电力监管理论与方法的研究
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摘要
随着电力体制改革深入,亟需建立高效的监管体系,控制改革成本和风险,提高电力工业效率。本文探索了机制设计理论及其在电力监管中的应用,深入、系统研究了电力监管主要环节的理论与监管方法。
本文首先研究了激励相容的机制设计理论及其在电力监管中的应用。分析了激励相容的机制设计的基础,提出了新的激励相容的设计准则,增强了激励相容的机制设计的可操作性,实现了公共利益和参与者利益全局最优,简化了引导参与者选择最优策略的过程,为在电力监管中全面应用激励相容奠定了基础。利用新的激励相容准则,评估了电力垂直垄断的运营模式、边际电价机制,揭示了制度影响市场成员策略与市场效率的过程;提出了符合激励相容的发电侧竞价模式的基本框架。
本文建立了发电厂市场力评估指标体系,提出了准确、客观和全面评估发电厂市场力的新方法。本文提出的方法综合考虑了网络约束、市场集中度和供需情况,可以定量评估网络约束对市场力的影响,并深刻揭示产生市场力的原因与各个节点市场力对总体市场力的影响程度,为削减市场力提供科学依据。
本文提出了基于有效竞争的评估方法,以评估发电厂是否动用了市场力。发电市场不可能是完全竞争的,不宜基于完全竞争进行评估,因此,本文提出了将有效竞争作为监管标准,将市场运营状态分别与四种有效竞争的基准状态对比,提出基准时段法、基准电厂法、基准节点法和基准市场集中度法,建立了可操作性强的基于有效竞争的评估体系,科学、准确地评估市场竞争力度。
本文系统研究了输配电监管的方法。分析了输配电企业可能采取的不合理扩大成本的行为;提出了电网规划后评估方法;提出电网建设的BOT模式,在保持电网垄断经营的基础上,在电网建设中,通过引入市场机制降低建设成本;明确了电网公平开放的内涵,即对用户、发电厂公平开放,以及互联电网之间相互公平开放,研究了其监管方法;为了有效防止调度交易中可能存在的不公平,提出了调度交易公平性评估的方法,其中包括采用偏差电量分析法、偏差电费分析法和约束条件分析法。
本文提出了比较完整的电力监管基础理论,并研究了主要环节的监管方法,对我国建立科学、高效的电力监管体系具有重要的参考价值。
As electricity industry reform deepens, it's needed to establish efficient regulation system, reduce reform costs and risk, and promote efficiency of electricity industry. In this thesis, mechanism design theory and its application in electricity surveillance are studied. The theory and methods in the main sectors of electricity regulation are also studied.
The mechanism design theory based on incentive compatibility and its applications in electricity surveillance are studied first in this thesis. The fundament of incentive compatibility is brought forward. New design criteria are established, which make incentive compatibility more practical. Furthermore, following the criteria to design mechanism, the global optimization of the benefits of participants and public can be achieved and the process that participants choose their optimal strategies can be simplified. The new criteria settle the foundation stone for the full application of incentive compatibility in electricity surveillance. Then, by applying the new criteria, the vertical monopoly mode of electricity industry and the System Margianl Price (SMP) pricing method in power pool are assessed to discover the process how mechanisms affect the market efficiency and participants’strategies. New competition mode is realized in generation market.
This thesis establishes an index system for generations’market power analysis, as well as a novel method which can precisely, subjectively and fully assesses market power. In the method, transmission constraints, market concentration and demand-supply ratio are integrated. Thus, it can quantitatively analyze the impacts of net constraints on the market power, and identify the critical reasons that result in market power and its degree. The new method can offer evidences to mitigate market power.
This thesis presents an assessment method based on workable competition to evaluate whether a generator execises its market power. It’s no impossible that electricity market is perfect competition. So, it’s irrationality to assess market powerabuse based on perfect competition. This thesis brought forward to assess market power abuse based on workable competition. By comparing the market operation status with four status benchmarks of workable competition, Four methods are brought forward, which are named as period of time benchmark method, power plant benchmark method, node benchmark method and HHI benchmark method. They have high maneuverability. They can be used to assess market power abuse truly.
The regulation of transmission and distribution enterprises is studied in this paper. The behaviors of enterprises to aggrandize costs of service are summed up. The plan ex post facto assessment methods are proposed to prevent irrational plan. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) mode is recommended in power grid investment. The BOT can introduce competition in power grid construction and keep monopoly in power grid operation. To ensure power grid open access without discrimination, the meaning of open access is classified to consumers, to plants and between inter-grid. The methods to monitor open access are brought forward. Dispatching and trading regulation methods are also studied in this thesis. Three methods are advanced, which called based output gap method, based price gap method and constraints analysis.
This paper establishes a quite complete system of electricity surveillance fundamental theories and studies the surveillance methods in the main sectors, which are of great value to building up a scientific and efficient electricity regulation system in our country.
本文首先研究了激励相容的机制设计理论及其在电力监管中的应用。分析了激励相容的机制设计的基础,提出了新的激励相容的设计准则,增强了激励相容的机制设计的可操作性,实现了公共利益和参与者利益全局最优,简化了引导参与者选择最优策略的过程,为在电力监管中全面应用激励相容奠定了基础。利用新的激励相容准则,评估了电力垂直垄断的运营模式、边际电价机制,揭示了制度影响市场成员策略与市场效率的过程;提出了符合激励相容的发电侧竞价模式的基本框架。
本文建立了发电厂市场力评估指标体系,提出了准确、客观和全面评估发电厂市场力的新方法。本文提出的方法综合考虑了网络约束、市场集中度和供需情况,可以定量评估网络约束对市场力的影响,并深刻揭示产生市场力的原因与各个节点市场力对总体市场力的影响程度,为削减市场力提供科学依据。
本文提出了基于有效竞争的评估方法,以评估发电厂是否动用了市场力。发电市场不可能是完全竞争的,不宜基于完全竞争进行评估,因此,本文提出了将有效竞争作为监管标准,将市场运营状态分别与四种有效竞争的基准状态对比,提出基准时段法、基准电厂法、基准节点法和基准市场集中度法,建立了可操作性强的基于有效竞争的评估体系,科学、准确地评估市场竞争力度。
本文系统研究了输配电监管的方法。分析了输配电企业可能采取的不合理扩大成本的行为;提出了电网规划后评估方法;提出电网建设的BOT模式,在保持电网垄断经营的基础上,在电网建设中,通过引入市场机制降低建设成本;明确了电网公平开放的内涵,即对用户、发电厂公平开放,以及互联电网之间相互公平开放,研究了其监管方法;为了有效防止调度交易中可能存在的不公平,提出了调度交易公平性评估的方法,其中包括采用偏差电量分析法、偏差电费分析法和约束条件分析法。
本文提出了比较完整的电力监管基础理论,并研究了主要环节的监管方法,对我国建立科学、高效的电力监管体系具有重要的参考价值。
As electricity industry reform deepens, it's needed to establish efficient regulation system, reduce reform costs and risk, and promote efficiency of electricity industry. In this thesis, mechanism design theory and its application in electricity surveillance are studied. The theory and methods in the main sectors of electricity regulation are also studied.
The mechanism design theory based on incentive compatibility and its applications in electricity surveillance are studied first in this thesis. The fundament of incentive compatibility is brought forward. New design criteria are established, which make incentive compatibility more practical. Furthermore, following the criteria to design mechanism, the global optimization of the benefits of participants and public can be achieved and the process that participants choose their optimal strategies can be simplified. The new criteria settle the foundation stone for the full application of incentive compatibility in electricity surveillance. Then, by applying the new criteria, the vertical monopoly mode of electricity industry and the System Margianl Price (SMP) pricing method in power pool are assessed to discover the process how mechanisms affect the market efficiency and participants’strategies. New competition mode is realized in generation market.
This thesis establishes an index system for generations’market power analysis, as well as a novel method which can precisely, subjectively and fully assesses market power. In the method, transmission constraints, market concentration and demand-supply ratio are integrated. Thus, it can quantitatively analyze the impacts of net constraints on the market power, and identify the critical reasons that result in market power and its degree. The new method can offer evidences to mitigate market power.
This thesis presents an assessment method based on workable competition to evaluate whether a generator execises its market power. It’s no impossible that electricity market is perfect competition. So, it’s irrationality to assess market powerabuse based on perfect competition. This thesis brought forward to assess market power abuse based on workable competition. By comparing the market operation status with four status benchmarks of workable competition, Four methods are brought forward, which are named as period of time benchmark method, power plant benchmark method, node benchmark method and HHI benchmark method. They have high maneuverability. They can be used to assess market power abuse truly.
The regulation of transmission and distribution enterprises is studied in this paper. The behaviors of enterprises to aggrandize costs of service are summed up. The plan ex post facto assessment methods are proposed to prevent irrational plan. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) mode is recommended in power grid investment. The BOT can introduce competition in power grid construction and keep monopoly in power grid operation. To ensure power grid open access without discrimination, the meaning of open access is classified to consumers, to plants and between inter-grid. The methods to monitor open access are brought forward. Dispatching and trading regulation methods are also studied in this thesis. Three methods are advanced, which called based output gap method, based price gap method and constraints analysis.
This paper establishes a quite complete system of electricity surveillance fundamental theories and studies the surveillance methods in the main sectors, which are of great value to building up a scientific and efficient electricity regulation system in our country.
引文
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