Asymmetric relationships with symmetric suppliers: Strategic choice of supply chain price leadership in a competitive market
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文摘
We investigate a supply chain member's incentive for supply chain price leadership. We analyze a game-theoretic model composed of two manufacturers and one retailer. We allow retailer's vertical relationships to vary across symmetric suppliers. The retailer may prefer the absence of a supply chain price leader to being a leader.

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