Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market
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- 作者：Ahmed Barkaouia ; b ; Arnaud Z. Dragicevica ; b ; c ; arnaud.dragicevic@agroparistech.fr" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：C78 ; D21 ; D86 ; L33 ; L73
- 刊名：Forest Policy and Economics
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：August 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：69
- 期：Complete
- 页码：90-100
- 全文大小：1433 K
文摘
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A timber and log public supplier and a lumber manufacturer negotiate a roundwood log supply contract.
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While the lumber manufacturer is a profit-maximizing agent, the timber and log public supplier can be either public-interest-oriented or profit-maximizing.
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The unique equilibrium log supply contract only involves the price negotiation.
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The supplier's public interest and the manufacturer's bargaining power work as strategic substitutes.
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The renegotiation reveals a memory effect over the quantities issued from bargaining.