to the theory of two-sided markets, the fourth chapter analyzes the pricing strategies under single-product and multi-product circumstance. It reveals that the debit cardholder fee is higher than that of credit while the merchant discount of debit is also higher than that of credit under single-product circumstance, and thus, the ratio of merchants who are willing to accept debit card is much lower that of credit card. However, the merchant discount under multi-product circumstance may be lower than the minimal level of that under single-product circumstance when the market power of merchants is weak enough.
4. Each kind of platform has it room to survive, and the winner does not necessarily take all, moreover, if the strength of cross-group network externality is relatively high or low enough, platforms could co-exist.
A two-sided market is characterized with cross-group network externality; the fifth chapter builds a two-stage game model and analyzes the effect of cross-group network externality on the competition among platforms and its performance. The theoretical model suggests that each kind of platform has it room to survive, and the winner does not necessarily take all, moreover, if the strength of cross-group network externality is relatively high or low enough, platforms could co-exist.In this sense, an inherent vulnerability can be attributed to paymentcard market. The empirical results reveal that the reason of platform co-existence in China payment card industry lies in its low enough cross-group network externality; strickingly, however, it is the one-way, asymmetric and low enough cross-group network externality that results in a reduction of performance rather than improvement since the first reform in China paymentcard industry.
5. The risk heterogeneity of cardholder and the degree of differentiation in acquiring market give birth to three niche markets for new entrants.
Issuing market is composed of cardholders with diverse risks, while acquiring market is essential to the whole transactional process. In order to consolidate the operational foundation, a payment card platform must divide and conquer both markets. This sixth chapter puts forward an incumbent-entrant model with payment or tax in acquiring market to explore the effect of risk features on positioning and pricing in issuing market for the entrant and to design the optimal incentive transfer payments in acquiring market. Results suggest that cardholder risk will exert an impressive effect on the positioning and pricing decision through risk Crowding-out channel and demand Crowding-out/in channel. The differentiation degree in acquiring market does not determine the pricing decision directly; however it does affect the pricing decision and profit level in issuing market. An entrant can still seek niche markets to obtain advantages over the incumbents as long as it is well and wisely positioned.
6. A discriminant pricing structure may stimulate the incumbent to open its network to competitiors, and an access fee affect the distribution of cardholder fee only.
Economic incentive rather than technology compatibility determines the network opening decision for an incumbent; the seventh chapter explores the pricing structure strategy for achieving an interconnection between networks. Under the circumstance of an asymmetric network scale, a discriminant pricing structure may stimulate the incumbent to open its network to competitiors, obtaining the highest price margin. Meanwhile, an access fee affect the distribution of cardholder fee between surcharging fees and transferring fees and thus zeor access fee may not a desirable policy target. As the gap of acquiring networks grows, the incumbent may raise the surcharging fee and reduce its transferring fee, while the new entrant will reduce the surcharging fee and raise its transferring fee.
As far as the reform of China's paymentcard market concerned, an introduction of competitive payment systems does not necessarily result in performance improvement; a secondary and dual reform is needed for China's payment card market to obtain further development.
Scholars in indusrial organization have been entending and deepening the theory of two-sided markets. At present, any small but significant improvement in theoretical model may result in innovative achievements. Based on this logic, there are four solid contributions in this dissertation.
Firstly, this dissertation accomplishes a fundamental research on the testing of two-sidedness, clearing the essential feature of paymentcard market.
Secondly, this dissertation breaks the confinement of literature and employes the Copula function to construct a well-defined joint demand function in paymentcard market, capturing the Chicken and Egg relationship in two-sided markets.
Thirdly, this dissertation returns to the primitive mission of payment system (Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole,2006) and defines the survival frontier for open-ended platform and closed platform, and then carries out an empirical testing on the performance of the reform since 2002 in China's paymentcard market.
Lastly, this dissertation synthesizes the risk heterogeneity of cardholder and the degree of differentiation in acquiring market into the model of platform competition, providing us with more insights on market segmenting and targeting, which is significantly different from related literature.
引文
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