• 作者：Carlos Fern&#225 ; ndez Mé ; ndez ; ^{cfernan@uniovi.es} ; Rubé ; n Arrondo Garcí ; a ; Enrique Fern&#225 ; ndez Rodrí ; guez
• 关键词：G30 ; G32
• 刊名：Cuadernos de Econom¨ªa y Direcci¨®n de la Empresa
• 出版年：2012
• 出版时间：January-March, 2012
• 年：2012
• 卷：15
• 期：1
• 页码：33-41
• 全文大小：323 K

This article examines the influence of Remuneration and Nomination Committees (RNCs) on the design of remuneration policies applied to executive board members of Spanish listed firms. We analyze whether the degree of the RNCs?independence or relevance affects the remuneration received by executive board members. Contrary to the expected results, our study suggests that both the independence and relevance of RNCs -the latter being proxied by its members?ownership stake and its relative size in comparison with the board- increase executive remuneration. Additionally, the firm's size, risk and the existence of investment opportunities are identified as determinants of the remuneration received by executive board members.