Taxation of nuclear rents: Benefits, drawbacks, and alternatives
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- 作者：J. Morbee ; 1 ; research@jorismorbee.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; P. Himpens1 ; pieterhimpens@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; S. Proost1 ; stef.proost@kuleuven.be" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：H25 ; L12 ; Q41 ; Q48
- 刊名：Energy Economics
- 出版年：2015
- 出版时间：September 2015
- 年：2015
- 卷：51
- 期：Complete
- 页码：622-632
- 全文大小：859 K
文摘
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Taxation of nuclear rents is studied using a dominant firm–competitive fringe model.
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The optimal tax can be large in the short run, but possibly negative in the long run.
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When a government cannot credibly commit, the tax harms investment incentives.
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Other policies like auctioning of nuclear franchises can be more efficient than taxes.
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The analytical results are numerically illustrated for the case of Belgium.