共享单车平台定价策略研究

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英文篇名：A Study of Pricing Strategy on Bicycle-Sharing Platforms 作者：彭赓 ; 吕芸 ; 刘颖 英文作者：PENG Geng;LV Yun;LIU Ying;School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences; 关键词：共享单车 ; 双寡头 ; 定价策略 ; 平台竞争 ; Hotelling模型 英文关键词：bicycle-sharing platforms;;duopoly;;pricing strategy;;platform competition;;Hotelling model 中文刊名：数学的实践与认识 英文刊名：Mathematics in Practice and Theory 机构：中国科学院大学经济与管理学院; 出版日期：2019-05-23 出版单位：数学的实践与认识 年：2019 期：10 语种：中文; 页：13-23 页数：11 CN：11-2018/O1 ISSN：1000-0984 分类号：F724.6;F572

摘要

共享单车市场规模的高速增长,形成了以摩拜单车和OFO共享单车为代表的双寡头竞争局面,共享单车平台的定价策略在平台竞争过程中起了重要作用.通过构建两阶段Hotelling双寡头竞争模型,探讨双寡头在市场均衡状态下稳定的定价机制.研究表明,在阶段一以用户扩张速度最大化为目标的平台1和以利润最大化为目标的平台2为争取市场份额展开竞争,均衡情况下平台1占优的定价策略为低接入费用、高租赁费用,其条件为用户感知的平台横向差异化程度较高;平台2占优的定价策略为高接入费用、低租赁费用,其条件为用户感知的平台横向差异化程度较低.在阶段二两平台均以利润最大化为目标时,网络外部性大小、用户感知的平台横向差异化程度以及单车与用户匹配概率对两平台竞争的均衡结果均有一定的影响;平台为获取更多的市场份额和平台利润,最优的定价策略为采用高接入费用、低租赁费用,其条件为该平台单车与用户的匹配概率较高并且交易成本较低.
        The rapid growth of the bicycle-sharing market has resulted in the duopoly competition represented by Mobike and OFO. The pricing strategy of bicycle-sharing platforms plays an important role in the competition. This paper discusses the duopoly's stable pricing mechanism in the market equilibrium by constructing a two-stage Hotelling model.The results show that: in stage 1, when the platforml which aims at maximizing users' expansion speed competes with the platform2 which aims at maximizing profits, the optimal pricing strategy for platforml is low access fee and high rental fee on the condition that the degree of users' perception for platform's horizontal differentiation is higher, and the optimal pricing strategy for platform2 is high access fee and low rental fee on the condition that the degree of users' perception for platform's horizontal differentiation is lower. In stage 2, two platforms both aim at maximizing profits. The size of the network externalities, the degree of user-perceived horizontal differentiation of the platforms and the matching probability of users and bicycles have a certain impact on the equilibrium results in the process of the competition. To obtain more market shares and profits, the optimal pricing strategy for platforms is to adopt high access fee and low rental cost and the condition is that matching probability of users and bicycles is higher and the transaction cost is lower.

引文

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    1.低交易成本:max[(2+θ_2)p_2+(2+θ_1)p_1)/(θ_2),0]((1-θ_2)p_2-(1-θ_1)p_1)/(θ_2)/(θ_1)