Why judges always vote
详细信息 查看全文
- 作者：Tonja Jacobi ; Eugene Kontorovich ; kontorovich@law.northwestern.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：K40
- 刊名：International Review of Law and Economics
- 出版年：2015
- 出版时间：August 2015
- 年：2015
- 卷：43
- 期：Complete
- 页码：190-199
- 全文大小：982 K
文摘
- •
Unlike legislators and regulators, Supreme Court justices never abstain from votes.
- •
Spatial competition models can help explain how judicial institutions discourage abstention.
- •
The doctrine of stare decisis helps explain full participation.
- •
The Marks doctrine helps explain full participation.