Target revaluation after failed takeover attempts: Cash versus stock

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Ulrike Malmendier^a ; ^b ; ^{ulrike@econ.berkeley.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Marcus M. Opp^b ; ^{mopp@haas.berkeley.edu" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Farzad Saidi^c ; ^{f.saidi@jbs.cam.ac.uk" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：G14 ; G34 ; D03 ; D82
• 刊名：Journal of Financial Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：January 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：119
• 期：1
• 页码：92-106
• 全文大小：675 K

文摘

Cash- and stock-financed takeover bids induce strikingly different target revaluations. We exploit detailed data on unsuccessful takeover bids between 1980 and 2008, and we show that targets of cash offers are revalued on average by +15% after deal failure, whereas stock targets return to their pre-announcement levels. The differences in revaluation do not revert over longer horizons. We find no evidence that future takeover activities or operational changes explain these differences. While the targets of failed cash and stock offers are both more likely to be acquired over the following eight years than matched control firms, no differences exist between cash and stock targets, either in the timing or in the value of future offers. Similarly, we cannot detect differential operational policies following the failed bid. Our results are most consistent with cash bids revealing prior undervaluation of the target. We reconcile our findings with the opposite conclusion in earlier literature (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1983) by identifying a look-ahead bias built into their sample construction.