Why household inefficiency? An experimental approach to assess spousal resource distribution preferences in a subsistence population undergoing socioeconomic change

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• 作者：Jonathan Stieglitz^a ; ^b ; ^{jonathan.stieglitz@iast.fr} ; Michael Gurven^c ; Hillard Kaplan^b ; Astrid Hopfensitz^d
• 关键词：Intra-household distribution ; Sexual division of labor ; Family ; Marriage ; Bargaining ; Tsimane
• 刊名：Evolution and Human Behavior
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：38
• 期：1
• 页码：71-81
• 全文大小：651 K
• 卷排序：38

文摘

Two disparate views of the sexual division of labour have dominated the representation of intra-household resource allocations. These joint and separate interests views differ in their interpretation of the relative roles of men and women, and make different predictions about the extent to which marriage promotes economic efficiency (i.e. maximized household production). Using an experimental “distribution task” stipulating a trade-off between household efficiency and spousal equality in allocating surpluses of meat and money, we examine factors influencing spousal distribution preferences among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia (n = 53 couples). Our primary goal is to understand whether and how access to perfectly fungible and liquid resources – which increases with greater participation in market economies – shifts intra-household distribution preferences. We hypothesize that greater fungibility of money compared to meat results in greater squandering of money for individual fitness gain at a cost to the family. Money therefore requires costly strategies to insure against a partner's claims for consumption. Whereas nearly all Tsimane spouses prefer efficient meat distributions, we find a substantially reduced efficiency preference for money compared to meat controlling for potential confounders (adjusted OR = 0.087, 95% CI: 0.02–0.38). Reported marital conflict over paternal disinvestment is associated with a nearly 13-fold increase in odds of revealing a selfish money distribution preference. Selfish husbands are significantly more likely than other husbands to be paired with selfish wives. Lastly, Tsimane husbands and wives are more likely than Western Europeans to prefer an efficient money distribution, but Tsimane wives are more likely than Western European wives to exhibit a selfish preference. In sum, preferences for the distribution of household production surplus support joint and separate interests views of marriage; a hybrid approach best explains how ecological-, family-, and individual-level factors influence spousal preferences through their effects on perceptions of marginal gains within and outside the household.