Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks

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• 作者：Christophe Bravard^a ; ^b ; ^{christophe.bravard@univ-grenoble-alpes.fr} ; Liza Charroin^c ; ^{charroin@gate.cnrs.fr} ; Corinne Touati^d ; ^{corinne.touati@inria.fr}
• 关键词：Attacks on links ; Network defense ; Network design
• 刊名：Journal of Mathematical Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：68
• 期：Complete
• 页码：62-79
• 全文大小：736 K
• 卷排序：68

文摘

A two-player game with a Designer and an Adversary is studied. The Designer designs and defends the network to protect it from an intelligent attack on links. She can use non-protected or protected links, i.e. links that cannot be removed by an attack. The objective of the Adversary is to isolate a part of the network by attacking kk links. In equilibrium, the Designer either builds a minimal 1-link-connected network which contains only protected links, or a minimal (k+1)(k+1)-link-connected network which contains only non-protected links, or a network which contains one protected link and (n−1)(k+1)/2(n−1)(k+1)/2 non-protected links. If the number of protected links available for the Designer is bounded, then there exists an equilibrium network which contains several protected and non-protected links.