Capital market consequences of managers' voluntary disclosure styles

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• 作者：Holly I. Yang ^{hollyy@wharton.upenn.edu}
• 关键词：M41
• 刊名：Journal of Accounting and Economics
• 出版年：2012
• 出版时间：February-April 2012
• 年：2012
• 卷：53
• 期：1-2
• 页码：167-184
• 全文大小：267 K

文摘

This paper studies the capital market consequences of managers establishing an individual forecasting style. Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset, I examine whether and when manager-specific credibility matters. If managers' forecasting styles affect their perceived credibility, then the stock price reaction to forecast news should increase with managers' prior forecasting accuracy. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the stock price reaction to management forecast news is stronger when information uncertainty is high and when the manager has a history of issuing more accurate forecasts, indicating that individual managers benefit from establishing a personal disclosure reputation.