水库群-河道水沙分配动态博弈模型理论框架
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摘要
与传统的定量分析方法和最优化方法相比,博弈论能较好地模拟不同方面的冲突,并将问题的许多特性囊括在模型当中,在缺乏数据信息的情况下也能获得模型可能的解。通过对相关文献的梳理和归纳,从博弈论在水资源配置模型中应用模式的分类、博弈论在水资源配置模型中的应用思路及水库群-河道水沙分配动态博弈概念模型的构建等3个方面,对水库群-河道水沙分配动态博弈模型理论框架进行了探讨,指出现阶段利用博弈论解决水资源冲突等方面存在的不足主要包括:①利用博弈论系统梳理总结并构建水资源冲突协调机制理论体系;②综合考虑水沙资源特性,基于博弈论构建不同用水户水沙资源动态分配模型。
Compared with those traditional quantitative-analyzing methods and optimization methods, game theory can better simulate different aspects of conflicts and include many features of the problem in the model. In the absence of data information, the possible solutions of model can also be obtained through game theory. Through literature analysis, this paper set up a theoretical framework of dynamic game-theory model for water and sediment allocation, which included three parts: the categories of applying modes, the applying technology roadmap, the dynamic game-theory model for water and sediment allocation between cascade reservoirs and lower channel. In addition, some deficiencies were proposed, mainly including: a) the construction of theoretical framework of water conflict coordination mechanism and; b) the construction of dynamic allocation model of water and sediment resources between different users, considering the characteristics of water and sediment resources comprehensively based on game theory.
Compared with those traditional quantitative-analyzing methods and optimization methods, game theory can better simulate different aspects of conflicts and include many features of the problem in the model. In the absence of data information, the possible solutions of model can also be obtained through game theory. Through literature analysis, this paper set up a theoretical framework of dynamic game-theory model for water and sediment allocation, which included three parts: the categories of applying modes, the applying technology roadmap, the dynamic game-theory model for water and sediment allocation between cascade reservoirs and lower channel. In addition, some deficiencies were proposed, mainly including: a) the construction of theoretical framework of water conflict coordination mechanism and; b) the construction of dynamic allocation model of water and sediment resources between different users, considering the characteristics of water and sediment resources comprehensively based on game theory.
引文
[1] MADANI K.Game Theory and Water Resources[J].Journal of Hydrology,2010,381(3-4):225-238.
[2] MORGENSTERN O,VON NEUMANN J.Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M].New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1953:1-741.
[3] NASH J.Non-Cooperative Games[J].Annals of Mathematics (Second Series),1951,54(2):286-295.
[4] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,2004:1-364.
[5] SCHMEIDLER D.The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game[J].Siam Journal on Applied Mathematics,1969,17(6):1163-1170.
[6] SHAPLEY L S.A Value for N-Person Games[J].Annals of Mathematical Studies,1953,28:307-317.
[7] HEANEY J P.Methods for Apportioning the Cost of a Water Resource Project[J].Water Resources Research,1982,18(3):476-482.
[8] STRAFFIN P D,HEANEY J P .Game Theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority[J].International Journal of Game Theory,1981,10(1):35-43.
[9] TISDELL J,HARRISON S.Estimating an Optimal Distribution of Water Entitlements[J].Water Resources Research,1992,28(12):3111-3117.
[10] WANG L,FANG L ,HIPEL K W.Basin-Wide Cooperative Water Resources Allocation[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,190(3):798-817.
[11] 曾勇.跨界水冲突博弈分析[J].水利学报,2011,42(2):204-210.
[12] ADAMS A G,RAUSSER B G,SIMON B L.Modelling Multilateral Negotiations:An Application to California Water Policy[J].Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,1996,30(1):97-111.
[13] 孔珂,解建仓,岳新利,等.水市场的博弈分析[J].水利学报,2005,36(4):491-495.
[14] 彭祥,胡和平.黄河水资源配置博弈均衡模型[J].水利学报,2006,37(10):1199-1205.
[15] ROGERS P.A Game Theory Approach to the Problems of International River Basins[J].Water Resources Research,1969,5(4):749-760.
[16] 刘文强,孙永广,顾树华,等.水资源分配冲突的博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,22(1):16-25.
[17] 赵海镜,胡春宏,陈绪坚.流域水沙资源优化配置研究综述[J].水利学报,2012,43(5):520-528.
[2] MORGENSTERN O,VON NEUMANN J.Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M].New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1953:1-741.
[3] NASH J.Non-Cooperative Games[J].Annals of Mathematics (Second Series),1951,54(2):286-295.
[4] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,2004:1-364.
[5] SCHMEIDLER D.The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game[J].Siam Journal on Applied Mathematics,1969,17(6):1163-1170.
[6] SHAPLEY L S.A Value for N-Person Games[J].Annals of Mathematical Studies,1953,28:307-317.
[7] HEANEY J P.Methods for Apportioning the Cost of a Water Resource Project[J].Water Resources Research,1982,18(3):476-482.
[8] STRAFFIN P D,HEANEY J P .Game Theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority[J].International Journal of Game Theory,1981,10(1):35-43.
[9] TISDELL J,HARRISON S.Estimating an Optimal Distribution of Water Entitlements[J].Water Resources Research,1992,28(12):3111-3117.
[10] WANG L,FANG L ,HIPEL K W.Basin-Wide Cooperative Water Resources Allocation[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,190(3):798-817.
[11] 曾勇.跨界水冲突博弈分析[J].水利学报,2011,42(2):204-210.
[12] ADAMS A G,RAUSSER B G,SIMON B L.Modelling Multilateral Negotiations:An Application to California Water Policy[J].Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,1996,30(1):97-111.
[13] 孔珂,解建仓,岳新利,等.水市场的博弈分析[J].水利学报,2005,36(4):491-495.
[14] 彭祥,胡和平.黄河水资源配置博弈均衡模型[J].水利学报,2006,37(10):1199-1205.
[15] ROGERS P.A Game Theory Approach to the Problems of International River Basins[J].Water Resources Research,1969,5(4):749-760.
[16] 刘文强,孙永广,顾树华,等.水资源分配冲突的博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,22(1):16-25.
[17] 赵海镜,胡春宏,陈绪坚.流域水沙资源优化配置研究综述[J].水利学报,2012,43(5):520-528.
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