Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints

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• 作者：Yuichiro Kamada^a ; ¹ ; ^{y.cam.24@gmail.com} ; Fuhito Kojima^b ; ¹ ; ^{fkojima@stanford.edu}
• 关键词：C70 ; D47 ; D61 ; D63
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：March 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：168
• 期：Complete
• 页码：107-142
• 全文大小：552 K
• 卷排序：168

文摘

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. To guide market designers faced with constraints, we propose new stability concepts. A matching is strongly stable if satisfying blocking pairs inevitably violates a constraint. We show that a strongly stable matching may not exist, and that existence is guaranteed if and only if all distributional constraints are trivial. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a more permissive concept, weak stability. We demonstrate a weakly stable matching always exists, implies efficiency, and is characterized by standard normative axioms. These results are obtained in a more general environment than those in existing studies, accommodating a wide variety of applications.