A cooperative game-theoretic framework for negotiating marine spatial allocation agreements among heterogeneous players

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• 作者：Zacharoula Kyriazi^a ; ^c ; ^{zacharoula.kyriazi@ugent.be} ; Raul Lejano^b ; Frank Maes^c ; Steven Degraer^d
• 关键词：Marine spatial allocation ; Cooperative game-theoretic solutions ; Shapley value ; Transferable utility ; Non-transferable utility
• 刊名：Journal of Environmental Management
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：1 February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：187
• 期：Complete
• 页码：444-455
• 全文大小：1288 K
• 卷排序：187

文摘

In case of heterogeneous spatial conflicting claims, cooperative solutions ensure the fairest allocation possible. Spatial coexistence may reduce the area that fulfils the coalitional objectives, resulting in distorted core boundaries. NTU solutions are able to address players’ heterogeneity, demonstrating the importance of the monetary valuation of an area. NTU solutions favour the weaker player and hence these solutions could be more socially acceptable than the TU.