The paradoxes of permission an action based solution

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• 作者：Dov Gabbay^a ; ^b ; ^c ; ^{dov.gabbay@kcl.ac.uk" class="auth_mail} ; Loï ; c Gammaitoni^d ; ^{loic.gammaitoni@uni.lu" class="auth_mail} ; Xin Sun^c ; ^{xin.sun@uni.lu" class="auth_mail}
• 关键词：Deontic logic permission ; Actions ; Contrary to duty obligations
• 刊名：Journal of Applied Logic
• 出版年：June 2014
• 年：2014
• 卷：12
• 期：2
• 页码：179-191
• 全文大小：308 K

文摘

The aim of this article is to construct a deontic logic in which the free choice postulate allow (Ross, 1941) [11] would be consistent and all the implausible result mentioned in (Hanson, in press) [5] will be blocked. To achieve this we first developed a new theory of action. Then we build a new deontic logic in which the deontic action operator and the deontic proposition operator are explicitly distinguished.