Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games

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• 作者：Eran Simhon^a ; ^{simhon@bu.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Yezekael Hayel^b ; ^c ; David Starobinski^a ; Quanyan Zhu^c
• 关键词：Queueing games ; Partial information system ; Revenue optimization
• 刊名：Operations Research Letters
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：44
• 期：1
• 页码：109-113
• 全文大小：574 K

文摘

Information about queue length is an important parameter for customers who face the decision whether to join a queue or not. In this paper, we study how optimal information disclosure policies can be used by a service provider of an class="mathmlsrc">class="formulatext stixSupport mathImg" data-mathURL="/science?_ob=MathURL&_method=retrieve&_eid=1-s2.0-S0167637715001649&_mathId=si12.gif&_user=111111111&_pii=S0167637715001649&_rdoc=1&_issn=01676377&md5=e60dab67628a5089be7d333cbdb7d0ba" title="Click to view the MathML source">M/M/1class="mathContainer hidden">class="mathCode">$M/M/1$ queue to increase its revenue. Our main contribution is showing that the intuitive policy of informing customers about the current queue length when it is short and hiding this information when it is long is never optimal.