A partial credit guarantee contract in a capital-constrained supply chain: Financing equilibrium and coordinating strategy

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• 作者：Nina Yan^a ; ^{yannina@cufe.edu.cn" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Baowen Sun^b ; Hui Zhang^c ; Chongqing Liu^a
• 关键词：Supply chain finance ; Credit guarantee ; Stackelberg game ; Coordination
• 刊名：International Journal of Production Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：173
• 期：Complete
• 页码：122-133
• 全文大小：1258 K

文摘

In this study, we first design a supply chain finance (SCF) system comprising a capital-constrained retailer, a manufacturer, and a commercial bank, and formulate a bilevel Stackelberg game model in which the bank acts as a leader. Second, we design a partial credit guarantee (PCG) contract for SCF, incorporating the bank credit financing (BCF) and manufacturer׳s trade credit guarantee, to analyze its equilibrium financing strategies. Third, we explore the interdependencies between the operational and financial decisions and analyze the coordination conditions for the PCG contract. Fourth, we perform a comparative analysis of the optimal strategies among the various financing scenarios, including a traditional supply chain without capital constraint and SCF without credit guarantee as well as one with full credit guarantee, to examine the impact of the credit guarantee coefficient. Finally, we perform a numerical sensitivity analysis in terms of the manufacturer׳s guarantee coefficient and the retailer׳s initial capital, and verify the manufacturer׳s willingness to provide PCG for SCF. The findings of this study reveal that based on a suitable guarantee coefficient, the PCG contract may realize profit maximization and channel coordination in the SCF system as well as achieve the super-coordination effect.