Participation in moral hazard problems
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- 作者：Guillaume Roger1 ; guillaume.roger72@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：D82 ; D86
- 刊名：Games and Economic Behavior
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：January 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：95
- 期：Complete
- 页码：10-24
- 全文大小：454 K
文摘
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Agent outside option unknown to contracting principals competing for a sole agent.
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Trade-off for principals between stronger incentives and more likely participation.
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Stronger principal competition increases rents and reduces incentives.
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Rent and effort are non-monotonic in transport cost.