How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?

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• 作者：Jun Tanimoto ^{juntanimoto@gmail.com}
• 关键词：Network reciprocity ; Prisoner's dilemma ; Evolutionary game
• 刊名：Applied Mathematics and Computation
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：15 May 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：301
• 期：Complete
• 页码：36-42
• 全文大小：916 K
• 卷排序：301

文摘

In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.