Does institutional shareholder activism stimulate corporate information flow?

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• 作者：Andrew K. Prevost^b ; Udomsak Wongchoti^a ; ^{J.wongchoti@massey.ac.nz" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Ben R. Marshall^a
• 关键词：Shareholder activism ; Stock price informativeness ; Labor unions
• 刊名：Journal of Banking & Finance
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：September 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：70
• 期：Complete
• 页码：105-117
• 全文大小：552 K

文摘

Activist shareholders have an incentive to communicate and cooperate with other major shareholders. However, the impact of their activity on information flow surrounding targeted firms is largely unknown. We explore this aspect using a prolific proponent: labor unions. Following the mailing of proxies containing union-sponsored shareholder proposals, trading volume increases significantly and at-issue bond yield spreads of targeted firms are lower compared to matched firms. Subsequent difference-in-differences analyses show that stock prices of targeted firms become more informative as a result of activism, affirming the intuition that activism results in a reduction of differential information between outside investors.