Raising rivals’ cost in multi-unit auctions

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• 作者：Maarten Janssen^a ; ^{maarten.janssen@univie.ac.at} ; Vladimir Karamychev^b ; ^{Karamychev@ese.eur.nl}
• 关键词：Combinatorial auctions ; Telecom markets ; Spiteful biding ; Raising rivals&rsquo ; costs
• 刊名：International Journal of Industrial Organization
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：50
• 期：Complete
• 页码：473-490
• 全文大小：514 K
• 卷排序：50

文摘

We study whether SAAs and CCAs generate prices that reflect bidders’ opportunity costs. When bidders have preferences to raise rivals’ cost, CCAs may fail to generate market-oriented prices. Even when a CCA ends with excess supply, it may fail to generate market-oriented prices.