地方官员本地化对土地出让方式选择的影响研究——以江苏省为例
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摘要
地方官员在土地出让方式的选择上有主导性影响。本文首先界定了官员本地化的内涵特征,并理论分析了官员本地化对土地出让方式选择的影响,然后构建计量经济模型,采用1999-2013年江苏13个地级市的面板数据进行实证检验。结果显示,官员本地化的特征对其选择土地出让方式的偏好影响显著。首先,本市籍贯的官员更倾向于以协议方式供地;其次,官员任期与协议供地规模存在倒U型关系,随着官员任期延长,协议出让规模呈先增后减的变化规律;再次,本市晋升的官员更倾向于以招拍挂方式出让土地:第四,相对于市长而言,市委书记的本地化程度越高,其对土地出让方式的影响更为强烈。论文最后就如何消除官员本地化对土地出让方式的影响提出了相关政策建议。
Since local officials have played a dominant role in the selection of land conveyance pattern,studying the effects of their localization features on urban land conveyance has important theoretical and practical meanings.The characteristics of officials' localization was firstly defined in this paper,followed by a theoretical analysis on its impact.On the basis of a panel data covering detailed information of Jiangsu from 1999 to 2013,we constructed and adopted an econometric model to investigate the impact empirically.As revealed from the result,the features of officials' localization have a significant impact on the selection of land conveyance pattern.Firstly,officials who were born and work locally are more likely to choose negotiation pattern.Secondly,there is an inverted U shape relationship between officials tenure and transfer scale of land by negotiation pattern.Thirdly,officials from primary branches of the same city prefer to transfer land trough bidding and auction pattern.Fourthly,the Party Secretary was found to have stronger influence on the selection of land conveyance pattern than the Mayor.At last,this study proposed some policy suggestions in order to eliminate the effects of officials' localization on urban land conveyance.
Since local officials have played a dominant role in the selection of land conveyance pattern,studying the effects of their localization features on urban land conveyance has important theoretical and practical meanings.The characteristics of officials' localization was firstly defined in this paper,followed by a theoretical analysis on its impact.On the basis of a panel data covering detailed information of Jiangsu from 1999 to 2013,we constructed and adopted an econometric model to investigate the impact empirically.As revealed from the result,the features of officials' localization have a significant impact on the selection of land conveyance pattern.Firstly,officials who were born and work locally are more likely to choose negotiation pattern.Secondly,there is an inverted U shape relationship between officials tenure and transfer scale of land by negotiation pattern.Thirdly,officials from primary branches of the same city prefer to transfer land trough bidding and auction pattern.Fourthly,the Party Secretary was found to have stronger influence on the selection of land conveyance pattern than the Mayor.At last,this study proposed some policy suggestions in order to eliminate the effects of officials' localization on urban land conveyance.
引文
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[23]黄贤金,陈志刚,於冉,等.20世纪80年代以来中国土地出让制度的绩效分析及对策建议[J].现代城市研究,2013(9):15-21,26.
[24]Koroso N H.Molen P V D.Tuladhar A M.et al.Does the Chinese Market for Urban Land Use Rights Meet Good Governance Principles[J].Land Use Policy.2013(30):417-426.
[25]Wong K K.Zhao X B.The Influence of Bureaucratic Behavior on Land Apportionment in China:the Informal Process[J].Environment and Planning C:Government and Policy.1999(17):113-126.
[26]李洋宇,严金明,夏方舟.产业结构视角下土地财政与经济增长关系及其调控机制研究:基于系统GMM方法的动态面板数据分析[J].土地经济研究,2014(2):1-26.
[27]Tao R,Su F B,Liu M X,et al.Land Leasing and Local Public Finance in China's Regional Development:Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities[J].Urban Studies.2010,47(10):2217-2236.
[28]Cai H B.Henderson J V.Zhang Q H.China's Land Market Auctions:Evidence of Corruption?[J].Journal of Economics.2013.44(3):488-521.
[29]傅利平,李永辉.地方政府官员晋升竞争、个人特征对城市扩张的影响:基于全国地级市面板数据的实证分析[J].城市问题,2015(1):27-32,40.
[30]郭峰,古月军.官员任期、政绩压力和城市房价:基于中国35个大中城市的经验研究[J].经济管理,2014(4):9-18.
[31]Li L H.The Political Economy of the Privatisation of the Land Market in Shanghai[J].Urban Studies,1997.34(2):321-335.
[2]曲福田.等.中国工业化、城镇化进程中的农村土地问题研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2010.
[3]Xu J.Yeh A,Wu F L.Land Commodification:New Land Development and Politics in China since the Late 1990s[J].International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,2009,33(4):890-913.
[4]Zhang Q,Wallace J,Deng X Z,et al.Central Versus Local States:Which Matters More in Affecting China's Urban Growth?[J].Land Use Policy,2014(38):487-496.
[5]杨其静.企业成长:政治关联还是能力建设?[J].经济研究,2011(10):54-66,94.
[6]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长:来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007(11):91-103.
[7]张莉,高元骅,徐现祥.政企含谋下的土地出让[J].管理世界,2013(12):43-51,62.
[8]李俊丽.城市土地出让中的地方政府经济行为研究[0].成都:西南财经大学,2005.
[9]龚丽贞.我国土地出让收人增长的影响因素与地区差异[J].经济与管理研究,2011(9):15-23.
[10]张莉,王贤彬,徐现祥.财政激励、晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为[J].中国工业经济,2011(4):35-43.
[11]李学文,卢新海.经济增长背景下的土地财政与土地出让行为分析[J].中国土地科学,2012,26(8):42-47.
[12]Yang Z,Ren R R,Liu H Y,et al.Land Leasing and Local Government Behavior in China:Evidence from Beijing[J].Urban Studies,2015.52(5):841-856.
[13]王小斌,邵燕斐.中国地方政府土地出让影响因素的理论与实证研究[J].北京社会科学,2014(9):30-39.
[14]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7):36-50.
[15]周黎安,陶婧.官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例[J].金融研究,2011(3):15-26.
[16]陶然,苏福兵,陆曦,等.经济增长能够带来晋升吗:对晋升锦标竞赛理论的逻辑挑战与省级实证重估[J].管理世界,2010(12):13-26.
[17]Su F B.Tao R,Lu X,et al.Local Officials'Incentives and China's Economic Growth:Tournament Thesis Reexamined and Alternative Explanatory Framework[J].China&World Economy.2012.20(4):1-18.
[18]王贤彬,徐现祥.地方官员晋升竞争与经济增长[J].经济科学,2010(6):42-58.
[19]张尔升.地方官员的专业禀赋与经济增长:以中国省委书记、省长的面板数据为例[J].制度经济学研究,2012(1):72-86.
[20]刘佳,吴建南,马亮.地方政府官员晋升与土地财政:基于中国地市级面板数据的实证分忻[J].公共管理学报,2012,9(2):11-23,122-123.
[21]陈绪群,赵立群.试论实行领导干部交流制制度的理论依据[J].党建研究,1996(3):31-33.
[22]陈刚,李树.官员交流、任期与反腐败[J].世界经济,2012(2):120-142.
[23]黄贤金,陈志刚,於冉,等.20世纪80年代以来中国土地出让制度的绩效分析及对策建议[J].现代城市研究,2013(9):15-21,26.
[24]Koroso N H.Molen P V D.Tuladhar A M.et al.Does the Chinese Market for Urban Land Use Rights Meet Good Governance Principles[J].Land Use Policy.2013(30):417-426.
[25]Wong K K.Zhao X B.The Influence of Bureaucratic Behavior on Land Apportionment in China:the Informal Process[J].Environment and Planning C:Government and Policy.1999(17):113-126.
[26]李洋宇,严金明,夏方舟.产业结构视角下土地财政与经济增长关系及其调控机制研究:基于系统GMM方法的动态面板数据分析[J].土地经济研究,2014(2):1-26.
[27]Tao R,Su F B,Liu M X,et al.Land Leasing and Local Public Finance in China's Regional Development:Evidence from Prefecture-level Cities[J].Urban Studies.2010,47(10):2217-2236.
[28]Cai H B.Henderson J V.Zhang Q H.China's Land Market Auctions:Evidence of Corruption?[J].Journal of Economics.2013.44(3):488-521.
[29]傅利平,李永辉.地方政府官员晋升竞争、个人特征对城市扩张的影响:基于全国地级市面板数据的实证分析[J].城市问题,2015(1):27-32,40.
[30]郭峰,古月军.官员任期、政绩压力和城市房价:基于中国35个大中城市的经验研究[J].经济管理,2014(4):9-18.
[31]Li L H.The Political Economy of the Privatisation of the Land Market in Shanghai[J].Urban Studies,1997.34(2):321-335.
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