Bargaining framework for competitive green supply chains under governmental financial intervention

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• 作者：Jiuh-Biing Sheu^a ; ^{jbsheu@mail.nctu.edu.tw"" rel=""nofollow}
• 关键词：Green supply chain cooperation ; Bilateral negotiation ; Nash bargaining game ; Government’ ; s financial instruments
• 刊名：Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
• 出版年：2011
• 出版时间：September 2011
• 年：2011
• 卷：47
• 期：5
• 页码：573-592
• 全文大小：606 K

文摘

This work investigates the problem of negotiations between producers and reverse-logistics (RL) suppliers for cooperative agreements under government intervention. Utilizing the asymmetrical Nash bargaining game with uncertainties, this work seeks equilibrium negotiation solutions to player agendas. Analytical results indicate that financial intervention by a government generates a significant effect on the relative bargaining power of green supply chain members in negotiations. Over intervention by a government may result in adverse effects on chain members’ profits and social welfare. Furthermore, a bargaining framework underlying the duopoly–oligopoly context may contribute to a negotiation outcome most profitable for green supply chain members.