Early or late conflict settlement in a variety of games – An experimental study

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• 作者：Anderhub ; Vital ; Gü ; th ; Werner ; Marchand ; Nadè ; ge
• 关键词：2340 ; C70 ; C90 ; Negotiation ; Ultimatum power ; Nonmonotonic pie
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Psychology
• 出版年：2004
• 出版时间：April, 2004
• 年：2004
• 卷：25
• 期：2
• 页码：177-194
• 全文大小：316 K

文摘

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how “the pie” changes over time, and whether the proposer in an early round has ultimatum power. We experimentally study eight such games. Each game is once repeated before being followed by the next one which defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness and efficiency.