Electricity retail contracting under risk-aversion
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- 作者：Anthony Downward ; a ; a.downward@auckland.ac.nz" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; David Youngb ; Golbon Zakeria
- 关键词：OR in energy ; Game theory ; Risk-aversion ; Retail pricing ; Electricity
- 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：16 June 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：251
- 期：3
- 页码：846-859
- 全文大小：770 K
文摘
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We develop a model of retail competition wherein the retailers are risk-averse.
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Entry into the retail market is endogenously determined within the model.
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We apply this model to a generation asset transfer policy from the NZEM.