国有企业经营者薪酬激励研究
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摘要
经营者薪酬激励是一个具有重要理论意义和实践价值的课题。随着市场经济的发展,企业家的价值日益凸显。适应市场竞争的需要,尽快建立起一套完整科学的经营者薪酬激励体系,有效地吸引和激励经营者已成为企业赢得市场竞争优势的关键。
现代企业制度下,企业所有权和经营权的分离,不可避免的产生了所有者与经营者之间的权力冲突。企业所有者追求的是剩余索取权,而经营者追求的是自身效用的最大化。如何使企业经营者以所有者的目标为自己的经营目标,合理行使自己的权力,积极谋求企业的发展,其关键在于建立一个完善的经营者激励-约束机制。
本文以我国国有企业经营者薪酬激励问题为研究对象,通过有关薪酬激励概念的研究,分析了经营者薪酬激励问题的现实意义和理论意义,并对国内外研究状况进行了文献回顾。在分析国有企业经营者薪酬激励现状及存在问题的基础上,重点研究如何从薪酬角度激发国企经营者的积极性,充分发挥他们的创造能力,推动企业不断创新和持续成长。在完善国企经营者薪酬激励的对策上,提出了应确定合理的薪酬结构和富于竞争力的薪酬水平的思路；系统设计了国有企业经营者的整体薪酬模式,将基本薪酬与风险收益有机结合,长期激励与短期激励相结合；针对不同类型国有企业制定经营者的薪酬激励制度,改进业绩评价体系等。这些激励方式的实施,将提高国有企业经营者的积极性,促进国有资产的保值增值。
Proprietors pay incentive is a significant subject in terms of both theory and practice. With the development of market economy, value of entrepreneurs becomes increasingly prominent. To adapt to market competition, it has become the key competitive advantage for an enterprise occupying market share to timely establish a complete and scientific system of proprietor pay incentive that effectively attracts and motivates proprietors.
In modern enterprise system, separation of enterprises management power from ownership, inevitably leads to power conflicts between owners and proprietors. Corporation owners pursue residual claim right, whereas proprietors long for maximizing their effectiveness. Establishing a sound motivation and restraining mechanism to proprietors is a key means that makes proprietors take owners'objects as theirs, reasonably use power and actively seek development of enterprises.
The paper studies the issue of proprietor salary motivation of state-owned enterprises in China. It analyses the practical and theoretical significance of the issue through examining the concepts of salary motivation related, and does the review of domestic and international research statue literature. On the basis of the analysis of present situation and existing problems of proprietor salary motivation in state-owned enterprises, the paper focuses on how to stimulate the proprietors' positivity and to completely develop their creativity, promoting continuous innovation and sustainable growth. The paper brings forward the strategy of improving the motivation system. It mainly analyzes the establishment of reasonable salary structure and salary level full of competition. The system in the paper designs the integration salary pattern of state-owned enterprise proprietors which presents organic combination of basic salary and risk return and combines long-term and short-term motivation. According to different types of state-owned enterprise, the salary motivation system is established and the performance evaluation system is ameliorated. Through the effective motivation means mentioned, the enthusiasm of state-owned enterprise proprietors will be increased. Maintenance and increment of the value of state-owned assets will be promoted.
现代企业制度下,企业所有权和经营权的分离,不可避免的产生了所有者与经营者之间的权力冲突。企业所有者追求的是剩余索取权,而经营者追求的是自身效用的最大化。如何使企业经营者以所有者的目标为自己的经营目标,合理行使自己的权力,积极谋求企业的发展,其关键在于建立一个完善的经营者激励-约束机制。
本文以我国国有企业经营者薪酬激励问题为研究对象,通过有关薪酬激励概念的研究,分析了经营者薪酬激励问题的现实意义和理论意义,并对国内外研究状况进行了文献回顾。在分析国有企业经营者薪酬激励现状及存在问题的基础上,重点研究如何从薪酬角度激发国企经营者的积极性,充分发挥他们的创造能力,推动企业不断创新和持续成长。在完善国企经营者薪酬激励的对策上,提出了应确定合理的薪酬结构和富于竞争力的薪酬水平的思路；系统设计了国有企业经营者的整体薪酬模式,将基本薪酬与风险收益有机结合,长期激励与短期激励相结合；针对不同类型国有企业制定经营者的薪酬激励制度,改进业绩评价体系等。这些激励方式的实施,将提高国有企业经营者的积极性,促进国有资产的保值增值。
Proprietors pay incentive is a significant subject in terms of both theory and practice. With the development of market economy, value of entrepreneurs becomes increasingly prominent. To adapt to market competition, it has become the key competitive advantage for an enterprise occupying market share to timely establish a complete and scientific system of proprietor pay incentive that effectively attracts and motivates proprietors.
In modern enterprise system, separation of enterprises management power from ownership, inevitably leads to power conflicts between owners and proprietors. Corporation owners pursue residual claim right, whereas proprietors long for maximizing their effectiveness. Establishing a sound motivation and restraining mechanism to proprietors is a key means that makes proprietors take owners'objects as theirs, reasonably use power and actively seek development of enterprises.
The paper studies the issue of proprietor salary motivation of state-owned enterprises in China. It analyses the practical and theoretical significance of the issue through examining the concepts of salary motivation related, and does the review of domestic and international research statue literature. On the basis of the analysis of present situation and existing problems of proprietor salary motivation in state-owned enterprises, the paper focuses on how to stimulate the proprietors' positivity and to completely develop their creativity, promoting continuous innovation and sustainable growth. The paper brings forward the strategy of improving the motivation system. It mainly analyzes the establishment of reasonable salary structure and salary level full of competition. The system in the paper designs the integration salary pattern of state-owned enterprise proprietors which presents organic combination of basic salary and risk return and combines long-term and short-term motivation. According to different types of state-owned enterprise, the salary motivation system is established and the performance evaluation system is ameliorated. Through the effective motivation means mentioned, the enthusiasm of state-owned enterprise proprietors will be increased. Maintenance and increment of the value of state-owned assets will be promoted.
引文
1.安蓉泉等.国企经营者激励约束机制研究[M],北京：经济科学出版社,1999,15-19.
2.陈佳贵,杜莹芬,黄群慧等.国有企业经营者的激励与约束——理论、实证与政策[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2001,11-18.
3.[英]约翰.E.特鲁普曼.薪酬方案[M],上海：上海交通大学出版社2002,483-493.
4.[美]雷蒙德.A.诺伊,约翰·霍伦拜克,拜雷·格哈特等.人力资源管理：赢得竞争优势(第三版)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001,487-491.
5.Holmstrom,B.Managerial Icentive Problem-A Dynamic Perspective[J], Essays in Economics and Management,Hornour of Lars Wahlbeck,Helsinki,Swedish school of Economics,1982,(3):12-15.
6.Holmstrom,B.Moral Hazard in Team[J],Bell Journal of Economics,1982,(3):13-15.
7.[法]让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,8-13.
8.Bruce R. Ellig著.胡玉明主译,经理薪酬完全手册[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004,12-19.
9.张维迎.企业理论和中国企业改革[M],北京：北京大学出版社,1999.
10.武忠远.西方激励理论及其启示[J],延安教育学院学报,1999,(3)：16-19.
11.俞文钊.中国的激励理论及其模式[M],上海：华东师范大学出版社,1993,1-9.
12.张德.人力资源开发与管理[M],北京：清华大学出版社,1996,88-92.
13.王长城.薪酬构架原理与技术[M],北京：中国经济出版社,2003,81-85.
14.张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托代理关系[J],经济研究,1996,(9)：3-15.
15.黄再胜.西方企业激励理论的最新发展[J],外国经济与管理,2004,(1)：29-32.
16.GeorgeT.Milkovich,Jerry[M],Newman:Compensation,7thed,McGraw-Hill/Irwi n,2002,3-8.
17.[美]乔治.T·米尔科维奇,杰里.M·纽曼.薪酬管理(第六版)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,3-5.
18.刘爽,王巍.国企经营者薪酬激励体系设计[J],辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(4)：394-396.
19.邹丽琴,刘进才.关于我国国企经营者薪酬激励模式的研究[J],理论纵横, 2006,(3)：32-35.
20.同勤学.国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制的问题与对策[J],西安文理学院学报(社会科学版),2006,(5)：67-69.
21.赵立军.十年来我国企业薪酬制度变迁及其影响因素研究[D],北京：中国人民大学硕士学位论文,2003.
22.董克用,叶向峰.人力资源管理[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003,258-259.
23.刘昕.薪酬管理[M],北京：中国人民大学出版,2002,2-4.
24.[美]迈克尔·比尔.管理人力资本[M],北京：华夏出版社,1998,143-150.
25.田国强.经济机制设计理论与信息经济学[M],上海：上海人民出版社,1995,59-62.
26.米尔科维奇.G.薪酬管理(第六版)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,483-490.
27.张大方.对国有企业薪酬制度改革的探讨[J],商场现代化,2006,(3)：20-24.
28.蔡继明.关键是弄清非劳动生产要素的作用[J],学术月刊,2001,(10)：9-11.
29.何传启.分配革命[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2001,189-120.
30.朱善利.威茨曼分享经济理论述评[J],北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1988,(6)：18-21.
31.VroomV.H..WorkandMotivation[M], NewYork:JohnWiley &.Sons,1964,47-81.
32.李宝元.战略性激励[M],北京：经济科学出版社,2002,27-35.
33.程国平.经营者激励[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2002,39-40.
34.PorterL.W.、LawlerE.F..Managerial Attitudes and Performance[J], Homewood, Ill.:Irwin-Dorsey,1968,23-27.
35.高闯等.经理股票期权制度分析[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2003,11-45.
36.刘昕.薪酬管理[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,20-57.
37.顾建平.我国企业经营者薪酬激励制度存在的问题及对策研究[J],理论月刊,2002,(2)：21-25.
38.顾建平.知识员工薪酬激励理论与实证研究[D],北京：中国人民大学硕士学位论文,2004.
39.黄群慧,张艳丽.国有企业代理阶层的“激励空缺”问题初探[J],经济研究,1995,(8)：15-17.
40.晋自力.管理层激励：股票期权与EVA的结合[J],中国煤炭经常学院学报,2003,(1)：52-55.
41.韩德明,朱晓燕.国企经营者薪酬激励模式研究[J],湖北工学院,2004,(3)：112-114.
42.彭晓华,沈进.国有企业经营者薪酬激励的问题与对策[J],河海大学商学院,2004,(3)：38-78.
43.叶响裙.国企经理层薪酬激励效应与体系[J],新东方,2004,(5)：49-53.
44.党春霞,张蔚虹.国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究[J],经济视点,2006,(1)：24-25.
45.邵光,苏云成.国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究[J],求实,2005,(1)：97-99.
2.陈佳贵,杜莹芬,黄群慧等.国有企业经营者的激励与约束——理论、实证与政策[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2001,11-18.
3.[英]约翰.E.特鲁普曼.薪酬方案[M],上海：上海交通大学出版社2002,483-493.
4.[美]雷蒙德.A.诺伊,约翰·霍伦拜克,拜雷·格哈特等.人力资源管理：赢得竞争优势(第三版)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001,487-491.
5.Holmstrom,B.Managerial Icentive Problem-A Dynamic Perspective[J], Essays in Economics and Management,Hornour of Lars Wahlbeck,Helsinki,Swedish school of Economics,1982,(3):12-15.
6.Holmstrom,B.Moral Hazard in Team[J],Bell Journal of Economics,1982,(3):13-15.
7.[法]让-雅克·拉丰,大卫·马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,8-13.
8.Bruce R. Ellig著.胡玉明主译,经理薪酬完全手册[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004,12-19.
9.张维迎.企业理论和中国企业改革[M],北京：北京大学出版社,1999.
10.武忠远.西方激励理论及其启示[J],延安教育学院学报,1999,(3)：16-19.
11.俞文钊.中国的激励理论及其模式[M],上海：华东师范大学出版社,1993,1-9.
12.张德.人力资源开发与管理[M],北京：清华大学出版社,1996,88-92.
13.王长城.薪酬构架原理与技术[M],北京：中国经济出版社,2003,81-85.
14.张维迎.所有制、治理结构及委托代理关系[J],经济研究,1996,(9)：3-15.
15.黄再胜.西方企业激励理论的最新发展[J],外国经济与管理,2004,(1)：29-32.
16.GeorgeT.Milkovich,Jerry[M],Newman:Compensation,7thed,McGraw-Hill/Irwi n,2002,3-8.
17.[美]乔治.T·米尔科维奇,杰里.M·纽曼.薪酬管理(第六版)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,3-5.
18.刘爽,王巍.国企经营者薪酬激励体系设计[J],辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(4)：394-396.
19.邹丽琴,刘进才.关于我国国企经营者薪酬激励模式的研究[J],理论纵横, 2006,(3)：32-35.
20.同勤学.国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制的问题与对策[J],西安文理学院学报(社会科学版),2006,(5)：67-69.
21.赵立军.十年来我国企业薪酬制度变迁及其影响因素研究[D],北京：中国人民大学硕士学位论文,2003.
22.董克用,叶向峰.人力资源管理[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003,258-259.
23.刘昕.薪酬管理[M],北京：中国人民大学出版,2002,2-4.
24.[美]迈克尔·比尔.管理人力资本[M],北京：华夏出版社,1998,143-150.
25.田国强.经济机制设计理论与信息经济学[M],上海：上海人民出版社,1995,59-62.
26.米尔科维奇.G.薪酬管理(第六版)[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,483-490.
27.张大方.对国有企业薪酬制度改革的探讨[J],商场现代化,2006,(3)：20-24.
28.蔡继明.关键是弄清非劳动生产要素的作用[J],学术月刊,2001,(10)：9-11.
29.何传启.分配革命[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2001,189-120.
30.朱善利.威茨曼分享经济理论述评[J],北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1988,(6)：18-21.
31.VroomV.H..WorkandMotivation[M], NewYork:JohnWiley &.Sons,1964,47-81.
32.李宝元.战略性激励[M],北京：经济科学出版社,2002,27-35.
33.程国平.经营者激励[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2002,39-40.
34.PorterL.W.、LawlerE.F..Managerial Attitudes and Performance[J], Homewood, Ill.:Irwin-Dorsey,1968,23-27.
35.高闯等.经理股票期权制度分析[M],北京：经济管理出版社,2003,11-45.
36.刘昕.薪酬管理[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,20-57.
37.顾建平.我国企业经营者薪酬激励制度存在的问题及对策研究[J],理论月刊,2002,(2)：21-25.
38.顾建平.知识员工薪酬激励理论与实证研究[D],北京：中国人民大学硕士学位论文,2004.
39.黄群慧,张艳丽.国有企业代理阶层的“激励空缺”问题初探[J],经济研究,1995,(8)：15-17.
40.晋自力.管理层激励：股票期权与EVA的结合[J],中国煤炭经常学院学报,2003,(1)：52-55.
41.韩德明,朱晓燕.国企经营者薪酬激励模式研究[J],湖北工学院,2004,(3)：112-114.
42.彭晓华,沈进.国有企业经营者薪酬激励的问题与对策[J],河海大学商学院,2004,(3)：38-78.
43.叶响裙.国企经理层薪酬激励效应与体系[J],新东方,2004,(5)：49-53.
44.党春霞,张蔚虹.国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究[J],经济视点,2006,(1)：24-25.
45.邵光,苏云成.国有企业经营者薪酬激励机制研究[J],求实,2005,(1)：97-99.
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