The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation
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- 作者：Florens Focke ; Ernst Maug ; Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi ; niessen@bwl.uni-mannheim.de
- 关键词：CEO compensation ; Firm prestige ; Social status ; Career benefits
- 刊名：Journal of Financial Economics
- 出版年：2017
- 出版时间：February 2017
- 年：2017
- 卷：123
- 期：2
- 页码：313-336
- 全文大小：1325 K
- 卷排序：123
文摘
We show that chief executive officers (CEOs) of prestigious firms earn less. Total compensation is on average 8% lower for firms listed in Fortune’s ranking of America’s most admired companies. We suggest that CEOs are willing to trade off status and career benefits from working for a publicly admired company against additional monetary compensation. Our identification strategy is based on matched sample analyses, difference-in-differences regressions, and a regression discontinuity design. We perform several robustness checks and exclude many alternative explanations, including that firm prestige just proxies for better corporate governance or for increased exposure of the pay-setting process to media attention.