伦理框架的建构:当前机器伦理研究面临的主要任务
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摘要
对当前机器伦理来说,一个迫在眉睫的任务就是首先需要建构一个既有利于规范人工道德主体的发展,又有助于人工道德主体创新发展的伦理框架。如果在人工道德主体和伦理道德之间缺乏一致性,由此而产生的人工道德主体就不会是真正的道德主体。为了确定这样一个人工道德主体的伦理框架,有必要从批判分析康德道德哲学入手。但是,在人工道德主体发展过程中,康德式的道德哲学分析路径最终却走向了它的反面。为此,需要超越康德式的道德哲学而去寻求其他的道德理论,以便应用于机器伦理框架的建构。
That the successful development of fully autonomous artificial moral agents(AMAs) is imminent is becoming the received view within artificial intelligence research and robotics. The discipline of machines ethics,whose mandate is to create such ethical robots,is consequently gaining momentum. Although it is often asked whether a given moral framework can be implemented into machines,it is never asked whether it should be. This paper articulates a pressing assignment for machine ethics: To identify an ethical framework that is both implementable into machines and whose tenets permit the creation of such AMAs in the first place. Without consistency between ethics and engineering,the resulting AMAs would not be genuine ethical robots,and hence the discipline of machine ethics would be a failure in this regard. Here this challenge is articulated through a critical analysis of the development of Kantian AMAs,as one of the leading contenders for being the ethic that can be implemented into machines. In the end,however,the development of Kantian artificial moral machines is found to be anti-Kantian. The upshot of all this is that machine ethicists need to look elsewhere for an ethic to implement into their machines.
That the successful development of fully autonomous artificial moral agents(AMAs) is imminent is becoming the received view within artificial intelligence research and robotics. The discipline of machines ethics,whose mandate is to create such ethical robots,is consequently gaining momentum. Although it is often asked whether a given moral framework can be implemented into machines,it is never asked whether it should be. This paper articulates a pressing assignment for machine ethics: To identify an ethical framework that is both implementable into machines and whose tenets permit the creation of such AMAs in the first place. Without consistency between ethics and engineering,the resulting AMAs would not be genuine ethical robots,and hence the discipline of machine ethics would be a failure in this regard. Here this challenge is articulated through a critical analysis of the development of Kantian AMAs,as one of the leading contenders for being the ethic that can be implemented into machines. In the end,however,the development of Kantian artificial moral machines is found to be anti-Kantian. The upshot of all this is that machine ethicists need to look elsewhere for an ethic to implement into their machines.
引文
(1)维基百科把机器伦理又称为机器道德、计算道德或计算伦理。它作为人工智能伦理的一部分,重点关注人工道德主体的道德行为。当然,国内有些学者也称之为机器人伦理。本文选择西方学术界比较公认的说法,使用“机器伦理”这一说法。
(2)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,Journal of Applied Philosophy,Vol.24,no.1(2007),p64.
(1)C.Allen,W.Wallach&I.Smi,t“Why machine ethics?”IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.12-17;C.Grau,“There is no‘I’in‘Robot’:Robots and utilitarianism”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.52-55;J.E.Nadeau,“Only androids can be ethical”,In K.Ford,C.Glymour&P.J.Hayes(Eds.),Thinking about android epistemology,MIT Press,2006,pp.241-248.
(2)T.Powers,“Prospects for a Kantian machine”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.46-51;W.Wallach,C.Allen&I.Smi,t“Machine morality:Bottom-up and top-down approaches for modelling human moral faculties”,AI&SOCIETY,Vol.22(2008),pp.565-582.
(3)M.Anderson,S.L.Anderson,“The status of machine ethics:A report from the AAAI symposium”,Minds and Machines,Vol.17(2007a),pp.1-10;M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,AI Magazine,Vol.28,no.4(2007b),pp.15-26.
(4)到目前为止,在建构机器伦理中对康德义务论进行最深刻分析的是鲍威尔,尽管鲍威尔对康德伦理学的分析仍然停留在应用的层次上,但他从未考虑过它是否真正把创造合乎伦理的人工道德主体放在第一位。
(5)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,p18.
(6)C.Allen,W.Wallach&I.Smi,t“Why machine ethics?”,p15.
(1)纳多在这方面走得更远,他甚至认为只有机器人可能是道德的,而人是不道德的。参见J.E.Nadeau,“Only androids can be ethical”,In Thinking about android epistemology,pp.241-248.
(2)C.Allen,W.Wallach&I.Smi,t“Why machine ethics?”,pp12-17;J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.18-21;W.Wallach,C.Allen&I.Smi,t“Machine morality:Bottom-up and topdown approaches for modelling human moral faculties”,pp.565-582.
(3)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“The status of machine ethics:A report from the AAAI symposium”,pp.1-10;M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,pp.15-26.
(4)J.Gips,“Towards the ethical robot”.In K.Ford,C.Glymour&P.Hayes(Eds.),Android epistemology,MIT Press,1995,pp.243-252.
(5)J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,pp.18-21.
(1)J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,p.19.
(2)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.62-77.
(3)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.63.
(4)D.G.Johnson,“Computer systems:Moral entities but not moral agents”,Ethics and Information Technology,Vol.8(2006),pp.195-204.
(5)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.62-77.
(6)S.Torrance,“Ethics and consciousness in artificial agents”,AI&SOCIETY,Vol.22,no.4(2008),pp.495-521.
(7)L.Floridi&J.W.Sanders,“On the morality of artificial agents”,Minds and Machines,Vol.14,no.3(2007),pp.349-379.
(8)D.J.Calverley,“Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person”,AI&SOCIETY,Vol.22,no.4(2008),pp.523-537.
(1)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,Trans.M.Gregor,Cambridge University Press,1996,p.141.
(2)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,P221.
(3)J.Rawls,Lectures on the history of moral philosophy,Harvard University Press,2000,pp.121-123.
(4)Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,p49,p58.
(1)O.O’Neill,Constructions of reason:Explorations of Kant’s practical philosophy,Cambridge University Press,1989,pp.89-91.
(2)在这里我们假定康德并非一个包容主义者。通过这种方式,如果一个实体的意志被决定,即使为了支持不同观点的目的,决定论者和包容主义者也建议是道德的,然而关于这些道德主体不具有自由意志的主张有增无减。值得注意的是,尽管康德认为自由意志的存在是不可证明的,但他也主张自由意志是一个真正的道德主体不可或缺的元素。
(1)这一说法确实很有争议,一些人认为可以把自由意志灌输给人工道德主体。具体参见J.McC arthy,“Free will-even for robots”,Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,Vol.12,no.3(2000),pp.341-352.
(2)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,p.148.
(3)C.Allen,G.Varner&J.Zinser,“Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent”,Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,Vol.12,no.3(2000),p.254.
(1)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,p.186.
(2)C.Allen,G.Varner&J.Zinser,“Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent”,p.251.
(3)J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,p.21.
(4)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,p.11.
(1)J.Gips,Towards the ethical robot,p.11.
(2)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.62-77.
(3)参见康德的《道德讲演录》。在其中康德区分了责任以外的英雄、该受责备的可恶和可允许的意外的自杀之间的区别。英雄的自杀代表了在世界上基于坚守道德规范而采取的自我生命的终结,尤其是在这种情况下,苟延残喘意味着会引起更加严重的道德悖论。
(1)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,pp.15-26.
(2)B.McL aren,“Computational models of ethical reasoning:Challenges,initial steps,and future directions”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.29-37.
(3)M.Guarin,i“Particularism and the classification and reclassification of moral cases”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.22-28.
(4)参见密尔的作为典型的功利者意义上的功利主义。
(5)The U.S.Army Future Combat Systems Program.www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=7122,2017年7月31日检索。
(1)R.A.Brooks,“Intelligence without representation”,Artificial Intelligence,Vol.47(1991),p.145.
(2)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,Journal of Applied Philosophy,Vol.24,no.1(2007),p64.
(1)C.Allen,W.Wallach&I.Smi,t“Why machine ethics?”IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.12-17;C.Grau,“There is no‘I’in‘Robot’:Robots and utilitarianism”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.52-55;J.E.Nadeau,“Only androids can be ethical”,In K.Ford,C.Glymour&P.J.Hayes(Eds.),Thinking about android epistemology,MIT Press,2006,pp.241-248.
(2)T.Powers,“Prospects for a Kantian machine”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.46-51;W.Wallach,C.Allen&I.Smi,t“Machine morality:Bottom-up and top-down approaches for modelling human moral faculties”,AI&SOCIETY,Vol.22(2008),pp.565-582.
(3)M.Anderson,S.L.Anderson,“The status of machine ethics:A report from the AAAI symposium”,Minds and Machines,Vol.17(2007a),pp.1-10;M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,AI Magazine,Vol.28,no.4(2007b),pp.15-26.
(4)到目前为止,在建构机器伦理中对康德义务论进行最深刻分析的是鲍威尔,尽管鲍威尔对康德伦理学的分析仍然停留在应用的层次上,但他从未考虑过它是否真正把创造合乎伦理的人工道德主体放在第一位。
(5)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,p18.
(6)C.Allen,W.Wallach&I.Smi,t“Why machine ethics?”,p15.
(1)纳多在这方面走得更远,他甚至认为只有机器人可能是道德的,而人是不道德的。参见J.E.Nadeau,“Only androids can be ethical”,In Thinking about android epistemology,pp.241-248.
(2)C.Allen,W.Wallach&I.Smi,t“Why machine ethics?”,pp12-17;J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.18-21;W.Wallach,C.Allen&I.Smi,t“Machine morality:Bottom-up and topdown approaches for modelling human moral faculties”,pp.565-582.
(3)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“The status of machine ethics:A report from the AAAI symposium”,pp.1-10;M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,pp.15-26.
(4)J.Gips,“Towards the ethical robot”.In K.Ford,C.Glymour&P.Hayes(Eds.),Android epistemology,MIT Press,1995,pp.243-252.
(5)J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,pp.18-21.
(1)J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,p.19.
(2)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.62-77.
(3)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.63.
(4)D.G.Johnson,“Computer systems:Moral entities but not moral agents”,Ethics and Information Technology,Vol.8(2006),pp.195-204.
(5)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.62-77.
(6)S.Torrance,“Ethics and consciousness in artificial agents”,AI&SOCIETY,Vol.22,no.4(2008),pp.495-521.
(7)L.Floridi&J.W.Sanders,“On the morality of artificial agents”,Minds and Machines,Vol.14,no.3(2007),pp.349-379.
(8)D.J.Calverley,“Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person”,AI&SOCIETY,Vol.22,no.4(2008),pp.523-537.
(1)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,Trans.M.Gregor,Cambridge University Press,1996,p.141.
(2)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,P221.
(3)J.Rawls,Lectures on the history of moral philosophy,Harvard University Press,2000,pp.121-123.
(4)Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals,p49,p58.
(1)O.O’Neill,Constructions of reason:Explorations of Kant’s practical philosophy,Cambridge University Press,1989,pp.89-91.
(2)在这里我们假定康德并非一个包容主义者。通过这种方式,如果一个实体的意志被决定,即使为了支持不同观点的目的,决定论者和包容主义者也建议是道德的,然而关于这些道德主体不具有自由意志的主张有增无减。值得注意的是,尽管康德认为自由意志的存在是不可证明的,但他也主张自由意志是一个真正的道德主体不可或缺的元素。
(1)这一说法确实很有争议,一些人认为可以把自由意志灌输给人工道德主体。具体参见J.McC arthy,“Free will-even for robots”,Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,Vol.12,no.3(2000),pp.341-352.
(2)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,p.148.
(3)C.Allen,G.Varner&J.Zinser,“Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent”,Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,Vol.12,no.3(2000),p.254.
(1)I.Kant,The metaphysics of morals,p.186.
(2)C.Allen,G.Varner&J.Zinser,“Prolegomena to any future artificial moral agent”,p.251.
(3)J.H.Moor,“The nature,importance,and difficulty of machine ethics”,p.21.
(4)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,p.11.
(1)J.Gips,Towards the ethical robot,p.11.
(2)R.Sparrow,“Killer robots”,pp.62-77.
(3)参见康德的《道德讲演录》。在其中康德区分了责任以外的英雄、该受责备的可恶和可允许的意外的自杀之间的区别。英雄的自杀代表了在世界上基于坚守道德规范而采取的自我生命的终结,尤其是在这种情况下,苟延残喘意味着会引起更加严重的道德悖论。
(1)M.Anderson&S.L.Anderson,“Machine ethics:Creating an ethical intelligent agent”,pp.15-26.
(2)B.McL aren,“Computational models of ethical reasoning:Challenges,initial steps,and future directions”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.29-37.
(3)M.Guarin,i“Particularism and the classification and reclassification of moral cases”,IEEE Intelligent Systems,Vol.21,no.4(2006),pp.22-28.
(4)参见密尔的作为典型的功利者意义上的功利主义。
(5)The U.S.Army Future Combat Systems Program.www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=7122,2017年7月31日检索。
(1)R.A.Brooks,“Intelligence without representation”,Artificial Intelligence,Vol.47(1991),p.145.
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