Securing property rights: A dilemma experiment in Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States
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- 作者：T.K. Ahna ; tkahn@snu.ac.kr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Loukas Balafoutasb ; Loukas.Balafoutas@uibk.ac.at" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Mongoljin Batsaikhanc ; mb1712@georgetown.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Francisco Campos-Ortizd ; francisco.camposortiz@prudential.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Louis Puttermane ; Louis_Putterman@Brown.Edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Matthias Sutterf ; matthias.sutter@uni-koeln.de" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Property rights ; Institutions ; Theft ; Efficiency ; Experiment ; Social dilemma ; Trust ; Norms
- 刊名：Journal of Public Economics
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：November 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：143
- 期：Complete
- 页码：115-124
- 全文大小：406 K
文摘
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Experimental subjects divide endowments between production, theft, and protection.
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In two treatments, endowments can be allocated to a collective protection activity.
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In one of these, groups vote on whether to fund collective protection by taxation.
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Achieved efficiency varies significantly among subjects in different countries.
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Efficiency is higher in countries where trust and quality of governance are higher.