Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case

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• 作者：Mustafa Oğuz Afacan ; ^{mafacan@sabanciuniv.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Umutcan Salman ^{umutcansalman@sabanciuniv.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：C70 ; D61
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：April 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：141
• 期：Complete
• 页码：95-97
• 全文大小：324 K

文摘

We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism cdddd19fc21d1cee94d" title="Click to view the MathML source">(BM)$\left(BM\right)$ is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quota-based affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM$BM$. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM$BM$ equilibrium outcomes.