An evolutionary analysis of low-carbon strategies based on the government-enterprise game in the complex network context
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- 作者：Bin Wu ; 101007032@seu.edu.cn" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Pengfei Liu ; Xuefei Xu
- 关键词：Complex network context ; Government&ndash ; enterprise game ; Low-carbon ; Evolutionary
- 刊名：Journal of Cleaner Production
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：10 January 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：141
- 期：Complete
- 页码：168-179
- 全文大小：2510 K
文摘
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A government-enterprise evolutionary game on low-carbon strategy in the complex network context is proposed.
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Diffusions of low-carbon strategy are affected by government incentives and accelerated by network externalities.
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Number of enterprises following effective low-carbon strategy is determined by their speed of adjusting expectations.
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When enterprises attach great importance to government incentives, they will adopt a more effective strategy.