Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in an M/M/1 queue with dynamic service control
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- 作者：Y. Dimitrakopoulosa ; dimigiannhs@aueb.gr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; A.N. Burnetas ; b ; aburnetas@math.uoa.gr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; aburnetas@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Queueing ; Customer equilibrium strategies ; Dynamic service control ; Positive externalities ; Price of anarchy
- 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：16 July 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：252
- 期：2
- 页码：477-486
- 全文大小：670 K
文摘
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We model a queue with dynamic service rate and strategic customers.
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The system exhibits a mixed Avoid/Follow the Crowd behavior.
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There are between one and three symmetric equilibium join/balk strategies.
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Both negative and positive externalities are present.