Social loafing vs. social enhancement: Public goods provisioning in real-time with irrevocable commitments
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- 作者：Goren ; Harel ; Kurzban ; Robert ; Rapoport ; Amnon
- 关键词：Binary public goods ; Binary contributions ; Equilibrium analysis ; Real-time protocol of play
- 刊名：Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- 出版年：2003
- 出版时间：March, 2003
- 年：2003
- 卷：90
- 期：2
- 页码：277-290
- 全文大小：376 K
文摘
Whereas most experimental studies of public goods provisioning require that all players make their decisions simultaneously, in most organizational settings contribution decisions are made in real time. To account for this aspect of the decision process, we introduce a real-time protocol of play in which, at any point in time, players can either withhold or contribute their entire endowment to a step-level public good. Once contributed, the individual endowments—that in the present experiment differ from one group member to another—cannot be withdrawn. Our results show that contribution levels under the real-time protocol with irrevocable commitments significantly exceed those observed in previous studies under the more common simultaneous protocol of play, thereby considerably reducing social loafing (free riding). Consistent with our equilibrium analysis, over multiple iterations of the game play converges to an equilibrium set of players who maximize the sum of their individual benefit-to-contribution ratios.