The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game
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- 作者：Hassan Benchekrouna ; hassan.benchekroun@mcgill.ca" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author ; Guiomar Martí ; n-Herrá ; n ; b ; c ; guiomar@eco.uva.es" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author
- 关键词：Myopia ; Differential games ; Transboundary pollution
- 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
- 出版年：2016
- 出版时间：16 May 2016
- 年：2016
- 卷：251
- 期：1
- 页码：300-309
- 全文大小：476 K
文摘
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Transboundary pollution game where some players adopt a myopic environmental policy.
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Farsightedness may not benefit the country that acquires it.
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The acquisition of foresight by one player may increase short-run global emissions.
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Incentive mechanisms can play a role in inducing a country to adopt farsightedness.