Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

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• 作者：David Rowell^a ; ^{d.rowell@uq.edu.au} ; Son Hong Nghiem^b ; ^{son.nghiem@qut.edu.au} ; Luke B. Connelly^a ; ^c ; ^{l.connelly@uq.edu.au}
• 关键词：C1 ; D8
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：150
• 期：Complete
• 页码：4-5
• 全文大小：325 K
• 卷排序：150

文摘

A proposed test for ex ante moral hazard in automobile insurance is evaluated. The co-existence of moral hazard and familial correlation can produce ambiguous results. Parent’s bonus malus is likely, an element of the insurer’s information set, for the adult child. The proposed test fails the technical requirements of a natural experiment.