Interest (mis)alignments in representative negotiations: Do pro-social agents fuel or reduce inter-group conflict?

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• 作者：Hillie Aaldering ; ^{H.Aaldering@uva.nl} ; Lindred L. Greer ; Gerben A. Van Kleef ; Carsten K.W. De Dreu
• 关键词：Personality ; Cooperation ; Competition ; Altruism ; Principal agent theory ; Social value orientation
• 刊名：Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：March, 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：120
• 期：2
• 页码：240-250
• 全文大小：374 K

文摘

In representative negotiations, interests of the representative and the represented constituency are not always aligned. We investigated how interest (mis)alignment and representative¡¯s social value orientation influence representative negotiations. Past theory and research on the principal-agent problem, social value orientation, and cooperation in social dilemmas offer different perspectives, which we examined in two experiments. Experiment 1 revealed that both representatives with a pro-social and a pro-self value orientation were reluctant to accommodate the negotiation adversary at a cost to themselves and their constituency, while pro-social representatives were more willing to sacrifice self-interest to benefit constituency and adversary combined. Experiment 2 replicated this finding, and clarified that pro-social representatives were more willing to self-sacrifice when this served their constituency only than when it indirectly served the adversary too. Such parochial altruism demonstrates the discriminatory nature of pro-socials¡¯ cooperation and reveals the potential dark side of a pro-social orientation in constructive intergroup negotiations.